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1. Study Background 
 
A few years after the commercialisation of the Internet, it became clear to 
businesses that the challenge for the coming years would be to win the trust of the 
consumers. First, consumers need to trust the Internet in general as a new means of 
communication. Second, consumers need to trust e-commerce as a new way of transferring 
ownership or rights to use goods or services by making transactions through a computer-
mediated network. Third, consumers need to trust the business practices of a specific 
company which sells goods or provides services online in order to choose and thus do 
business with that specific company instead of preferring to deal with another one out of an 
almost unlimited number of options available online.1 
Speaking about trust is comparable to speaking about love: one can talk for hours 
without reaching any definite conclusion. Trust is a feeling, so it is really difficult to 
measure and to identify all the factors that affect it.2 However, as with love, there are some 
basic rules which, if followed, can at least increase the chances to enhance trust. These 
rules vary and transform together with the development of society. Nowadays, security and 
privacy seem to be at the top of the list of consumers’ concerns in online transactions.3 If 
                                                 
∗ All the websites quoted in this book were last visited on 11 september 2008. 
1 Improving the security of the electronic transactions, in particular in e-commerce, and increasing 
consumers’ trust and confidence in them have a high priority on the political agenda of the European Union. 
See “i2010 – A European Information Society for growth and employment”. Available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/index_en.htm>. 
2 See Cross F. (2005) Law and Trust, George Town Law Journal 93 (5), p. 1461 “While we have a 
generalized understanding of the concept of trust, it is not readily amenable to clear definition. (...) Research 
has at least implicitly accepted a definition of trust as a belief, attitude, or explanation concerning the 
likelihood that the actions or outcomes of another individual, group or organisation will be acceptable (...) or 
will serve the actor’s interests.” 
3 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Working Party on Indicators for the 
Information Society (2005) Scoping Study for the Measurement of Trust in the Online Environment, 
DSTI/ICCP/IIS(2005)1/FINAL. Available at <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/15/35792806.pdf>; Organisation 
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there is concern, trust is unlikely to develop. Therefore, if online companies want to gain 
consumers’ trust, they have to start by presenting the consumers with trustworthy security 
measures and a trustworthy privacy policy. 
Starting from the late 1990s in the US and a few years later also in Europe, a 
potential solution to the need for trust of e-consumers and e-merchants has been offered by 
a sort of quality certification system provided by Trustmark Organisations (henceforth: 
TMOs). “Certification is a procedure by which a third party gives a written assurance that a 
product, process or service conforms to specific characteristics.”4 TMOs – also defined as 
Trusted Third Parties (henceforth: TTPs),5 or parties that can be trusted and relied on – are, 
in a nutshell, organisations which present themselves as independent parties (third parties) 
and provide trustmarks (a label or visual representation indicating that a product, process or 
service conforms to specific quality characteristics) to online merchants (henceforth: e-
merchants).6 
Security, privacy, and more generally business practice7 are the fields in which 
trustmarks are very popular. In fact, a TMO will issue a trustmark to an e-merchant that has 
demonstrated its conformity to the policy standards of the TMO regarding security, 
privacy, and business practice. The e-merchant hopes that by displaying the trustmark on 
its website, e-consumers will less likely question the integrity of that e-merchant in relation 
to security, privacy, and business practice. Thus, the consumer will be more likely to 
divulge his personal data to and transact with that e-merchant, i.e., to conduct online 
business. 
                                                                                                                                                    
for Economic Co-operation and Development - Working Party on Indicators for the Information Society 
(2008) Measuring Security and Trust in the Online Environment: A View Using Official Data 
DSTI/ICCP/IIS(2007)4/FINAL, p. 8. Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/18/40009578.pdf>; 
Eurobarometer (2004) Issues Relating to Business and Consumer e-Commerce, European Commission, p. 5; 
the executive summary is available at <europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/topics/btoc_ecomm.pdf>; 
Eurobarometer (2003) Data Protection, European Commission, p. 44. Available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_196_data_protection.pdf>. 
4 Rae, A. et al. (1995) Software Evaluation for Certification. Principles, Practice and Legal Liability 
(London: McGraw Hill Book Company) p. 2. For more information on the importance of certification for e-
commerce and the related legal issues, see Brun, M. B. (2001). Nature et impacts juridiques de la 
certification dans le commerce électronique sur Internet, Lex Elettronica 7 n. 1, été 2001. Centre de 
recherche en droit public, Université de Montréal.  Available online at <http://www.lex-
electronica.org/articles/v7-1/Brun.htm>. 
5 Froomkin, M. (1996) The Essential Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 
Oregon Law Review 75, p. 49. Available at <http://osaka.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/trusted.htm>. See 
also Duthler, A.W. (1998) Met recht een TTP! Een onderzoek naar juridische modellen voor een Trusted 
Third Party (Deventer: Kluwer). 
6 See more on TMOs and their practice in Chapter 2. 
7 Business practice is a term which has a very broad meaning and embraces various e-merchant practices, 
e.g., security, privacy, marketing, information. 
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In summary, TMOs are independent organisations which try to promote online trust 
by offering a system of certification.  
So far so good. Now let us take a close look at the trustmark system and how it 
works in reality. Such system is generally based on cooperation between TMOs and e-
merchants that ask for the trustmark. More precisely, the e-merchant should check its 
security, privacy or business practice and then provide a self-assessment with the 
understanding and expectation that the TMO may rely on the statement contained therein 
for the purposes of determining whether the e-merchant’s practice complies with the TMO 
standards.8 However, when the cooperation between TMOs and e-merchants does not 
work, the trustmark system shows its weaknesses. In fact, TMOs have already proven to be 
not as trustworthy as they seem to be. There have been cases in which e-consumers’ data 
were kept, shared, or sold by e-merchants without obtaining the data subjects’ prior consent 
and without the knowledge of the TMO which issued the trustmarks to such e-merchants. 
The trustmark was on the e-merchants’ website at the time the violations occurred and 
remained there after the wrongful act was discovered.9 Therefore, it may become 
dangerous to trust the trustmarks. The chances of undetected e-merchant practices that are 
not in compliance with the TMOs’ programmes are high, and malpractice can cause 
damage to e-consumers. As it will be further explained in Section 2, the damage can range 
from violation of e-consumer’s privacy and data protection right10 to pure economic loss. 
The pictured scenario raises the following question, which is of evident practical 
relevance: 
 
“What can e-consumers do in order to recover the damage suffered from relying on 
a trustmark?” 
 
In order to elaborate the answer to such question, the legal relationships between the 
players of the certification system offered by TMOs need to be spelled out first. 
Accordingly, there is a contractual relationship between TMOs and their clients (e-
merchants). A contract may usually occur also between the certified e-companies and their 
                                                 
8 See more extensively on TMO practice in Chapter 3, Section 5. 
9 See Chapter 2, Section 6.  
10 Generally recognised in all Europe through the implementation of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31. 
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clients (e-consumers). However, there seems to be a tortious relationship between TMOs 
and e-consumers that rely on the certificates, although a contractual relationship cannot be 













Table 1: Legal relationships 
 
 
In order to recover the damage, e-consumers may sue the e-merchant for breach of a 
contractual obligation or, in tort, for wilful act or breach of their duty of care (i.e., 
negligence liability). However, it will not always be that easy. De-materialisation of 
personal identities and internationalisation,11 two inner features of online communications, 
can make it very difficult for an e-consumer to actually identify and localise an e-merchant. 
Practically anybody, under false identity, and from any place in the world, can register a 
domain name, set up a commercial website overnight, and start selling goods or offering 
services worldwide through the Internet. Moreover, as it is very easy and quick for an e-
merchant to set up a website, it is also easy and quick to shut it down and disappear without 
leaving any trace. This will decrease the chance for an e-consumer to enforce his rights 
against malicious or negligent e-merchants. It has to be pointed out that the players of the 
pictured scenario will most likely be small e-merchants, as opposed to big ones (i.e., 
companies which regularly offer their products and services online). Trustmarks, as a 
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means to gain credibility, are much more appealing to small e-merchants than to big ones, 
as the latter very often already have a consolidated reputation and clientele.  
Given the described setting, theoretically, it would be easier for e-consumers to seek 
redress directly from the TMO who issued the trustmark to the e-merchant than from the e-
merchant itself. First, the TMO should be easier to localise. Its contact details should be 
clearly stated in the website. Second, it should have more money to satisfy the e-
consumers’ request for compensation – as TMOs should generally be better capitalised 
than the small e-merchants that they certify. E-consumers may sue the TMO for the 
provision of inaccurate information on the e-merchant’s practices. The TMO, on its side, 
could then seek redress from the e-merchant whose identity and location should be known 
to the TMO because of the certification procedure they had been through. 
The relevant question here is whether the TMO may be held liable by aggrieved e-
consumers.  
None of the hard12 and soft laws13 applicable to TMOs sets forth specific rules on 
TMO liability. Apparently, governments have so far opted for a non-intervention policy in 
the trustmark sector. Moreover, there is (almost) no literature on the liability of TMOs. 
More generally, “[l]iterature has discussed issues such as privacy law, intellectual property 
regimes, licenses for selling drugs and medicines and finally, regulation on commercial 
                                                 
12 E.g., Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practice in the internal market and amending Council Directive 
84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/C and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair commercial 
Practices Directive’), OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22; Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in the Internal Market 
(Directive on electronic commerce), OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p.1; Directive 97/7/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of consumers in respect of distance 
contracts, OJ L 144 , 4.6.1997, p. 19; Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p.31. 
13 E.g., European Trustmark Requirements (ETR). Available at <http://www.quatro-
project.org/files/file/unice-beuc/eConfidence.pdf>. The UNICE - BEUC e-Confidence project establishes 
European trustmark requirements (ETR) aiming to provide a high standard of consumer protection in 
electronic commerce and encourage the sale of goods and services on the Internet. The ETR offer a basis for 
good online practice. They do not seek to override or replace any mandatory provisions at European level. 
They are supplementary to legal obligations and do not affect consumers’ statutory rights. BEUC, the 
European Consumers’ Organisation, is the Brussels-based federation of independent national consumer 
organisations from all the Member States of the EU and from other European countries. See 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/e-commerce/e-conf_working_doc.pdf>; Principles for e-
Commerce Codes of Conduct - Second Draft (The E-Confidence Initiative Working Documents); Global 
Business Dialogue on e-Commerce Recommendations. 
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communications and advertisements. None of these regulations, however, offer direct 
protection against damages caused by reliance on information.”14 
The absence of specific liability rules for online service providers, such as TMOs, 
does not come as a surprise. The Internet has created many new services and the legislator 
has not regulated all of them, sometimes to leave room for self-regulation, other times 
because it is difficult or simply because regulation needs time and money. However, this 
does not mean that there is no liability for ‘unregulated’ online service providers and, in the 
present case, for TMOs. If there is no specific regulation, the general principles of tort and 
contract law will be applicable. In fact, the main instrument for protection against damages 
caused by reliance on inaccurate information is civil liability.15 Moreover, the principle of 
analogy can be applied in order to use the rules set forth for offline and online professionals 
which are comparable to TMOs.16 However, TMOs usually tend to limit or even exclude 
their liability towards both e-merchants and third parties through contractual provisions.17 
 
2. Research questions 
 
Given the scenario described above, it is possible to sketch what a typical TMO 
third-party liability case may look like (henceforth: the typical TMO third-party liability 
case). 
An e-consumer, relying on a security-, privacy- or business practice-trustmark 
placed on an e-merchant website, decides to interact with such e-merchant. The e-consumer 
purchases, for example, goods from the e-merchant website or subscribes to an e-
merchant’s online service. To complete the transaction, the e-consumer provides the 
personal data the e-merchant asks for (e.g., his name, surname, date of birth, phone 
number, address, e-mail address, interests, purchase preferences), together with the relevant 
payment details (e.g., credit card number, bank details).  
In fact: 
a) the e-consumer does not receive the good or the service he has paid for;  
                                                 
14 Schellekens, M. & Prins, C. (2006) Unreliable Information on the Internet: A Challenging Dilemma for the 
Law, Information, Communications and Ethics in Society 4 (1), p. 51. 
15 See Id. 
16 See Subsection 3.1. 
17 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.5. 
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b) without the e-consumer’s prior consent, his personal data are processed by the e-
merchant for purposes other than the fulfilment of the relevant contractual obligations (e.g., 
used for profiling- and marketing-related purposes, shared or sold to third parties) and 
eventually the e-consumer starts to receive unsolicited marketing e-mails and phone calls 
by the e-merchant and/or by third parties; and 
c) e-consumer’s payment details are used directly by the e-merchant to defraud the 
e-consumer; shared or sold by the e-merchant to third parties who ultimately defraud the e-
consumer; or stolen during the transaction or from the e-merchant’s client database by a 
cunning third party who takes advantage of the poor security of the e-merchant’s IT 
infrastructure. 
 In any or all of the circumstances indicated in items a, b, and c above, he will suffer 
damage. The damage can range from violation of the e-consumer’s privacy and data 
protection right18 to pure economic loss. 
 For the reason mentioned in the previous section, it may be difficult to recover the 
damage from the e-merchant. Hence, it is relevant to check whether the e-consumer may 
recover the damage directly from the TMO that issued the trustmark to the e-merchant and 
on what legal basis. 
From the ‘typical TMO third-party liability case’ originates the following legal 
question: 
 
a) “What is TMO third-party liability in Europe?” More precisely: “Are TMOs 
liable towards e-consumers who detrimentally rely on inaccurate trustmarks and suffer 
loss?” From a different perspective: “Do e-consumers have a cause of action to recover 
the damages they incurred by relying on inaccurate trustmarks directly from TMOs? If they 
do, what will be the legal basis?” 
 
Moreover, given the TMO’s role in e-commerce and the related trustmark 
potentialities, it will be interesting to evaluate the present liability system by answering the 
question: 
 
                                                 
18 Generally recognised in all Europe through the implementation of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31. 
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 b) “Is the present TMO third-party liability system in Europe adequate?”19 
 
Eventually, if the TMO third-party liability system in Europe proves to be 
inadequate, it will be logical to bring the matter one step further and to provide an answer 
to the question: 
 
 c) “What will an adequate TMO third-party liability system be?” 
 




The study starts off by reviewing the major issues that e-consumers face in e-
commerce and demonstrating how trustmarks can – theoretically – serve e-consumers’ 
primary need for reliable information and, at the same time, offer benefits to e-merchants 
and governments. However, also with the support of a case study, it is provisionally 
concluded that, both in US and in Europe, the present TMO practice is generally not 
trustworthy. Instead of contributing to enhancing e-consumer’s, trust in e-commerce, this 
may actually represent a risk to e-consumers, e-merchants and governments and eventually 
undermine the growth of e-commerce (Chapter 2). 
This provisional conclusion is confirmed by an in-depth analysis of four TMOs 
based in the US and five TMOs based in Europe. Although the present study is about 
European TMO practice, American TMOs are dealt with for mainly three reasons. First, 
because they have influenced European TMO practice very significantly. Second, because 
some of them offer their services also in Europe. Third, because the whole trustmark 
phenomenon was started by the four selected TMOs in the US. Hence, the analysis of their 
practice is needed in order to have a better and broader understanding of the matter. The 
selection criteria differ between American and European TMOs. The US market is 
dominated by the four selected TMOs. Therefore, they are a representative sample of the 
                                                 
19 The adequacy of the third-party liability system will be assessed considering TMO practice, its impact on e-
consumers, e-merchants, governments, as well as on the same TMOs, and the deterring role that liability 
should have – it being one of the first legal guards against undesirable societal behaviour. See Section 3 and 
Chapter 9, Section 4. 
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US practice. The European market, however, consists of many small players. None of them 
has reached critical mass. Moreover, it is usually not so easy to find much information on 
their practice. The five TMOs are thus chosen because they made enough information 
available on their websites to carry out an accurate analysis. As to the analysis criteria of 
the selected TMOs’ practice, first, the certification process is defined; second, the 
necessary conditions for a trustworthy certification practice are isolated; and third, the 
practice of the nine benchmarked TMOs is evaluated against the necessary conditions for a 
trustworthy certification practice (Chapter 3). 
 
3.1 Comparative legal analysis 
 
Having explained what TMOs are, the service they provide, and the current state of 
the art of their practice, the comparative analysis of their third-party liability will take place 
(Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7). 
 
Choice of the legal systems to compare 
The fundamental questions that this study aims to answer are related to Europe.20 
Therefore, following a classical method of private comparative law, the English, the 
German, and the French legal systems will be analysed to obtain insights on the most 
representative legal systems in Europe. In fact, according to the theory of ‘legal families’, 
which try to bring back the vast number of legal systems into few large groups (the ‘legal 
families’), the Romanistic legal family is well represented by the French legal system, the 
Germanic by the German one, and the Anglo-American by the English legal system.21 
However, because the trustmark phenomenon started in the US and there it is more 
expanded than that in Europe, as a matter of completeness, the American legal system will 
also be analysed. In this way, the reader will have a better understanding of the legal issues 
related to trustmarks. Furthermore, as already pointed out, there are a number of well-
established American TMOs which also operate in Europe, bringing along their own terms 
and conditions for the services they offer in the old continent and influencing European 
                                                 
20 See Section 2. 
21 Zweigert, K. & Kötz (1998) An Introduction to Comparative Law (New York: Oxford University Press), 
pp. 63ff. 
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TMOs’ legal practice.22 Last but not least, since the second and the third research questions 
are evaluative in nature,23 knowledge of a non-European system will allow for more 
powerful conclusions and serve as an additional source of inspiration. 
 
Choice of TMO offline equivalents 
Given that in the analysed legal systems there are no specific rules on TMO 
liability, following the principle of ‘what applies offline should also apply online’,24 which 
has been generally used to fill the legislative gaps on online matters, offline professionals 
comparable to TMOs are identified in surveyors, auditors, and accountants. More precisely, 
following the principle of functionality,25 trustmarks are seen as information on somebody 
or something to be relied upon by others. Accordingly, TMOs are seen as professionals 
who provide information on their clients, or their clients’ practice, to be relied upon by 
third parties (e.g., e-consumers). Surveyors, auditors and accountants may also be seen as 
professionals who provide information on somebody or something to be relied upon by 
others. (The comparison amongst TMOs, surveyors, and auditors/accountants is further 




    TMOs   Surveyors Auditors/Accounts 
Independent and trustworthy info Trustmarks  Valuations Reports 
On the quality of goods or  Security, privacy, and Real estate Accounts 
practice    business practices 
To be relied upon by third parties E-consumers  Purchasers Shareholders/investors 
 
                                                 
22 See Chapter 3, Sections 4 and 5. 
23 See Section 2. 
24 See, e.g., Schellekens, M. (2006) What Holds Off-Line, also Holds On-Line? in Koops, B. J. et al. (eds.) 
Starting Point for ICT Regulation (The Hague: T M C Asser Press), pp. 51-76; Koops, B. J. et al. (2000) 
ICT Law and Internationalisation. A Survey of Government Views. Law and Electronic Commerce Vol. 10 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International). 
25 The principle of functionality is the basic methodological principle of all comparative law analysis. 
“Incomparables cannot usefully be compared, and in law the only things which are comparable are those 
which fulfil the same function.” Zweigert, K. & Kötz (1998), p. 34. For further information on the principle 
of functionality, see also Id., pp. 34 s. and 44; Ralf, M. (2006) The Functional Method of Comparative Law, 
in Reimann, M. et al. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, pp. 339-382 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
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Table 2   Table of comparison 
 
 
The third-party liability regime of surveryors, auditors, and accountants will be 
studied through the analysis of the relevant provisions and case law. Moreover, its 
applicability by analogy to TMOs and the related effects on TMO third-party liability will 
be investigated. However, it has to be pointed out that the analysis of significant cases 
which do not concern surveyors, auditors, and accountants but are nevertheless related to 
third-party liability for the provision of information will sometimes be allowed in order to 
have a broader and more complete view of the issue at stake. 
One could ask why surveyors, auditors, and accountants are preferred to certifiers as 
offline professionals comparable to TMOs. There are two main reasons for this choice. 
First, certifiers are actually a species of the broader genus of the auditors, as in practice 
certifiers carry out auditing activities.26 Therefore, the choice has been to study the issue 
from a broader perspective.27 Second, instead of focusing on offline certifiers, the study 
deals with online certifier third-party liability, which is more relevant to the present 
analysis. Given the implementation in Europe of Article 6 of the Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community Framework for 
Electronic Signatures (99/93/EC),28 which sets forth a third-party liability clause for 
Certification Service Providers (henceforth: CSPs) – professionals who, for the services 
they provide, are comparable by analogy to TMOs – the effects of the application by 
analogy of such provisions to TMOs are dealt with in the analysis of the European legal 
systems.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
26 See Chapter 3, Subsection 2.2. 
27 Moreover, it has to be noticed that certifier third-party liability has been generally denied in Europe. Only 
contracting party can enforce damage payment related to losses suffered relying on the certificates. See e.g., 
Jahn, G. et al. (2005) The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool, Journal of 
Consumer Policy 28, p. 64. 
28 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community 
Framework for Electronic Signatures (99/93/EC) (OJ L 13, 19 January 2000, p. 12). 
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Possible application by analogy of Certification Service Providers liability rules to 
TMOs 
According to Article 2 (11) of the Electronic Signatures Directive, a CSP is “an entity 
or a legal or natural person who issues certificates or provides other services related to 
electronic signatures.” CSPs are TTPs29 that offer mainly three services: authentication, 
time-stamping, and certification management. First, the authentication service consists of 
linking the signatory (“a person who holds signature creation device and acts either on his 
own behalf or on behalf of the person he represents”30) to his digital signature. In practice, 
the exchange of digital certificates (provided by CSPs), through an automatic ‘digital 
handshake’ between computers, provides assurance that the parties are who they say they 
are and helps assess whether the service provided and the goods or services delivered are 
genuine. Second, time stamping means to create a notation that indicates the correct date 
and time of an action. Through the time-stamping service, CSPs guarantee the time at 
which an electronic document was digitally signed. Third, CSPs offer certification 
management services. In fact, for a number for reasons, the certificate may lose its 
trustworthiness or become unreliable31 and the CSP (at the signatory’s request or even 
without the signatory’s consent, depending on the circumstances) may suspend 
(temporarily interrupt the operational period) or revoke (permanently invalidate) the 
certificate. Immediately upon suspending or revoking a certificate, the CSP is expected to 
publish a notice of the revocation or suspension or notify persons who have enquired or are 
known to have received a digital signature verifiable by reference to the unreliable 
certificate. 
Courts could compare TMOs with CSPs because they are two species of the broader 
genus of TTPs. Moreover, CSPs fit the definition given in Section 3 of the TMOs’ 
equivalent. CSPs are professionals that provide information on somebody (i.e., the identity 
of the signatory) or something (i.e., the time at which an electronic document was digitally 
signed and the validity of the certificate) to be relied upon by others (third parties who are 
recipients of digitally signed messages). 
                                                 
29 On Trusted Third Parties, see Section 1. For more information on CSPs as Trusted Third Parties, see 
Froomkin, A. M. (1996), pp. 49 et seq.  
30 Article 2 (3) of the Electronic Signatures Directive. 
31 E.g., in a situation where the signatory misrepresents its identity to the CSP. In other circumstances, a 
certificate may be reliable enough when issued, but sometime thereafter, it may become unreliable (e.g., the 
private key is compromised through loss of control of it by the signatory). 
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The third-party liability of CSPs has been set out in Article 632 of the Electronic 
Signatures Directive.33 The implementation of this provision in the English, German, and 
French legal systems and its potential impact on TMO third-party liability will thus be 
analysed. 
 
3.2 Model of adequate third-party liability for TMOs 
 
 On the basis of the results of the comparative analysis, it is concluded that, in 
theory, there seems to be enough legal ground in Europe to enforce TMO third-party 
liability towards e-consumers who rely on trustmarks and consequently suffer loss. 
However, in practice, the chances that TMOs will not be held liable accountable to e-
consumers for the provision of inaccurate trustmarks are way bigger than the chances that 
TMOs will be held liable. Furthermore, considering TMO practice, the impact it has on e-
consumers, e-merchants, governments, as well as on the same TMOs, and the deterring role 
that liability should have, being one of the first legal guards against undesirable societal 
                                                 
32 Article 6. Liability. 1. As a minimum, Member States shall ensure that by issuing a certificate as a qualified 
certificate to the public or by guaranteeing such a certificate to the public a certification service provider is 
liable for damage caused to any entity or legal or natural person who reasonably relies on that certificate: (a) 
as regards the accuracy at the time of issuance of all information contained in the qualified certificate and as 
regards the fact that the certificate contains all the details prescribed for a qualified certificate; (b) for 
assurance that at the time of the issuance of the certificate, the signatory identified in the qualified certificate 
held the signature-creation data corresponding to the signature-verification data given or identified in the 
certificate; (c) for assurance that the signature-creation data and the signature-verification data can be used 
in a complementary manner in cases where the certification service provider generates them both; unless the 
certification service provider proves that he has not acted negligently. 2. As a minimum, Member States 
shall ensure that a certification service provider who has issued a certificate as a qualified certificate to the 
public is liable for damage to any entity or legal or natural person who reasonably relies on the certificate 
for failure to register revocation of the certificate unless the certification service provider proves that he has 
not acted negligently. 3. Member States shall ensure that a certification service provider may indicate in a 
qualified certificate limitations on the use of that certificate, provided that the limitations are recognisable to 
third parties. The certification service provider shall not be liable for damage arising from use of a qualified 
certificate which exceeds the limitations placed on it. 4. Member States shall ensure that a certification 
service provider may indicate in the qualified certificate a limit on the value of transactions for which the 
certificate can be used, provided that the limit is recognisable to third parties. The certification service 
provider shall not be liable for damage resulting from this maximum limit being exceeded. 5. The provisions 
of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall be without prejudice to Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair 
terms in consumer contracts.  
33 For an in-depth analysis of CSP liability as set forth in Article 6 of the Electronic Signatures Directive, see 
Balboni, P. (2004) Liability of Certification Service Providers towards Relying Parties and the Need for a 
Clear System to Enhance the Level of Trust in Electronic Communication, Information & Communications 
Technology Law 13, pp. 211-242. 
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behaviour,34 it is concluded that the present TMO third-party liability system is not 
adequate (Chapter 8). 
Therefore, a model of adequate third-party liability for TMOs will be elaborated. 
The core of TMO liability will be based on the same principles of surveyors’, auditors’, and 
accountants’ liability which will be tailored to the specific TMO practice by developing the 
concept of ‘adequacy’. More precisely, the concept of ‘adequacy’ is defined by applying to 
the trust relationship between TMOs and e-consumers the ethical theory of ‘Warranted 
Trust’ – which, in a nutshell, aims to protect trustor reliance on trustee by implementing a 
regulative framework which takes into consideration the interest of both parties and the 
influence of the specific context in which the trust relationship develops – and considering 
the social, economic, and political value of trustmarks. 
There are two main reasons why an ethical theory is chosen in order to improve the 
TMO third-party liability system. First, this approach seems to widely comply with what 
has been recommended at the European level. In fact, in Recital 32 of the Directive 
2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain 
Legal Aspects of Information Society Services in the Internal Market,35 the creation of 
codes of conduct at the Community level is encouraged as a means to determine the rules 
on professional ethics applicable to commercial communication.36 As the present effort 
aims to contribute to the creation of European standards/code of conduct for TMOs, the 
ethical aspects of TMO practice need to be taken into consideration also in setting out the 
related liability system. Second, law and ethics are two normative sciences which 
traditionally can very well complement each other. To put it down very simply, ethics sets 
the basic societal interests that law should guarantee: “[w]ithin the tradition of natural law 
thinking which finds its roots in the philosophies of Aristotle and Aquinas, the political 
community has generally been understood in terms of a fundamental goal: that of fostering 
                                                 
34 “Liability law has traditionally been the first legal guard against undesirable societal developments” 
Schellekens, M. & Prins, C. (2006), p. 49. In this respect, liability law aims to discourage subjects from 
putting in place specific unwanted conducts by making them liable for them and eventually obliging them to 
compensate the damages that may result from their misconduct. 
35 OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p.1. 
36 Recital 32: “In order to remove barriers to the development of cross-border services within the Community 
which members of the regulated professions might offer on the Internet, it is necessary that compliance be 
guaranteed at Community level with professional rules aiming, in particular, to protect consumers or public 
health; codes of conduct at Community level would be the best means of determining the rules on 
professional ethics applicable to commercial communication; the drawing-up or, where appropriate, the 
adaptation of such rules should be encouraged without prejudice to the autonomy of professional bodies and 
associations.” 
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the ethical good of citizens. Law, on this concept, should seek to inculcate habits of good 
conduct, and should support a social environment which will encourage citizens to pursue 




                                                 
37 Craig, E. (2005) The Shorter Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (New York: Routledge), p. 542. The 





















1. Lack of e-consumer trust in e-commerce 
 
A quite recent survey of European citizens on issues relating to business and 
consumer e-commerce shows that ‘lack of trust’ in the Internet is the third most important 
reason for consumers to not buy online. The first reason is ‘lack of access’ (57% of the 
respondents), the second being ‘lack of interest in buying anything using the Internet 
medium’ (28% of the respondents); 25 % of the respondent consumers said that they did 
not trust the Internet itself.38 In other words, except for Internet access and consumer 
interest in buying something online, ‘lack of trust’ is indeed the first reason why consumers 
do not buy online. 
Security, privacy, unfamiliarity with services, lack of direct interaction, and 
credibility of information seem to be at the top of the list of consumers’ concerns in making 
online transactions.39 If there is concern, trust is unlikely to develop. Therefore, if e-
merchants want to gain consumers’ trust, they have to start by reassuring consumers about 
the security of their website, the soundness of their privacy policy, and the reliability of the 
information provided by their websites. Moreover, e-merchants have to find ways to 
overcome potential clients’ unfamiliarity with the services on offer. Last but not least, e-
merchants have to deal with the absence of direct interaction with consumers, on the one 
                                                 
38 Eurobarometer (2004), pp. 9-11; see also Increasing Trust and Confidence of Consumers in the Information 
Society (forthcoming) Study for the European Commission. For the description of the project see 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/studies/studies_ongoing/index_en.htm>. 
39 See Egger, F. (2002) Consumer Trust in E-commerce: From Psychology to Interaction Design. In Prins, 
J.E.J. et al. (eds.) Trust in Electronic Commerce. The Role of Trust from a Legal, an Organizational and 
Technical Point of View (The Hague: Kluwer Law international), pp. 13-16; See also Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development - Working Party on Indicators for the Information Society (2008), 
pp. 26 et seq. 
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hand, and the lack of consumers’ direct interaction with the e-merchants’ products, on the 
other hand. 
 
2. Top five psychological barriers for e-consumers 
 
In Trust in Electronic Commerce, Florian Egger points out security, privacy, 
unfamiliarity with services, lack of direct interaction, and credibility of information as the 
main psychological barriers to the adoption of e-commerce.40 
Various statistics have shown that security is the biggest concern not only of e-
consumers but also of e-merchants.41 For example, security of payment is the leading 
concern of European citizens about buying through the Internet.42 Moreover, bugs in (or 
breach of) e-merchants’ security systems that allow hackers to steal passwords and all 
kinds of customers’ personal information have often been reported.43 Last but not least, the 
Consumer Sentinel database,44 which is maintained by the Federal Trade Commission 
(henceforth: FTC) and which tracks both domestic and cross-border fraud, contains more 
than one million consumer complaints that can be classified in two categories: identity theft 
complaints and fraud complaints.45 In summary, e-consumers do not feel secure in the 
online environment and thus are reluctant to provide payment details and personal data. 
Part of the privacy concerns that have already been pointed out pertains to security. 
In fact, the two issues are closely connected.46 However, e-consumer data are not always 
captured by malicious third parties who manage to bypass security systems. There are also 
                                                 
40 See Egger, F. (2002), pp. 13-16; see also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - 
Working Party on Indicators for the Information Society (2008), pp. 26 et seq. 
41 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Working Party on Indicators for the 
Information Society (2005); see also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Working 
Party on Indicators for the Information Society (2008). 
42 “In the context of issues of concern to those having used e-commerce, security of payment was still an 
important issue for 48% of EU15 respondents” (Eurobarometer (2004), p. 5). 
43 E.g., “DSW reported on March 8, 2005 that credit card and personal shopping information on its customers 
was stolen from a corporate database over a three-month period” W.D.P.R. (2005) DSW Settles FTC 
Charges it Failed to Protect Sensitive Customer Data, World Data Protection Report 5 (12), p. 3. 
44 Available at <http://www.consumer.gov/sentinel/>. 
45 See also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Working Party on Indicators for the 
Information Society (2008), pp. 19 et seq. 
46 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Working Party on Indicators for the 
Information Society (2008), p. 27. 
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e-merchants and dedicated organisations that intentionally collect e-consumer data.47 A 
considerable number of users do not feel their privacy is sufficiently protected by the law 
of their countries.48 Users are worried about leaving personal information (i.e., name, 
address, date of birth, gender) on the Internet.49 They would like to know the reason why e-
merchants or organisations gather their personal data and whether they share the data with 
other parties.50 Actually, more than half of all European citizens are concerned about the 
broad issue of privacy protection.51  
As to the unfamiliarity with the services, e-merchants have created many new 
services and business models. Perceived e-consumer risks exist in this new market. Novelty 
implies unfamiliarity which, coupled with perception of risk, is more likely to bring 
mistrust than trust. This can be explained by the lack of experience with such services, the 
lack of understanding of radical new business models, and, last but not least, lack of 
information on the e-merchants providing the new services. In fact, since a website can be 
created quickly, inexpensively, and at almost any location in the world, the e-consumer 
may question the very existence of the e-merchant. Furthermore, as the e-merchant might 
be unknown to e-consumers prior to his discovery on the Internet, concerns could arise 
about product quality, e-merchant reputation, and policies. E-consumers may also be 
worried about divulging confidential information, such as their credit card number, to an 
unknown e-merchant over the Internet. 
The fact that commercial exchange is mediated via a computer screen or handsets 
may also impede the development of e-consumer trust in e-commerce.52 There is a lack of 
direct interaction with people. Both salespeople and fellow shoppers can give clues about 
an e-merchant’s trustworthiness in face-to-face interaction. On the Internet, salespeople are 
replaced by FAQs and search engines or are available only through electronic media.53 The 
other kind of interaction missing online is obviously the interaction with the products 
                                                 
47 See, e.g., Listening to the Internet. Internet trends: Companies are eavesdropping on online discussion 
forums to find out what their customers really think about them, The Economist, 9 March 2006, p. 7. 
48 About 46% of the European citizens think that the level of data protection offered by the law in their own 
country is not high. See Eurobarometer (2003), p. 41.  
49 About 64% of the European citizens are worried about spreading personal information (i.e., name, address, 
date of birth, gender) on the Internet. See Eurobarometer (2003), pp. 44. Only EU15 citizens were polled. 
50 Nine out of ten European citizens tend to agree that they should be informed why organisations are 
gathering personal data and if they are sharing it with other organisations. See Eurobarometer (2003), p. 40. 
51 See Eurobarometer (2003), p. 7. 
52 See, e.g., Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Working Party on Indicators for the 
Information Society (2008), p. 27. 
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themselves.54 The lack of experimental interaction proves to be a particularly tough 
challenge for non-standard products, such as textiles or craft products. Despite 
sophisticated feedback devices, it will always be very difficult to adequately communicate 
factors associated with the intrinsic quality of a non-standard product through a computer 
interface.55 
Lastly, since everybody can register a domain name and set up a website, it is 
sometimes hard to recognise websites of fair companies from those that are driven by 
malicious intentions. Sometimes, published information can be deliberately wrong or 
misleading. A common example is the case of allegedly objective product reviews that are 
sponsored by the manufacturer or fake testimonials. This problem is made worse by the 
fact that information can be altered simply and quickly, leaving no trace of the original text. 
Besides, websites are meant to be the most dynamic medium to date, as information can be 
updated and published instantly. However, this does not mean that all websites are always 
up-to-date, which can be a real problem in relation to prices, description of products or 
services, or, more generally, the availability of information. People appear to be quite 
aware of these issues. In fact, it is reported that one quarter of European citizens have had 
difficulties with the actual reliability of information on the Internet.56 
 
3. Factors enhancing e-consumer concern 
 
E-consumers’ psychological barriers find further justification in the fact that e-
commerce is marked by various new features, including de-materialisation, 
internationalisation or de-territorialisation, and technological turbulence. 
The Internet has a de-materialising effect on identity, products, and information. 
Physical identity is replaced on the Internet by multiple virtual identities or by anonymity.57 
                                                                                                                                                    
53 However, the anonymity of the seller is a cause of concern to only 16% of those who have bought 
something on the Internet. Eurobarometer (2004), p. 6. 
54 The main reason given by two thirds (68%) of the people who have never purchased online for lack of 
interest in buying on the Internet is that they need to see and touch the products they intend to buy. 
Eurobarometer (2004), p. 17. 
55 See Egger, F. (2002), p. 16. 
56 Eurobarometer (2004), p. 6. 
57 For an in-depth analysis of digital anonymity and the legal issues related, see Nicoll, C. et al. (2003) Digital 
Anonymity and the Law. Tension and Dimension (The Hague: TMC Asser Press); see also Ricci, A., Pelino, 
E., Balboni, P. and Cunegatti, B. (2008) Il diritto al nome e il diritto all’anonimato su Internet in 
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This makes it easier to carry out fraudulent actions (e.g., phishing58 and pharming59). 
Furthermore, products are presented online to potential buyers by means of pictures, 
descriptions of the relevant qualities, and sometimes feedback from previous purchasers 
(i.e., people you do not know and who may not even exist). It is reported that people 
generally need not only see but also touch the products that they intend to buy.60 Hence, de-
materialisation of products represents a psychological barrier that e-merchants need to 
break down. Moreover, when the identity of a source of information is not known, or is 
simply not checkable, the credibility of the information is more difficult to assess. De-
materialisation of information means that the information is no longer supplied in written 
form but electronically. Files, software, and other information are no longer made available 
using physical carriers but are increasingly being made available online for downloading 
purposes. This third effect of de-materialisation has a significant impact on security and 
privacy protection. In fact, on the one hand, e-merchants have to secure invisible data flows 
(e.g., transactions, e-consumers’ personal data communications). On the other hand, e-
consumers are unable to check how their dematerialised data are used by e-merchants.61 
Internationalisation is the change brought about by the Internet as a means of 
communication not restricted by geographic borders. It will be extremely challenging, due 
                                                                                                                                                    
Finocchiaro, G. (ed.) Diritto all’anonimato. Anonimato, nome e identità personale (Padova: Cedam), pp. 
281-344. 
58 “In computing, phishing is a form of criminal activity using social engineering techniques, characterized by 
attempts to fraudulently acquire sensitive information, such as passwords and credit card details, by 
masquerading as a trustworthy person or business in an apparently official electronic communication, such 
as an e-mail or an instant message. The term phishing arises from the use of increasingly sophisticated lures 
to fish for users’ financial information and passwords.” Wikipedia. See 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phishing>. 
59 “Pharming is a hacker’s attack aiming to redirect a website's traffic to another (bogus) website. Pharming 
can be conducted either by changing the host’s file on a victim’s computer or by exploitation of a 
vulnerability in DNS server software. DNS servers are computers responsible for resolving Internet names 
into their real addresses — they are the “signposts” of the Internet. Compromised DNS servers are 
sometimes referred to as “poisoned”. The term pharming is a word play on farming and phishing. The term 
phishing refers to social engineering attacks to obtain access to credentials such as user names and 
passwords. In recent years both pharming and phishing have been used to steal identity information. 
Pharming has become of major concern to businesses hosting ecommerce and online banking websites. 
Sophisticated measures known as anti-pharming are required to protect against this serious threat. Antivirus 
software and spyware removal software cannot protect against pharming. Pharming is becoming the attack 
du jour of today's hackers.” See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pharming>. 
60 Eurobarometer (2004), p. 17. As already mentioned in footnote 54, the survey shows that 68% of the 
people who have never bought anything online maintain that the main reason for it is that they need to see 
and touch the product first. 
61 For a more detailed analysis of “de-materialisation” and the related legal issues, see De Cock Buning, M. et 
al. (2001) Consumer@Protection.EU. An Analysis of European Consumer Legislation in the Information 
Society, Journal of Consumer Policy 24, pp. 291ff; Van Klink, B.M.J. & Prins, J.E.J. (2002) Law and 
Regulation: Scenarios for the Information Age, (Amsterdam / Berlin / Oxford / Tokyo / Washington, DC: 
IOS Press), pp. 9-10. 
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to the mobility of the traffic on the Internet and the tendency of senders to hide their 
identity, to determine where exactly a particular person is or where an activity is being 
carried out. Moreover, it is becoming more and more difficult to determine which route an 
electronic message has taken before it eventually reaches its destination. It may be true that 
the borderless nature of the Internet gives e-consumers access to a great amount of 
information; but this also makes it extremely complex for them to verify the source of the 
information and to have a direct interaction with the person behind the source. 
Internationalisation has given rise to worldwide competition in lower prices for e-
consumers. However, rules (e.g., consumer or data protection rules) are not the same 
everywhere, so e-consumers may be more at risk in some places. 
Technological turbulence refers to the constant and rapid development of technology. 
One could say that the Internet brings to the e-consumer his daily (technological) 
challenge. In fact, owing to the dizzying evolution of technology, new services or updates 
of the existing ones are offered online almost everyday. The upside of this phenomenon is 
that e-consumers are constantly presented with better quality of services. The downside is 
that the same technological improvement may also be used for malicious purposes. For 
example, more sophisticated fraud can be carried out online, more powerful viruses62 can 
be sent to harm user computers, and more advanced spyware63 can be used to collect user 
preferences. Technology itself already represents an obstacle for many people. They have 
to become familiar with the technology and learn how to use it. However, it takes a lot of 
effort to become familiar with something that constantly evolves. If the people do not feel 
that they are familiar with the situation, they feel more vulnerable and develop concerns 
about online security. 
                                                 
62 “A computer virus is a self-replicating computer program written to alter the way a computer operates, 
without the permission or knowledge of the user. Though the term is commonly used to refer to a range of 
malware, a true virus must replicate itself, and must execute itself. The latter criteria is often met by a virus 
which replaces existing executable files with a virus-infected copy. While viruses can be intentionally 
destructive—destroying data, for example—some viruses are benign or merely annoying.” See 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_virus>. 
63 “In the field of computing, the term spyware refers to a broad category of malicious software designed to 
intercept or take partial control of a computer’s operation without the informed consent of that machine’s 
owner or legitimate user. While the term taken literally suggests software that surreptitiously monitors the 
user, it has come to refer more broadly to software that subverts the computer’s operation for the benefit of a 
third party. In simpler terms, spyware is a type of program that watches what users do with their computer 
and then sends that information over the internet. Spyware can collect many different types of information 
about a user. More benign programs can attempt to track what types of websites a user visits and send this 
information to an advertising agency. More malicious versions can try to record what a user types to try to 




4. Information asymmetry as the key issue 
 
De-materialisation, internationalisation, and technological turbulence create a great 
variety of information, products, and services for e-consumers. However, the source of the 
information and the quality of the products and services are not easily verifiable by e-
consumers. Generally, e-consumers do not have enough competence to master the 
technology on which e-commerce is based. This causes far-reaching information deficits on 
the e-consumers’ side. Therefore, it may be argued that the very reason for the consumers’ 







Table 3: Information asymmetry 
 
 
Generally, information asymmetry exists when one party to a transaction has more or 
more accurate information than the other party (usually it is the seller that knows more 
about the product than the buyer).64 Although information asymmetry is not a specific 
                                                 
64 See, e.g., Arrow, K.J. (1963) Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, The American 
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feature of the online market, offline markets are also often characterised by far-reaching 
information deficits that impede smooth functioning.65 Quality labels, as the result of a 
neutral certification process,66 have been used in offline markets to reduce psychological 
barriers. 
Considering the European food sector, for example, Gabriele Jahn et al. in their paper 
The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool aptly describe 
the origin and the value of quality labels in the food sector.67 They argue that quality labels 
based on neutral control throughout the value chain have been adopted to enhance 
consumer protection.68 In fact, consumers’ confidence in the safety and quality of food 
products has decreased after the recent scandals (e.g., BSE, FMD, and bird flu), which 
abundant regulation and government controls were not able to prevent.69 Concerning 
quality labels as a policy tool, the authors point out that, on the one hand, by outsourcing 
labelling services, public authorities are relieved of a financial burden. On the other hand,70 
the reliability of the quality labels and their effectiveness in consumer policy strongly 
depend on the quality of the assessment carried out.71 
Food quality certification has taught three important lessons. First, regulations and 
governmental control have proved inadequate to guarantee the safety and quality of (food) 
products. Second, third-party certification (i.e., quality labelling) has been used by 
European countries as a policy tool to improve consumer protection, win back consumer 
trust, and, at the same time, relieve public authorities of an additional financial burden. 
Third, the central task of certification, i.e., the reduction of information asymmetry within 
the market, can be fulfilled only if the institutions in charge succeed in assuring 
certification quality and thus the validity of the audit signal.  
                                                 
65 See Akerlof, G.A. (1970) The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, pp. 488-500. See also Spence, M. (1976) Informational Aspects of 
Market Structure: An Introduction, Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, pp. 591-597. 
66 “Certification is a procedure by which a third party gives a written assurance that a product, process or 
service conforms to specific characteristics”, Rae, A. et al. (1995), p. 2. 
67 See Jahn, G. et al. (2005), pp. 53-73. 
68 Id., p. 53. 
69 See also Hobbs, J.E. et al. (2002) Incentive Structures for Food Safety and Quality Assurance: An 
International Comparison, Food Control 13, pp. 77-81; Sporleder, T.L. & Goldsmith, P.D. (2001) 
Alternative Firm Strategies for Signalling Quality in the Food System, Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 49, pp. 591-604. 
70 See also Caswell, J.A. & Mojduszka, E.M. (1996) Using Information Labelling to Influence the Market for 
Quality in Food Products, American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78, pp. 1248-1253. 
71 “The control process is usually carried out by independent inspectors (certifiers) who, in their turn have to 
meet criteria laid down by rule-making agencies. Only if the certifiers succeed in revealing critical aspects 
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Another important lesson can be learned from the financial market. In this market, 
third-party audits are carried out to detect and prevent errors, fraud, and lack of conformity 
to external and internal rules and standards. In fact, external auditors are required to 
examine the books, vouchers, records, and accounts of a company with a view to 
ascertaining whether they represent a true and fair view of the company’s affairs, whether 
they have been prepared in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, and 
whether these principles have been consistently applied over the years. However, the recent 
crisis in financial auditing reflects the potential shortcomings of third-party control 
procedures. Enron and Parmalat were two scandals which, to use a euphemism, 
significantly diminished confidence in the quality of financial auditing.72 The lesson to 
learn here is that the reputation of the auditing company is crucial to the certification 
business. At this point, it has to be borne in mind that “[a]ny player in the market suffers 
reputation damage when there is a failure of one sort or another.”73 
 
5. Good news: trustmarks 
 
As in the offline market, third-party certification has also been used to reduce 
information asymmetry in the online market. In the late 1990s, a potential solution to the 
need for trust of consumers and merchants was offered in the US by private companies 
called trustmark organisations (TMOs). In a nutshell, TMOs are organisations which 
present themselves as independent parties that provide trustmarks – labels or visual 
representations indicating that a product, process, or service conforms to specific quality 
characteristics – to e-merchants. Security, privacy, and business practice74 are three fields 
in which trustmarks are popular. In fact, a TMO will issue a trustmark to an e-merchant if it 
has demonstrated that it conforms to the policy of the TMO regarding security, privacy or 
                                                                                                                                                    
and opportunistic behaviour will quality assurance concepts be able to build up the reputation necessary to 
serve as a reliable quality signal.” Jahn, G. et al. (2005), p. 53. 
72 See Nussbaum, B. (2002) Can You Trust Anybody Anymore?, Business Week, January 28, pp. 39-55. 
Available at <http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_04/b3767701.htm>; Thomas, C.W. 
(2002) The Rise and Fall of Enron, Journal of Accountancy 193 (4), pp. 41-48; Vinten, G. (2003) Enronitis 
– Dispelling the Disease, Managerial Auditing Journal 18, pp. 448-445. 
73 Samuel DiPiazza, global head of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, in an interview with the Financial Times 
on 21 July 2005 Parker, A. (2005) ‘We have to prove our own quality’, Financial Times, 21 July 2005, p. 
11. 
74 “Business practice” is a term which has a very broad meaning and embraces various e-merchant practices, 
e.g., security, privacy, marketing, information. 
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business practice. The e-merchant hopes that, by displaying the trustmark on its website, an 
e-consumer will less likely question the integrity of the e-merchant in relation to the 
security, privacy or business practice. Moreover, the trustmark, as a third-party professional 
guarantee for various e-merchant activities, addresses e-consumer concerns, such as 
unfamiliarity with services, lack of direct interaction, and credibility of information. Thus, 
the e-consumer will more likely divulge his personal data and transact with the e-merchant, 
i.e., conduct online business. In summary, TMOs are independent organisations that try to 
promote online trust by offering a system of certification. VeriSign,75 TRUSTe,76 
BBBOnline,77 and WebTrust78 are the most popular TMOs in the US. 
The nature and complexity of the Internet encourage the use of institution-based 
assurances because they are a signal to the users of legitimacy and trustworthiness. TMOs 
offering e-commerce assurance services may be perceived in the electronic marketplace as 
third-party endorsers. Research on marketing literature shows that third-party endorsements 
function similarly to expert endorsements.79 In other words, consumers may perceive 
TMOs as experts/professionals who control and eventually guarantee the conduct of e-
merchants.  
When there is a trusting attitude, consumers are more comfortable in sharing personal 
information and purchasing online.80 According to studies carried out in the US, there 
seems to be a positive relationship amongst institution-based structures (e.g., trustmarks), 
online trust, and intent to purchase.81 For example, in a survey conducted by Harris 
Interactive,82 on behalf of VeriSign, in September 2004, it was reported that 74% of people 
                                                 
75 See <http://www.verisign.com/>. 
76 See <http://www.truste.org/>. 
77 See <http://www.bbbonline.org/>. 
78 See <http://www.webtrust.org/>. 
79 See Dean, H. & Biswas, A. (2001) Third-Party Organization Endorsement of Products: An Advertising Cue 
Affecting Consumer Pre-purchase Evaluation of Goods and Services, Journal of Advertising 30, pp. 41-57. 
80 See McKnight, H. et al. (2002) Developing and Validating Trust Measures for e-Commerce: An Integrative 
Typology, Information System Research 13 (3), pp. 334-359. Available at 
<http://www.msu.edu/~mcknig26/Measures.pdf>. 
81 See Lala, V. et al. (2002) The Impact of Relative Information Quality of e-Commerce Assurance Seals on 
Internet Purchasing Behavior, International Journal of Accounting Information Systems 3 (4), pp. 237-253; 
Odom, M. et al. (2002) Web Assurance Seals: How and Why They Influence Consumers’ Decisions, 
Journal of Information Systems 16 (2), pp. 231-250 Available at <http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-
2268451/Web-assurance-seals-how-and.html>. Empirical research also relates the positive effect of third-
party certification on the likelihood of online purchases and trusting attitudes, see Mauldin, E. & 
Arunachalam, V. (2001) An Experimental Examination of Alternative Forms of Web Assurance for 




in the US who have ever made an online purchase look for a trustmark when determining 
whether or not to buy from an e-merchant website.83 
In Europe, the trustmark phenomenon is still in its infancy. Confianza Online,84 Euro-
Label,85 Luxembourg e-Commerce Certified,86 Thuiswinkel,87 and Trusted Shops88 are 
some of the European TMOs. What was pointed out in 2003 by Ton Wagemans in his 
paper An introduction to the labelling of Websites is still valid: “[whether] the existing 
labelling initiatives really have increased consumer trust in internet and e-business is hard 
to measure, because most of them are still in a development stage and because of the lack 
of data.”89 Only one in ten European citizens in 2004 had heard of Internet trustmarks.90 
However, in a recent study on trustmarks in Europe, it has been reported that e-consumer 
representatives foresee that the largest effect of a trustmark scheme will be the increased 
willingness of consumers to leave personal information on a website of a certified e-
merchant. In terms of online shopping, consumer representatives feel it is more likely that 
consumers will buy online more often and at different shops.91  
5.1 Trustmark benefits 
 
Trustmarks are a very valuable means to improve e-society and e-economy and to 
simplify e-policy. In fact, not only e-consumers but also e-merchants and governments can 
benefit a great deal from trustmarks. 
E-consumers are not able to scrutinise the policies of organisations, companies, and 
other participants of the virtual world without borders.92 Ideally, through trustmarks, e-
consumers can receive a sort of guarantee from an independent third party of the quality of, 
for example, the e-merchants’ business practice, their privacy statement, or the security 
                                                 
83 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Working Party on Indicators for the 
Information Society (2005), p. 14. 
84 See <http://www.confianzaonline.org>. 
85 See <http://www.euro-label.com/euro-label/ControllerServlet>. 
86 See <http://www.e-certification.lu/index.html>. 
87 See <http://www.thuiswinkel.org/>. 
88 See <http://www.trustedshops.de/de/home/index.html>. 
89 Wagemans, T. (2003) An Introduction to the Labelling of Websites, background paper for DG Information 
Society Conference ‘Quality Labels for Websites Alternative Approaches to Content Rating’, 27 February 
2003, Luxembourg, p. 2. Available at 
<http://europa.eu.int/information_society/activities/sip/docs/pdf/reports/qual_lab_bkgd.pdf>. 
90 See Eurobarometer (2004), p. 20. 
91 See De Bruin, R. et al. (2005) Analysis and Definition of Common Characteristics of Trustmarks and Web 
Seals in the European Union: Final Report + Annexes (2 Vols.), Final Report, p. 32.  
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level of their websites. Moreover, trustmarks are very easy to recognise and can improve 
the perception of e-consumers with regard to potential online business partners, provide 
‘always-available’, independent, and trustworthy information on e-merchants and thus 
enhance e-consumer confidence in online transactions. 
If the benefits of trustmarks to e-consumers can be summarised by the concept of a 
better buying experience, the consequential benefit to e-merchants will be a better selling 
experience. Given the big pressure to which merchants are exposed in the online world, 
which has been neatly described by Assafa Endeshaw in his paper The Legal Significance 
of Trustmarks, as follows: “[w]hile it has taken many international companies a succession 
of decades to establish trust and confidence in the line of business or type of wares and 
services they have offered to their customers, the current wave of business start-ups on the 
Internet feel hard pressed to succeed fast in the ‘Wild Web’ lest they perishes with the 
same speed that they sprouted”,93 trustmarks can help e-merchants succeed fast. Through 
the exhibition of the trustmark on their websites, e-merchants can make some information 
easily available to e-consumers, increase the chance to win their trust, and eventually do 
some business with them. Moreover, trustmarks offer e-merchants the chance to self-
regulate sectors of their activities, set out their own standards, and thus prevent 
governments from interfering. 
Last but not least, enhancing consumer trust in e-commerce tops the European Union 
agenda.94 The reason is very simple: nowadays, trust is money,95 and with a minority of the 
European citizens engaged in e-commerce activities,96 there is still a long way to go in 
terms of reaping the full benefits of e-commerce. Trust is the first reason why consumers 
do not buy online, given the presence of Internet access and interest in purchasing anything 
                                                                                                                                                    
92 See Section 3. 
93 Endeshaw, A. (2001) The Legal Significance of Trustmarks, Information & Communication Technology 
Law 10 (2), p. 204. 
94 See, e.g., the recent study for the European Commission Increasing Trust and Confidence of Consumers in 
the Information Society (forthcoming); Eurobarometer (2004); i2010 Five-year strategy to boost digital 
economy <http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/i2010/index_en.htm>; the setup of a dedicated 
European Agency on Information Security (ENISA) also highlights the political significance of information 
security and the need to strive for greater cooperation across EU Member States as well as internationally, 
see <http://www.enisa.eu.int/>; see also the very recent document produced by the ENISA Information 
Security Awareness Initiatives: Current Practice and Measurement of Success (July 2007). Available at: 
<www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/deliverables/enisa_measuring_awareness.pdf>. 
95 See, e.g., Valente, K. (2001) Keeping Promises: Backing up your Promises of Reliability with Proof is 
Becoming a New Economy Critical Success Factor’, Intelligent Enterprise. Available online at: 
<http://www.intelligententerprise.com/010613/trust1_1.jhtml;jsessionid=CVK11KPCSJIVEQSNDLPCKHS
CJUNN2JVN>. 
96 Eurobarometer (2004), p. 3. 
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online.97 Trustmarks are a means of self-regulation which aims to enhance the e-
consumers’ trust in online communications. Therefore, trustmarks can give governments 
the chance to stay out of some sectors of Internet regulation, thus relieving them of an 
additional financial burden. Concurrently, trustmarks can help boost e-commerce and bring 
governments the related revenues. 
 
5.2 Reputation: TMO success key 
 
TMO reputation and credibility are key elements for the success of trustmarks. 
Without them, the system will not take off. Robin Wakefield and Dwayne Whitten, in their 
paper Examining User Perceptions of Third-Party Organization Credibility and Trust in an 
E-Retailer, proved that TMO credibility is positively related to e-consumer trust in e-
merchants.98 They demonstrated their statement in two steps. First, the authors showed that 
TMO credibility is positively related to the value of a trustmark (i.e., web assurance seal) 
and that the value of a trustmark is positively related to trust in the e-merchant.99 Second, 
they proved that the value which Internet users assign to assurance structures is negatively 
related to perceptions of purchase risk and that the perception of purchase risk is negatively 
related to trust in the e-merchant.100  
Such finding matches earlier results of signalling literature, according to which 
signals tend to be effective when the signalling firm (e.g., a TMO) maintains a high 
reputation.101 Furthermore, organisational credibility plays a role in influencing attitudes 
and purchase intentions102 and is an important component of reputation.103 Ultimately, trust 
may have less to do with privacy, security, and business practice and more to do with the 
reputation of the TMO.104  
                                                 
97 Eurobarometer (2004), pp. 9-11. 
98 See Wakefield, R.L. & Whitten, D. (2006) Examining User Perceptions of Third-Party Organization 
Credibility and Trust in an E-Retailer, Journal of Organizational and End User Computing 18 (2), pp. 1-19. 
99 See id. pp. 6-7. 
100 See id. p. 7. 
101 See Hoxmeier, J. (2000) Software Preannouncements and their Impact on Customers’ Perceptions and 
Vendor Reputation, Journal of Management information Systems 17 (1), pp. 115-139. 
102 See Goldsmith, R. et al. (2000) The Impact of Corporate Credibility and Endorser Celebrity on Consumer 
Reaction to Advertisement and Brands, Journal of Advertising 29 (3), pp. 43-54; Lafferty, B. et al. (2002) 
The Dual Credibility Model: The Influence of Corporate and Endorser Credibility on Attitudes and Purchase 
Intention, Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice 20 (3), pp. 1-12. 
103 Keller, K.L. (1998) Strategic Brand Management (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall). 
104 See Wakefield, R.L. & Whitten, D. (2006), p. 1. 
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This has been indirectly confirmed also by Fredrik Nordquist et al. in their paper 
Trusting the Trustmark?, in which they point out that “the average e-consumer does not 
possess the necessary knowledge or eagerness to evaluate all existing TMs [trustmarks] and 
CoCs [Codes of Conduct]. He will therefore find himself in a position of ignorance in 
regards to the actual implications of the individual TMs for him as a consumer. He will 
therefore, according to the theory of asymmetric information,[105] consider all TMs to be of 
equal quality.”106 In fact, e-consumers are unaware of the details of the trustmark process. 
They do not know where to find this information. If they find it at all, they will most likely 
not understand it, and it is a time-consuming exercise, anyway.  
Hence, e-consumers basically rely on TMO reputation.  
Such statement has been confirmed also by Bernard Brun, who wrote in his paper 
Nature et impacts juridiques de la certification dans le commerce électronique sur Internet: 
“Dans la réalité, il ne sera pas question de reconnaissance de la certification mais plutôt de 
reconnaissance du certificateur”.107  
 
6. Bad news: TMO practice has already been proven 
to be untrustworthy 
 
6.1 A case study 
 
Despite the fact that online quality certification is still in its early stages, the 
unpleasant events – not to say scandals – in which TRUSTe was involved in 1999 and 2000 
show some weaknesses of the US trustmark system.108 A brief description of what 
happened is provided hereunder. 
In March 1999, Microsoft (which was TRUSTe-certified) was caught transmitting 
user information through the Windows 98 registration wizard. However, TRUSTe refused 
                                                 
105 See Akerlof, G.A. (1970). 
106 Nordquist, F. et al. (2002) Trusting the Trustmark?, 17th Bileta Annual Conference, Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands, 5-6 April 2002. Available at 
<http://www.bileta.ac.uk/Document%20Library/1/Trusting%20the%20Trustmark.pdf>. 
107 Brun, B. (2001), p. 46. 
108 See Froomkin, M. (2000) The Death of Privacy?, Stanford Law Review 52, p. 1526. Available at 
<http://personal.law.miami.edu/~froomkin/articles/privacy-deathof.pdf>. 
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to act decisively because the breach did not involve a website but a software, which was 
not covered in its charter. 
In September 1999, a security hole in Microsoft’s web-based e-mail programme 
Hotmail allowed hackers to snatch users’ IDs and passwords. Microsoft fixed the bugs and, 
at TRUSTe’s request, submitted to a third-party privacy audit. 
In November 1999, a news report revealed that RealJukebox, a software plug-in by 
RealNetworks, was surreptitiously collecting data on users’ music-listening habits and 
passing them back to RealNetworks. Working with TRUSTe, RealNetworks discontinued 
the practice, appointed a privacy compliance officer, and checked its privacy policies. 
However, as in the first case reported, because the violation involved a piece of software, 
which was not covered in its charter, TRUSTe declined to take further action.109  
Moreover, as Michael Froomkin stated in his paper Death of Privacy?: “[T]he 
RealNetworks incident followed an earlier, similar fiasco”,110 referring to a case in which 
the FTC settled a complaint against GeoCities.111 In fact, the FTC discovered that 
GeoCities had collected personal identifying information from its users (i.e., children and 
adults) in order to create a database that included e-mail and postal addresses, member 
interest areas, and demographics, including income, education, gender, marital status, and 
occupation, and eventually disclosed customer data to marketing companies without 
adequately stating the purposes of such data processing.112 However, GeoCities’ privacy 
statement set forth that the customers’ registration information would be used only to 
“provide members the specific advertising offers and products or services they requested 
and that the ‘optional’ information [education level, income, marital status, occupation, and 
interests] would not be released to anyone without the member’s permission.”113 
Accordingly, the FTC maintained first that GeoCities provided its customers with a 
misrepresentation of the purposes for which their personal data were processed and, 
second, that user data communication occurred without prior data subject 
                                                 
109 For more information on the case, see Open Letter 1999/11/1 to RealNetworks, RealNetworks’ Privacy 
Intrusion, Junkbuster <http://www.junkbusters.com/ht/en/real.html>; Lemos, R. (1999) Can You Trust 
TRUSTe?, ZDNet News, 2 November 1999. Available at <http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-
516377.html>. 
110 See Froomkin, M. (2000), pp. 1526-1527. 
111 See McCarthy, J. (1999) TRUSTe Decides Its Own Fate Today, Slashdot, 8 November 1999. Available at 
<http://slashdot.org/yro/99/11/05/1021214.shtml>. The article details several other debacles, in which 
trustmark holders violated privacy policies or principles but kept their accreditation. 
112 See Kornblum, J., (1998) FTC, GeoCities Settle on Privacy, CNET News.com, 13 August 1998. Available 
at <http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-332199.html>. 
113 Kornblum, J. (1998) (quoting GeoCities’ membership sign-up form). 
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permission/consent. GeoCities settled the complaint, although it denied the allegations. 
Concurrently, it modified its privacy policy by clearly stating that subject to prior user 
consent, user data might be disclosed to third parties. It has to be noted that during the FTC 
investigation, TRUSTe’s trustmark was not removed from GeoCities’ website.114 
On 1 February 2000, a healthcare group revealed breaches of the stated privacy 
policies of 16 healthcare websites, including seven TRUSTe members (i.e., AltaVista, 
CBS.com, Excite.com, Healtheon/WebMD, Mediconsult, MotherNature.com, and Yahoo). 
Among other things, the sites were criticised for failing to disclose that advertising banner 
networks they participate in, such as DoubleClick, let advertisers collect any personal 
information disclosed by a customer on a page where an advertisement appeared. A week 
after the incident, TRUSTe stated that it was working with licensees to ensure compliance 
with the programme, although TRUSTe did not take any further action against the e-
merchants’ misconduct. 
Finally, on 7 February 2000, a news report revealed that, while E-Loan did not use 
cookies or share users’ personal data with third parties, several recently acquired 
subsidiaries did, violating E-Loan’s stated policy. The firm quickly posted a rewritten 
policy on its website. Because E-Loan acted promptly to align its policy and practice, 
TRUSTe took no action.  
These examples have some common features. First, the privacy programme of 
TRUSTe was violated. Second, TRUSTe was seemingly not aware of it until the violation 
was pointed out by some outsider (a news report in the E-Loan case, a complaint by a 
health care group in the second example, a news report in the RealJukebox case, etc.). 
Third, none of the trustmarks was revoked. In fact, what TRUSTe did in some cases was to 
work with the e-merchant to restore compliance with its programme (e.g., healthcare 
companies case, RealJukebox case, and Hotmail case); in the E-Loan case, it was the e-
merchant, on its own initiative, which discontinued the practice, and in the Microsoft case, 
TRUSTe did not take any action at all, denying its responsibility for the issue at stake. 
Consumers’ data were kept, shared, or sold by e-merchants which had TRUSTe’s trustmark 
on their websites, without TRUSTe even being aware of it. Nonetheless, TRUSTe’s 
trustmark was still on the e-merchants’ website after the violation was discovered. 
                                                 
114 See McCarthy, J. (1998) Is TRUSTe Trustworthy?, The Ethical Spectacle, September 1998. Available at  
<http://www.spectacle.org/998/mccarthy.html>.  
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It is argued by some American doctrine that the reasons for these incidents can be 
traced to TRUSTe’s funding structure and to the US self-regulation policy.115 TRUSTe (as 
with other TMOs) receives funds from big high-tech companies, which, in some cases, also 
happen to be the same e-merchants that pay the yearly fee for the licence to use the 
trustmarks and whose representatives also sit in the TRUSTe board of directors. As a 
result, TRUSTe will think twice before denouncing the non-compliance of an e-merchant 
with its trustmark programmes and eventually revoking their respective trustmarks. 
TRUSTe certainly has no economic incentive to be tough on its funding sources.116 On the 
other hand, the US self-regulation policy does not offer legal sanctions to incentivise or 
enforce strong privacy compliance117 in a marketplace where the economic incentive to 
provide strong privacy protection is either weak, nonexistent, or at least not uniformly 
distributed amongst all the participants.118 Roger Clarke in his paper The Legal Context of 
Privacy-Enhancing and Privacy-Sympathetic Technologies interestingly portrayed the 
consequence of this policy as follows: “Wolves self-regulate for the good of themselves 
and the pack, not the deer”;119 and the TRUSTe scandals are cases in point. 
 
6.2 Marketing-based trust 
 
As already pointed out in Subsection 5.2, e-consumers ignore the practice behind a 
trustmark (i.e., the code of conduct, the assessment system, monitoring activities, and the 
enforcement system). They basically rely on the reputation of TMOs. Therefore, TMOs 
benefit more from investing money in advertising their brand than in improving the quality 
of their trustmark system (i.e., a sound code of conduct, an independent assessment system, 
                                                 
115 See, e.g., Farrell, H. (2005) The Political Economy of the Internet and E-Commerce, in Stubbs, R. & 
Geoffrey, R.D. (eds.) Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (third edition) (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) Available at <http://www.henryfarrell.net/internet.pdf>; Froomkin, M. (2000), pp. 1525-
1529; Regoli, N.L. (2002) Indecent Exposures in an Electronic Regime, Federal Communications Law 
Journal 54, pp. 369-370. Available at <http://www.law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v54/no2/Regoli.pdf>; Rafter, 
M. (2000) Trust or Bust?, The Standard. Available at 
<http://www.webtrust.fr/Apropos/presse/article%20critique%20sur%20truste.pdf>. 
116 See Froomkin, M. (2000), p. 1527. This issue, which pertains to several TMOs, will be extensively dealt 
with in Chapter 3, Subsection 5.1. 
117 The US may be unique in endorsing self-regulation without legal sanctions to incentivise or enforce it, see 
Clarke, R. (7 July 1998) Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee. Inquiry into Privacy and 
the Private Sector. Available at <http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/SLCCPte.html>. 
118 See Froomkin, M. (2000), p. 1525 and p. 1528. 
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proactive monitoring of the compliance of an e-merchant, and a strong enforcement 
system). It is obvious that a trustmark system which is based more on marketing than on 
quality can be very dangerous for e-consumers and, in the long run, for the credibility of 
the trustmark system itself. A typical example of this practice and its consequences is again 
offered by TRUSTe.  
In 2000, Jens Riegelsberger and Martina Angela Sasse wrote in their paper Trust me, I’m a 
.com. The Problem of Reassuring Shoppers in Electronic Retail Environments: 
“Surprisingly, one of the leading advertisers on the Internet in the past half-year has been 
TRUSTe, an organisation that assigns seals to e-commerce enterprises which it considers 
‘trustworthy’. In order to raise its profile, TRUSTe has instigated an internet-based 
publicity campaign involving between 200 and 700 million weekly impressions for its 
adverts. ‘Why?’ The number of B2C e-commerce retailing activities has not reached the 
dizzying heights predicted 18 months ago. Consumers’ ‘lack of trust’ in e-commerce is 
widely assumed to be one of the main reasons.” 120 
The authors should not have been surprised to find TMOs amongst the leading 
advertisers on the Internet. These figures show the importance of marketing a brand in the 
certification process. However, TRUSTe tried to win e-consumers’ trust in order to build 
its reputation by a marketing operation, although offering a service not up to expectations. 
More generally, it is hardly surprising that a company which invests a major part of its 
budget in marketing operations to catch e-consumers’ attention will not have much money 
left to provide a high-quality service. A marketing-based reputation represents a big risk to 
e-consumers who rely on TMO practices. Furthermore, this is potentially very dangerous 
for the trustmark system as a whole because, in the certification business, “[a]ny player in 
the market suffers reputational damage when there is a failure of one sort or another.”121 It 
is easier and more effective to do things right from the very beginning than be forced by 
scandals to have to win back consumers’ trust. This will be confirmed by the four big 
accounting firms that are nowadays, after the Enron scandal, struggling to restore trust in 
the accountancy profession. 
                                                                                                                                                    
119 Clarke, R. (12 April 1999) The Legal Context of Privacy-Enhancing and Privacy-Sympathetic 
Technologies, Available at <http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Florham.html>. 
120 Riegelsberger, J. & Sasse, M.A. (2000) Trust me, I’m a .com. The Problem of Reassuring Shoppers in 
Electronic Retail Environments, Intermedia 28 (4). Available at 
<http://www.cs.ucl.ac.uk/staff/A.Sasse/trustme.htm>. 
121 Samuel DiPiazza, global head of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, in an interview with the Financial Times 
on 21 July 2005 Parker, A. (2005), p. 11. 
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7. European TMOs’ business model 
 
Turning attention now to European TMOs, it is relevant to check whether the 
American TMO practice has also been implemented by European TMOs. 
In a recent study on trustmarks, it is reported that there are seven critical success 
factors according to European TMOs:  
 
1. Awareness of business and consumers  
2. A detailed and robust code of conduct  
3. Effective enforcement mechanisms 
4. A sufficient number of trustmarks issued (leading to user fee revenue) 
5. Trust in the (independent) organisation that operates the TMO 
6. Stakeholder support 
7. Low up-front and operational costs 122 
 
Awareness of business and consumers, which could be summarised in one word – 
‘marketing’ (critical success factor no. 1)123 – has already been proven to be extremely 
important in American TMO practice124 and is also a prominent element of the European 
TMOs’ business model. However, TMOs declare to also pay a great deal of attention to 
developing a detailed and robust code of conduct (critical success factor no. 2) and a strong 
                                                 
122 “[M]ost respondents mentioned that raising awareness amongst companies and consumers is a critical 
success factor. A highly elaborated and robust code of conduct that defines criteria exceeding the strict legal 
requirements and provides measurable proven legal rights increases the perceived value of the trustmark 
scheme. Another critical success factor is the existence of effective enforcement mechanisms, such as audits 
(including helping applicants to meet the criteria), monitoring and an independent alternative dispute-
resolution system. The number of trustmarks issued (leading to user fee revenue) and in which pricing plays 
a role is critical. Also mentioned is the trust from both businesses and consumers in the (independent) 
organisation that operates the trustmark scheme. A critical success factor that is closely related to this is the 
support of stakeholders, including government. Finally, low up-front and operational costs were indicated as 
critical success factor” (De Bruin, R. et al. (2005) Final Report, p. 97). 
123 Marketing is estimated to amount to as much as 23% of the total costs of the start-up phase. De Bruin’s 
study acknowledges that a TMO’s success depends on its visibility with business as well as consumers. 
Therefore, it is necessary for its logo to have a strong brand. High brand recognition requires 
communication through various media channels and therefore can be very costly. Furthermore, marketing 
expenses have to be seen as permanent costs. Once the brand has been created, it requires permanent 
marketing investment to retain or increase brand recognition. Cutting down on marketing, means less 
visibility and thus less brand recognition. 
124 See Subsection 6.2. 
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enforcement mechanism (critical success factor no. 3) which guarantees a fair audit, 
effective monitoring, and an independent alternative dispute resolution system.  
At this point, a fine observer could ask himself how European TMO are able to 
combine a detailed and robust code of conduct and a strong enforcement mechanism with 
low up-front and operational costs (critical success factor no. 7). The answer to such 
question rests in private sponsorship (critical success factor no. 6). Private sponsorship, in 
the form of investment of the funding organisation(s) or future trustmark users, is an 
important source of money for performing TMO services. As it has been pointed out in the 
analysis of the case study, however, this direct financial link between the TMO and its 
members may imply a conflict of interest, notably when sanctions have to be enforced.125  
Moreover, it is enough to dig a bit deeper into the European TMOs’ practice to see a 
few differences between what TMOs point out to be critical success factors and the service 
they actually offer. Regarding the effectiveness of the monitoring, most TMOs do not seem 
to put in place all the possible mechanisms for establishing and monitoring compliance 
with their specifications.126 Furthermore, as will be discussed in the next chapter, almost 
none of the TMOs analysed has a full-scale enforcement structure in place.127 One of the 
reasons for this can be related to the costs of such a mechanism. Furthermore, for reasons 
of commercial viability, TMOs prefer quantity (number of clients) over quality (effective 
enforcement infrastructure) in the start-up phase.128 
In summary, the practice of European TMOs does not differ much from that of 
American TMOs. As the American TMOs’ practice represents a risk to e-consumers who 
possibly rely on trustmarks, the European one does so, too. Furthermore, given the present 
practice, scandals such as the ones in which TRUSTe was involved are likely to happen in 
Europe. This will have a devastating effect on the European TMOs’ reputation and 
credibility of European TMOs and, ultimately, on the e-consumers’ trust in e-commerce. 
 
8. A lose-lose situation  
 
                                                 
125 See subsection 6.1. 
126 See De Bruin, R. et al. (2005) Final Report, p. 78. 
127 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.4 
128 See De Bruin, R. et al. (2005) Final Report, p. 103. 
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The TMO business consists of addressing e-consumer concerns by providing 
assurance services to e-merchants. A TMO’s goal is to promote trusting attitudes that will 
allow electronic transactions to proceed smoothly. E-merchants that display a TMO’s web 
assurance seal (i.e., trustmark) communicate to the consumer certain affirmations 
concerning legitimacy, security of transactions, privacy, and integrity. Research shows that 
web seals promote feelings of security and trust129 and influence the e-consumers’ intent to 
purchase online.130 In other words, TMOs help e-merchants obtain e-consumer data and 
sell goods and services.  
However, TMOs have already been proven to be not very trustworthy and, at first 
glance, their present practice does not look very promising. Risks of undetected e-
merchants’ actions that can cause loss to e-consumers are high, and damages can be 
difficult to recover.131  
Not only e-consumers but also e-merchants and governments will lose as a result of 
an untrustworthy TMO practice.  
By joining a trustmark programme, e-merchants run the risk that other e-merchants 
with the same trustmark will violate the rules of the trustmark programme and eventually 
cause damage to e-consumers who happen to rely on that trustmark. In this way, the 
reputation of that trustmark programme will be damaged and the investments made by all 
e-merchants to join it will be wasted. In fact, this is a risk that will always exist, but an 
unreliable TMO practice will increase it exponentially. Damage to e-consumers caused by 
a certified e-merchant will reduce the already scarce trust that e-consumers have in e-
commerce. This will not bring any positive effect to e-business or to the economy. 
Moreover, governments run the extra risk of letting TMOs run wild. In fact, if damage 
                                                 
129 See Huston, R., & Taylor, G. (1999) Consumer Perceptions of CPA Web Trust assurances: Evidence of an 
Expectation Gap, International Journal of Auditing 3 (2), pp. 89-105; Palmer, J. et al. (2000) The Role of 
Intermediaries in the Development of Trust on the WWW: The Use and Prominence of Trusted Third 
Parties and Privacy Statements, Journal of Computer Mediated Communication 5 (3). Available at 
<http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol5/issue3/palmer.html>. 
130 See Kovar, S. et al. (2000) Consumer Responses to the CPA WebTrust Assurance, Journal of Information 
Systems 14 (1), pp. 17-35; Mauldin, E. & Arunachalam, V. (2001), pp. 33-54; Wakefield, R.L. (2001) A 
Determination of the Antecedents of Online Trust and an Evaluation of Current Web Assurance Seals, 
Doctoral dissertation, University of Mississippi, MS. 
131 Damages were quite difficult to quantify in, e.g., the two class action lawsuits filed on a federal level, the 
other in California for the surreptitious harvesting of music preference data by RealJukebox. In the federal 
case, the plaintiffs sought a refund of the 30 dollars that some users paid for the registered version of the 
software. In the California case, plaintiffs’ lawyers very optimisticly estimated in 500 dollars per person the 
value of music preference data. See McWilliams, B. (November 10, 1999) Real Hit With Another Privacy 
Lawsuit, Internet news.com, Available at <http://www.internetnews.com/streaming-
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related to e-consumers’ reliance on trustmarks occurs, the inactivity of governments in 
regulating the matter will also be indicated as one of the reasons for the TMOs’ unreliable 
practice. 
From this quick review of TMO practice, it seems that TMOs are heading in the 
wrong direction. However, this is only a provisional conclusion. It is now necessary to 
undertake an in-depth analysis of how the certification system offered by TMOs works, in 
order to check the grounding of this preliminary assumption. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
news/article/0,1087,8161_236261,00.html>; Molland, M. (2001) Privacy Litigation in the United States — 











1. A definition of certification 
 
The word ‘certification’ derives from the Latin adjective certus, which means 
“determined, resolved, fixed, settled, purposed”.132 In fact, the most common perception of 
certification is that it gives some form of guarantee, generally of quality and dependability 
in their widest sense. Such perception could find its justification in the certification 
procedure according to which “a third party gives a written assurance that a product, 
process, or service conforms to specific characteristics”.133 The key element in the 
certification process is indeed the third party, an independent party who is expected to give 
an assurance (a guarantee) of the qualities of some products or services through the 
issuance of a certificate. 
Moreover, Jean-Marie Ponthier, in his paper La certification outil de la modernité 
normative, compares certification with scales as they can both be used in a comparative 
analysis.134 In fact, certification is mostly a means to measure products and services based 
on (quality) criteria which are established in advance. In this way, certification facilitates 
the comparison between different products and services.  
The importance of product and service quality certification schemes for international 
markets is evident. In fact, when goods and services are exchanged worldwide, most of the 
time, their quality cannot be directly tested. An independent third-party guarantee, given 
through the issuance of quality certificates, is therefore very useful. E-commerce is actually 
                                                 
132 Lewis, C.T. (1996) A Latin Dictionary (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 320. 
133 Rae, A. et al. (1995), p. 2. 
134 Ponthier, J. (1996) La certification outil de la modernité normative , Dalloz-Sirey vol. 30, p. 355. 
 49
the ultimate expression of market internationalisation,135 so certification can play an 
essential role there.136 
 
2. The certification process 
 
Certification is a process in which five stages can be distinguished (see Table 4). Two 
stages are in the pre-certification phase, i.e., before the issuance of the certificate. The third 
stage is indeed the possible issuance of the certificate. The other two stages are in the post-
certification phase, i.e., after the certificate has been granted. The process unfolds as 
follows: 
 
1. The standards need to be set.  
2. An assessment of the entity to be certified has to be carried out.  
3. Depending on the positive or negative outcome of the evaluation, the certificate will 
be issued or denied.  
4. In the post-certification phase, the certificate has to be monitored. 
5. Depending on the positive or negative outcome of the monitoring procedure, it may 
be confirmed or revoked. The certificate may also be suspended pending further 





                                                 
135 See Chapter 2, Section 3. 
136 On the importance of certification for e-Commerce and the related legal issues, see Stuurman, K. (1990) 
Legal Aspects of Standardization and Certification of Information Technology and Telecommunications: An 
Overview. In Kaspersen, H.W.K. & Oskamp, A. (eds.) Amongst Friends in Computers and Law (Deventer: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publisher), p. 75. See also extensively on the matter Brun, M.B. (2001). 
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Table 4: Certification process 
 
 
2.1 Setting the standards 
 
The role of standards 
It can be argued that standards are yardsticks by which different products and services 
may be compared. The comparison of products and services is a primary need in the 
international market. Drafting standards is the first step to fulfil this need. In a certification 
process, it is particularly important to use uniform standards so that products and services 
could be evaluated and compared worldwide according to the same rules.137 There are 
national and international organisations that set uniform standards in different sectors; 
sometimes the market itself is free to develop its own standards, which may eventually 
become recognised worldwide. 
 
 Official and de facto standards 
Standards can be classified on the basis of different criteria. However, for the purpose 
of this legal analysis, a distinction between official standards and de facto standards may 
suffice.  
Official standards (sometimes also referred to as ‘formal’ standards) are those that 
have been developed by national and international standardisation institutes and 
organisations. The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) defines (official) 
standard as follows: a “[d]ocument established by consensus and approved by a recognized 
body, that provides, for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
activities or their results, aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a 
                                                 
137 “In England no less than the Magna Carta legislated for one weight and one measure throughout the land, 
giving early emphasis to the importance of standardization and accountability” Rothery, B. (1996) 
Standards and Certification in Europe (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Limited), pp. 3-4. 
 51
given context.”138 Official standards are open and public: the participation in their 
development is open to all, and the results of the standardisation process are publicly 
available. 
A de facto standard differs from a formal standard in the sense that it has not been 
developed by an official body. De facto standards can differ substantially in origin, nature, 
and status. They can be closed in the sense that only one organisation or a closed group of 
organisations can define or update them. The latter applies, for instance, to technical 
specifications that have initially been developed by a supplier to support his particular 
product range or marketing strategy and, in the course of time, have become more widely 
used, also by other suppliers seeking a share of the business. A closed de facto standard 
may be public or non-public, depending on whether the technical specifications are 
available to everybody or only to the parties that participate in the body that originated the 
standard. In other words, when de facto standards are open, more organisations are 
involved in their definition and update through an open process, and the results (e.g., the 
technical specifications) are public, i.e., available to everyone who wants to use them.139 
 
Pros and cons of official and de facto standards 
Official standards have the advantage of being, by definition, public. They are 
accessible to all the actors in the market, which is very unlikely to happen with de facto 
standards. However, since official standards imply some sort of public intervention in 
regulating the market, they can have some undesirable effect on market growth.  
De facto standards are created by the companies themselves. The advantage of this 
form of self-regulation is its flexibility. This type of standards can be easily updated in 
order to comply with market needs. A big drawback of de facto standards is that they are 
closed. Only one organisation or a closed group of organisations can define or update 
them.140 




139 See Brun, M.B. (2001), p. 30. 
140 In fact, most of the time, large companies tend to elaborate their own internal standards, then claim 
copyright on them, and subsequently sell them or make the standards available through a licence contract. 
As a consequence of this policy, access to the standards by market competitors turns out to be difficult and 
limited. This practice is more likely to create a monopoly of standards and create an unfair competitive 
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Firms, governments, and users all benefit from standardisation 
Standardisation can be seen as the process of setting out international market rules. In 
this way, standardisation increases international competition. Consequently, it may help 
firms trying to expand their market share and hurt those trying to defend their market 
against others. For governments, standardisation of Information Technology (henceforth: 
IT) products and services is an important instrument to regulate trade and industry. From 
the user point of view, standardisation of IT products and services may be important in 





The second step of the certification process consists of the evaluation of the product, 
the service, the practice, or the policy to be certified. Although the ways in which the 
evaluation is carried out differ, the most common mechanism is the audit. ‘Audit’ usually 
refers to an official examination of the business and financial records of a company in order 
to see that they are true and correct. However, an audit can also be understood more 
generally as a systematic quality verification procedure. There are different types of 
auditing procedures – some of them very simple, others very complex. The quality level of 
the evaluation procedure will have an important impact on the quality level of the 
certification, its scope, and its legal value. 
 
Internal audit based on internal standards 
This is an evaluating procedure which is carried out by the company itself. It is the 
company that sets the standards which the products, services, procedures, or policies have 
to comply with. Furthermore, the company appoints employees who will be in charge of 
assessing whether the internal standards are respected and, if it is the case, issuing a sort of 
quality ‘certificate’.  
                                                                                                                                                    
advantage for the companies which can join the programme in relation to the other competitors. Ultimately, 
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The internal audit does not involve any third party, neither in the setting of the 
standards nor in the assessment of the company’s compliance with them. It is not possible 
to define this procedure as certification because, as already pointed out in Section 1 – 
“certification is a procedure by which a third party gives a written assurance that a product, 
process or service conforms to specific characteristics” – certification implies the presence 
of a third party.  
The outcome of the internal audit based on internal standards is comparable to a 
guarantee (but not to a certificate) issued by a company that its procedures, products, and 
services comply with some internal standards. In this context, Alan Couret, in his book La 
Certification, gives the example of the mark ‘Woolmark’.141 
The value of this guarantee is very limited because the company’s statements have 
not been counterchecked by a third party. 
 
Internal audit based on third-party standards 
This certification practice consists of the companies’ self-assessment based on third-
party standards. Usually, an authorised representative of the company which asks for the 
certificate has to fill out a questionnaire prepared by a third party, sign it, and attest that the 
statements made on the questionnaire are true and accurate on the date submitted and will 
remain true and accurate for the term of the agreement with the certifier. Then the certifier 
evaluates the answers given in the returned questionnaire and decides whether or not to 
issue the certificate. This is a certification system which can give some warranties of 
quality, since it is based on third-party standards, a company’s internal audit, and a third-
party countercheck.  
 
External audit 
The only evaluation procedure which can give strong warranties of accuracy and 
reliability is the external audit. The quality of a company’s products, services, practices, or 
policies to be certified is evaluated on the basis of official standards by external 
professional auditors, who will eventually issue a statement. On the basis of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
this situation is not in the best interest of the market. See Brun, M.B. (2001) pp. 56-58. 
141 Couret, A. et al. (1995) La Certification (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France), p. 10. 
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information provided in the statement, the entity in charge of the certification decides 
whether or not to issue the certificate. 
 
2.3 Issuance or denial of the certificate 
 
The pre-certification phase ends with the issuance or denial of the certificate. 
Moreover, if at the end of the auditing procedure the certificate is issued, the post-




After the certificate has been issued, the ongoing compliance of the certified company 
products, services, practices, or policies with the standards of the certification programme 
is monitored. Passive and active monitoring can be distinguished, depending on who takes 
the initiative for the monitoring. In the case of passive monitoring, the certifier starts to 
monitor a certified company as a result of a complaint received on that company’s non-
compliance with the certifier’s programme. In the case of active monitoring, the certifier 
periodically (and proactively) checks the quality of company’s certified products, services, 
practices, or policies. The frequency and the level of the investigations depend upon the 
sector of certification. For example, in the financial sector, the normal practice is to check 
on the certified companies every 30 to 90 days.  
 
2.5 Confirmation, suspension, or revocation 
 
The monitoring procedure is nothing but a re-evaluation of the company’s certified 
products, services, practices, or policies. If, at the end of the re-evaluation, the company 
still complies with the standards of the certification programme, the certificate will be 
confirmed. If the company no longer meets the certification standards, the certificate will 
be revoked. Sometimes, if the certifier encounters non-compliance, it sets a time frame for 
the company to bring its products, services, practices, or policies in line with the standards. 
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It goes without saying that, if the company meets the certification requirements at the end 
of the suspension time, it can keep the certificate; if it does not, the certificate will be 
revoked. A certificate is also revoked when the contract terminates. By doing regular 
monitoring and consistently using their power to confirm, suspend, and revoke certificates, 
certifiers can foster the compliance of the certified companies with the certifiers’ 
programmes in the phase after the certificate has been issued.  
 
3. The key elements of a trustworthy certification 
practice 
 
The analysis of the certification process suggests five necessary conditions for a 
trustworthy certification practice: 
 
1. Certifier independency 
2. Impartiality in the auditing procedure 
3. Active monitoring of the certified company 
4. Certifier enforcement power 
5. Certifier accountability 
 
3.1 Certifier independency  
 
The third-party certifier must be an unbiased, independent entity. There cannot be a 
mixing of interests with the certification candidate.142 Bernard Brun, in his paper Nature et 
impacts juridiques de la certification dans le commerce électronique sur Internet, pointed 
out the situation in which the certifier carries out its activity for business as a blatant 
example of conflict of interests.143 Of course, if the certifier makes a business out of its 
                                                 
142 See Havighurst, C.C. (1994) The Place of Private Accreditation among the Instruments of Government, 
Law and Contemporary Problems 57 (4), p. 2; Astrue, M.J. (1994) Health Care Reform and the 
Constitutional Limits on Private Accreditation as an Alternative to Direct Government Regulation, Law and 
Contemporary Problems 57 (4), p. 75. 
143 “(…) un organisme privé est susceptible d’avoir des intérêts qui peuvent mettre en cause son impartialité 
dans le processus de certification. L’exemple le plus flagrant serait la situation où le certificateur exerce son 
activité dans un but lucratif” (Brun M.B. (2001), pp. 44-45). 
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activity, its independency can be compromised by its eagerness to make money. However, 
with the exception of public certification, most of the private certifiers (e.g., financial 
auditing companies) run their activity for lucrative purposes. Brun’s view is therefore 
slightly naïve. It is a matter of fact that, nowadays, certification is a business. Certifier 
independency should not depend on whether the certifier makes money by issuing 
certificates. Seemingly more relevant to the matter at hand are questions such as:  
 




“Does the certifier receive financial funding from potential clients?”  
 
There may be two completely different answers to the first question: (a) certification 
fees are paid for the issuance of a certificate; and (b) certification fees are paid for the 
conduct of audit. In the first case, the certifier is obligated to issue the certificate to the 
company. In the second, the certifier is only requested to audit the company. It goes 
without saying that the first situation excludes an (independent) evaluation of the company. 
As to the second question, a bias will also be created if the certifier receives consistent 
sponsorship by potential clients. In fact, the certifier will think twice about refusing issuing 
those companies a certificate denouncing their non-compliance with the certification 
programme, and eventually suspending or revoking their certificates. 
 
3.2 Impartiality in the auditing procedure 
 
In the pre-certification phase, the company to be certified must be audited on the 
basis of official standards by an independent party.144 In this way, the impartiality of the 
audit is guaranteed,145 as opposed to the situation in which the audit of the company is 
carried out by one of its employees.146 
                                                 
144 On the importance of independent assessment, see Couret, A. et al. (1995), p. 5; Rae, A. et al. (1995), p. 2. 
145 See Subsection 2.2 External audit. 
146 See Subsection 2.2 Internal audit based on third-party standards. 
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3.3 Active monitoring of the certified company 
 
The certificate is by definition already ‘outdated’ the moment it is issued or, more 
precisely, after the company has been audited. However, it is from then on that the 
certificate will be displayed as a quality guarantee. Therefore, it is essential to assure the 
trustworthiness of the certificate by actively running periodic controls to assess that the 
certified quality of the companies’ products, services, practices, or policies, products, or 
services is still up to standards.  
 
3.4 Certifier enforcement power 
 
It is also very essential that a certifier has the power to take appropriate measures if a 
certified company does not comply with the certification programme. A certifier must have 
the necessary independence from and avoid conflict of interests with the certified 
companies so that it could suspend or revoke a certificate (e.g., the certifier will not have 
the power to suspend or revoke the certificate of a company that finances the certifier).147 
A certifier that cannot, for example, suspend or revoke a certificate if a certified 
company has been shown not to comply with the certification programme is ‘comparable to 
a tiger without teeth and nails’. Moreover, it represents a risk to people who rely on its 
possibly outdated certificates. It creates unfair competition among companies, allowing 
companies which do not comply with the certification programme to convey trust by 
displaying a certificate. Last but not least, it represents a risk to the reputation of all 
certifiers. If a certificate is found on, for example, a product which does not meet the 
certified quality, this can cause a deep loss of confidence in the whole certification 
system.148 
 
                                                 
147 See Subsection 3.1. 
148 “Any player in the market suffers reputation damage when there is a failure of one sort or another” Samuel 
DiPiazza, global head of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, commenting on the loss of confidence in the quality 
of financial auditing, in an interview with the Financial Times on 21 July 2005, quoted in Parker, A. (2005), 
p. 11. 
 58
3.5 Certifier accountability  
 
People perceive a certificate as a sort of guarantee149 of the information provided 
through the certificate. In fact, the certificate informs the customer of certain quality 
aspects of a product or service and thus of its use.150 Certifier liability towards third parties 
can, on the one hand, enhance the accuracy of the information provided through the 
certificate and thus improve the trustworthiness of the certification service. On the other 
hand, certifier accountability for the provision of inaccurate information towards third 
parties reassures people who rely on the certificate and possibly fosters trust in the 
certification system.151 
 
4. Benchmarked TMOs 
 
Four TMOs based in the US and five TMOs based in Europe will now be presented 
and evaluated on the basis of the five necessary conditions for a trustworthy certification 
practice.152 The aim of this effort is to draw some conclusions on the soundness and 
trustworthiness of the actual TMO practice. The selection criteria differ between the 
American and the European TMOs. The US market is dominated by the four TMOs 
selected. Therefore, they are a representative sample of the US TMO practice. The 
European market, on the other hand, consists of many small players, none of which has 
reached critical mass. Moreover, it is usually not so easy to find much information on their 
practices. The five TMOs were chosen because they made enough information available on 
their websites to carry out an accurate analysis.  
 
4.1 American TMOs 
TRUSTe, BBBOnLine, WebTrust, and VeriSign are the TMOs which dominate the 
market in the US.  
                                                 
149 See Rae, A. et al. (1995), p. 6; Dean, H. & Biswas, A. (2001), pp. 41-57. 
150 See Stuurman, K. (1990), p. 51. 
151 See Brun M.B. (2001), pp. 51-53. 
152 See Section 3. 
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TRUSTe (Trusted Universal Standards in Electronic Transaction) was set up in the 
US in 1996 to fill the US government’s need for self-regulation in personal data 
protection.153 TRUSTe offers its trustmark programmes worldwide. The object of the 
trustmark programmes is the protection of personal data. The main scopes of TRUSTe’s 
activity are (a) to help consumers gain control over their personal data; (b) to offer 
companies privacy standards; and (c) to foster self-regulation. TRUSTe has about 2,500 
clients.154 
BBBOnLine is the Internet counterpart of the Better Business Bureau155 and the trust 
roles it plays in the physical market. This self-regulatory initiative was launched in 1997 as 
the second privacy programme, together with TRUSTe, to stress the commitment of the US 
government towards e-merchant privacy compliance.156 BBBOnLine’s mission is to 
promote trust and confidence in the Internet through the BBBOnLine Reliability and 
Privacy Seal Programmes. BBBOnLine’s website trustmark programmes allow companies 
with websites to display the trustmark once they have been evaluated and deemed to meet 
the programme requirements.157 To date, about 40,000 e-merchants display BBBOnLine 
trustmarks.158 
The WebTrust trustmark programme was created jointly by the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the Canadian Institute of Charted Accountants 
(CICA) and was launched in June 1999. Webtrust provides several trustmarks.  
Generally, e-merchants that request WebTrust’s trustmarks are audited on the basis of 
five principles: (1) security, (2) availability (of relevant information for e-consumers), (3) 
process integrity, (4) online privacy, and (5) confidentiality.159 The webpage “Sites with 
seal” provides a sampling of about 30 e-merchant sites that have been awarded WebTrust’s 
trustmarks.160 
VeriSign was created in 1995. Although VeriSign presents itself as a TMO which 
issues security certificates, in fact, it does not. TMOs are defined as independent 
                                                 
153 See extensively Farrell, H. (2005). 
154 See member list available at <http://www.truste.org/about/member_list.php>. 
155 See <http://www.bbb.org/>. 
156 For the story of BBBOnLine, see Farrell, H. (forthcoming). 
157 See BBBOnLine Programmes available at <http://www.bbbonline.org/business/>. 
158 The list of the certified e-merchants is available at <http://www.bbbonline.org/consumer/>. 
159 The principles are explained in Suitable Trust Services and Criteria, available at 
<http://www.webtrust.org/download/final-Trust-Services.pdf>. 
160 The list of certified e-merchants is available at <http://www.webtrust.org/abtseals.htm>. 
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organisations that offer a system of certification.161 Certification is “a procedure by which a 
third party gives a written assurance that a product, process or service conforms to specific 
characteristics.”162 Since VeriSign does not carry out a conformity evaluation procedure, it 
cannot sensu stricto be defined as a TMO. In fact, VeriSign sells security products that 
come together with a trustmark that purchasers can post on their websites to show that they 
use VeriSign technology. Because VeriSign is a strong and well-established brand, its 
trustmarks are perceived by consumers as quality certificates.163 A very large number of e-
merchants display the VeriSign trustmark on their websites.164 
 
4.2 European TMOs 
 
Confianza Online, Euro-Label, Luxembourg e-Commerce Certified, Thuiswinkel, and 
Trusted Shops are the chosen European-based TMOs. 
Confianza Online is a joint self-regulatory initiative of the Spanish advertising 
organisation, the Asociación para la Autorregulación de la Comunicación Comercial 
(AUTOCONTROL), and of the Spanish e-commerce association, the Asociación Española 
de Comercio Electrónico (AECE). It was launched in 2003 to increase consumer 
confidence in e-commerce by issuing the Confianza Online trustmark to e-merchants that 
comply with the Confianza Online Ethical Code on e-commerce and interactive 
advertising. To date, some 200 e-merchants have displayed the Confianza trustmark on 
their websites.165 
Euro-Label is a pan-European self-regulatory initiative launched in November 1999 
and coordinated by EuroCommerce,166 a European association representing the retail, 
wholesale, and international trade sectors. E-merchants may apply for the Euro-Label 
trustmarks by contacting their national Euro-Label certification body.167 This organisation 
                                                 
161 See Chapter 2, Section 5. 
162 See Section 1. 
163 The literature also considers VeriSign a TMO. See, e.g., Endeshaw, A. (2001), p. 211. 
164 See Existing Customers, available at <http://www.verisign.com/log-in/index.html>. 
165 See the list of certified e-merchants available at 
<http://www.confianzaonline.org/quienessomos/adheridas.php>. 
166 See <http://www.eurocommerce.be>. 
167 Currently, there are six Euro-Label certification bodies: 1. Das Österreichische E-Commerce Gütezeichen 
in Austria; 2. Labelsite in France; 3. Geprüfter Online-Shop in Germany; 4. ConfCommercio in Italy; 5. 
Confederación española de comercio / Confianza Online in Spain; 6. Institute of Logistics and Warehousing 
(Instytut Logistyki i Magazynowania) in Poland. 
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will then carry out a standardised certification process, checking the e-merchant’s 
commercial practices against both the European code of conduct168 and any specific 
national commercial rules that apply. If the e-merchants are found to operate according to 
these rules of commercial practice, they will be granted the Euro-Label trustmark. Euro-
Label’s main objective is to foster the growth of national and cross-border e-transactions 
within Europe by ensuring that there is a common basis for online trading that is 
trustworthy and fair. To that end, Euro-Label guarantees e-consumers that, when an e-
merchant has been awarded the Euro-label trustmark, they will receive reliable and 
trustworthy services. So far, slightly more than 500 e-merchants have been awarded the 
Euro-Label trustmark.169 
Luxembourg e-Commerce Certified was launched in March 2002. It is a joint 
initiative of the Ministère de l’Economie et du Commerce extérieur, the Chambre de 
Commerce, and the Chambre des Métiers to guarantee the quality and security of 
Luxembourg’s commercial websites. One e-privacy trustmark and two e-commerce 
trustmarks, depending on whether or not e-merchants provide online payment services, are 
offered. The issuance of each of the three trustmarks is subject to an audit of candidate e-
merchants by the Société Nationale de Certification et d’Homologation (SNCH)170 
accredited by the Office Luxembourgeois d’Accréditation et de Surveillance (OLAS).171 So 
far, about 10 e-merchants have been certified by Luxembourg e-Commerce Certified.172 
Thuiswinkel is a trustmark launched in December 2001 by Thuiswinkel.org, a Dutch 
association representing retailers that offer distance-selling services to consumers. The 
Thuiswinkel trustmark has received the approval of the Consumentenbond,173 the largest 
Dutch consumer association. E-merchants receive the Thuiswinkel trustmark if they 
comply with the Thuiswinkel code of conduct, which sets forth rules on privacy and fair 








170 See <http://www.snch.lu/>. 
171 See <http://www.olas.public.lu/>. 
172 See the list of certified e-merchants available at <http://www.e-certification.lu/listsit.htm>. 
173 See <http://www.consumentenbond.nl/?ticket=nietlid>  
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business practice.174 So far, about 800 e-merchants have displayed the Thuiswinkel 
trustmark on their websites. 
Trusted Shops was launched in January 2000. It is a private, self-regulatory initiative 
created in cooperation with consumer protection agencies. “The primary objective was to 
meet the demands made by the leading politicians for better security in the Internet – and to 
confirm the consumer that this security is here to stay.”175 In order to receive the Trusted 
Shops trustmark, e-merchants have to meet the Trusted Shops security standards.176 
According to the figure provided by Trusted Shops, about 2,500 e-merchants are today 
operating under such standards.177 
 
5. Evaluation of TMO practice 
 
At this point, be it somewhat circuitous, a quality assessment will be carried out to 
determine the quality of service provided by TMOs. The five elements of a trustworthy 
certification practice178 will form the yardstick against which the quality of the TMO 













                                                 
174 See 
<http://www.thuiswinkel.org/onderdeel/thuiswinkelennl/index.asp?kolomA=3950&kolomB=&navid=1>. 
175 Trusted Shops - About us. Available at <http://www.trustedshops.com/en/trustedshops/index.html>. 
176 See Obligations, available at http://www.trustedshops.com/en/shops/obligations_en.html. 
177 See <http://www.trustedshops.com/en/trustedshops/index.html>. 
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2 Impartiality in the auditing procedure 
 
3 Active monitoring of the certificate owner practice 
 






Table 5: Yardstick for the measurement of TMO services quality 
 
 
5.1 Assessing TMO independency 
 
TMOs can be considered independent if their funding structure and the composition 
of their board of directors are neutral. However, the analysis of the benchmarked TMOs’ 
practice reveals that independency is not easy to achieve. 
The trustmark market is totally unregulated and is characterised by the opportunistic 
behaviour of the players. E-merchants willing to receive a trustmark have to pay, in the 
majority of cases, an ‘entrance fee’ (i.e., a fee to become a member of the trustmark 
programme)179 as opposed to a ‘compliance audit fee’ (i.e., a fee to be audited). There are 
in fact more TMOs which ‘sell’ certificates than TMOs which provide a real quality 
evaluation service, which may culminate in the issuance of a certificate to an e-merchant 
but which may also end with the refusal of the certificate.180 
However, TMOs should not be branded as the ‘bad guys’. Given the absence of 
regulation, TMOs simply adapt their practice to market demand. In fact, e-merchants are 
not interested in the highest possible standards of inspections. Instead, their main interest 
lies in acquiring a trustmark as easily as possible. As strict inspections lower the probability 
of successful certification, e-merchants have an incentive to choose TMOs with low 
evaluation standards.181 As a result, TMOs will act in the same way assuming a given fee, 
i.e., to minimise their audit cost. Consequently, they can become dependent on their clients 
through a special form of setting the fee, known in auditing theory as ‘low-balling’.182 
According to this theory, auditors, in order to win a contract, set the fee for the first 
                                                                                                                                                    
178 See Section 3. 
179 This is the case, for example, for four out of the nine benchmarked TMOs. 
180 This is the case for three out of the nine benchmarked TMOs. 
181 See Pierce, B. & Sweeney, B. (2004) Cost-Quality Conflict in Audit Firms: An Empirical Investigation, 
European Accounting Review 13, pp. 415-441. 
182 See Calegari, M. et al. (1998) Experimental Evidence of Differential Auditor Pricing and Reporting 
Strategies, Accounting Review 73, pp. 255-275; De Angelo, L.E. (1981) Auditor Independence, Low Balling 
and Disclosure Regulation, Journal of Accounting and Economics 3, 113-127. 
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inspection far below their calculated real costs. As profits tend to be realised only in an 
ongoing business relationship, the annual returns from subsequent inspections represent a 
‘quasi-rent’, since they depend on customer loyalty.183 Therefore low-balling makes the 
inspectors undesirably dependent on their clients.184  
Moreover, if TMOs have to keep the fee as low as possible, they will necessarily seek 
sponsorship185 in order to survive, which in turn will have further negative effects on their 
independence. Almost all the benchmarked TMOs receive financial sponsorship.186 It is not 
unusual for the same e-merchants that sponsor a TMO to join that TMO’s trustmark 
programme. Sometimes, representatives of those e-merchants are also on the TMO’s board 
of directors.187 This direct financial link between the TMO and the members of its 
trustmark programme may imply a conflict of interest, notably when sanctions have to be 
enforced. In fact, TMOs will think twice before denouncing the non-compliance with their 
trustmark programmes by one of those e-merchants and eventually revoking their 
trustmarks.  
Another necessary condition for the TMO to be independent is that the composition 
of the TMO’s board should be a balanced representation of all interested parties. This will 
ensure the objectivity of requirements for e-merchants as well as maintain an egalitarian 
approach. However, majority of the benchmarked TMOs’ boards are composed only of 
representatives of e-merchants.188 
 
5.2 Assessing TMO impartiality in the e-merchant auditing 
procedure 
 
As to evaluation mechanisms, internal audits are used more often than external 
audits.189 Moreover, e-merchants’ practice and policies are checked against closed de facto 
                                                 
183 The generation of revenue through user fees (in addition to sponsorship) is a critical success factor for 
TMOs. See De Bruin, R. et al. (2005) Final Report, p. 99. 
184 See Makkawi, B. & Schick, A. (2003) Are Auditors Sensitive Enough to Fraud?, Managerial Auditing 
Journal 19, pp. 797-822. 
185 “[I]n the [TMO] operational phase, user fees are the most significant type of revenues, followed by 
sponsorships” De Bruin, R. et al. (2005) Final Report, p. 96.  
186 See De Bruin, R. et al. (2005) Final Report, p. 89. 
187 This is the case, for example, for two of the nine benchmarked TMOs. 
188 This is the case, for example, for five of the nine benchmarked TMOs. 
189 Five of the nine TMOs analysed base their certification practice on an internal audit. 
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standards.190 TMOs set forth their own standards, which apply only to the e-merchants that 
join their programmes. In other words, e-merchants that apply for trustmarks are usually 
requested to self-assess their policy or practice against the TMO’s standards. This internal 
procedure is usually followed by a (self-)declaration of conformity, on the basis of which 
the TMO issues the trustmark to the e-merchant.  
The self-assessment procedure can take various forms. The ‘check-the-box’ practice 
is the most widespread. Authorised representatives of e-companies which ask for 
certificates have to fill in a questionnaire prepared by the TMO. Then they usually have to 
sign and attest that the statements made on the questionnaire are true and accurate as of the 
date submitted and will remain true and accurate for the term of the agreement with the 
TMO. The TMO evaluates the answers given in the returned questionnaire and decides 
whether or not the certificate will be issued.  
In theory, this certification system can give some warranties on quality based on 
third-party standards, a company’s internal audit, and a third-party countercheck. However, 
in practice, the evaluation procedure presents some weaknesses. The TMO’s countercheck 
is only a formality; usually, the questionnaire is already returned to the TMO together with 
the fee for the trustmark. Therefore, the success of the system is based upon the good faith 
and professionalism of the e-companies’ representatives and, to some minor extent, upon 
the quality of the questionnaire. The reason why this practice is so popular rests in its 
inexpensiveness. Furthermore, it does not require the physical presence of the individuals 
taking part in the certification process. The same remarks are also valid when the self-
assessment consists only of the e-merchant’s declaration of conformity with the TMO’s 
standards. There are quite a few TMOs which, for the issuance of their trustmarks, require 
only the e-merchant’s declaration of conformity with their standards and principles.191 
Definitely less common in the trustmark business is the external audit of the e-
merchant’s practices and policies.192 In this procedure, professional auditors check the e-
merchants’ policies and practices against the TMO’s standards. On the basis of the 
auditors’ report, the TMO eventually decides whether to issue the trustmark to the e-
                                                 
190 See Subsection 2.2 Internal audit based on internal standards. 
191 Three of the nine benchmarked TMOs require only the e-merchant’s declaration of conformity to their 
standards/principles. 
192 Two of the nine benchmarked TMOs carry out an external audit of the e-merchant’s practices and policies 
before they decide whether or not to grant e-merchants the trustmark. 
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merchant. Moreover, the trustmark is actually a hyperlink on which an e-consumer can 
click to read the full report the auditors have written on the company.193 
It goes without saying that the TMOs’ practice based on an external audit of an e-
merchant’s policies and practices offers more warranties that the quality standards 
represented by the trustmark are actually met by the certified e-merchant, at least at the 
time the trustmark was issued. From that moment on, compliance has to be checked 
through monitoring activities.194 However, the TMOs which require this evaluation practice 
are by far the less successful. There are at least two reasons for this. First, the trustmark 
fees are higher than the ones asked by TMOs which base their certification on the e-
merchants’ self-assessments. Obviously, a third-party audit is more expensive than a self-
assessment. Second, it is more difficult for e-merchants to get the trustmark. In one case, a 
declaration of conformity, not even always followed by a self-assessment procedure, of the 
e-merchant is enough to receive the trustmark. In the other case, third-party auditors have 
to assess that the e-merchant’s policies and practices are in compliance with the TMO 
standards. 
If unregulated, the trustmark market, driven by the opportunistic behaviour of the 
players, stimulates worst practice (i.e., only an internal audit) as opposed to best practice 
(i.e., an external audit). Therefore, negative consequences involving e-consumers who rely 
on the trustmarks are more likely to follow. 
 
5.3 Assessing whether TMOs actively monitor e-merchant 
practice 
 
Given the possible conflict of interests for the TMO due to the financial link195 with 
its clients (i.e., certified e-merchants), it would be best if the monitoring practice were 
undertaken by an independent third-party body, external to the TMO, or by a dedicated 
impartial body, composed of a balanced representation of the stakeholders, i.e., e-
merchants and e-consumers, operating within the TMO. However, in most of cases, the 
monitoring of the certified e-merchants rely neither on the intervention of an independent 
                                                 
193 See Subsection 2.2 External audit. 
194 See Subsection 5.3. 
195 See ‘sponsorship system’ and ‘low-balling effect’ (Section 5.1). 
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body external to the TMO nor on an impartial body inside the TMO. Often, there is no 
separation of powers within the TMO; in fact, one single body is in charge of all the 
trustmark-related activities. 
Moreover, concerning the modality of monitoring, Requirement 7 (Monitoring 
System) of the European Trustmarks Requirements (henceforth: ETR)196 set forth that: 
 
Trustmark schemes should regularly monitor the subscriber’s compliance 
with the trustmark requirements. This should include random checks of the 
subscriber’s site including mystery shopping.  
Trustmark schemes should report on the results of the monitoring and of the 
non-compliance complaints received to the independent third party.  
Trustmark schemes should encourage feedback from consumers and other 
interested parties. 
 
The provision encourages TMOs to put in place a system of active (i.e., “random 
checks of the subscriber’s site including mystery shopping”) and passive (i.e., “feedback 
from consumers and other interested parties”) monitoring activities. Moreover, TMOs 
should also report on the monitoring results. 
Generally, the benchmarked TMOs meet the first two recommendations of the ETR. 
Almost all TMOs use (or at least they declare to use) the ‘mystery shopping’ method and 
provide a feedback system by which e-consumers and other interested parties can report 
complaints about the e-merchants’ practices. However, due to the absence of reported 
information on the monitoring results, it is very difficult to assess whether TMOs in fact 
actively monitor e-merchants and whether TMOs do it in a non-discriminatory way by 
random checks or by systematic monitoring of all the certified e-merchants. 
The regularity of checks may vary considerably from one TMO to another. Some 
TMOs limit themselves to “regularly” sample sites, while other TMOs have a timeframe 
which ranges between 90 days and one year. 
                                                 
196 European Trustmark Requirements (ETR) is a code of conduct drafted by the European Consumers’ 
Organisation (Bureau Européen des Unions de Consommateurs - BEUC) in 2000. The ETR aim to provide a 
high standard of consumer protection in electronic commerce and encourage the sale of goods and services 
on the internet. The ETR offer a basis for good online practice. They do not seek to override or replace any 
mandatory provisions at the European level. They are supplementary to legal obligations and do not affect 
consumers’ statutory rights. Trustmark schemes are encouraged to meet or exceed the ETR. These 
requirements are aimed at general trustmarks for e-commerce directed towards consumers. 
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5.4 Assessing TMO enforcement power 
 
Both consumers and businesses find it very important that there is an effective 
enforcement infrastructure, including a complaints procedure and alternative dispute 
resolution. 197 However, almost none of the benchmarked trustmark schemes have a full-
scale enforcement structure in place.  
Requirement 8 of the ETR lays down what a full-scale enforcement procedure should 
look like: 198 
 
Trustmark schemes should have an adequate and meaningful enforcement 
mechanism and should take the necessary steps to ensure that subscribers 
comply with the trustmark requirements. 
Trustmark schemes should ensure that, when the trustmark requirements are 
not met, subscribers undertake to amend practices to bring them into line with 
the trustmark requirements within a short period of time. 
A list of dissuasive and proportionate sanctions should be established, which 
could include information on the media and financial fines. 
Available sanctions Sanctions available should include the withdrawal of the 
trustmark when the subscriber fails to take action to comply with the 
trustmark requirements or seriously or repeatedly fails to comply with them. 
The enforcement process should be transparent. 
Decisions as regards sanctions should be disclosed to the independent third 
party. 
Trustmark schemes should make available to the public decisions to withdraw 
the trustmark. 
                                                 
197 De Bruin, R. et al. (2005) Final Report, p. 83. 
198 European Trustmark Requirements (ETR). As already mentioned in footnote 13, the UNICE - BEUC e-
Confidence project establishes European trustmark requirements (ETR) aiming to provide a high standard of 
consumer protection in electronic commerce and encourage the sale of goods and services on the Internet. 
The ETR offer a basis for good online practice. They do not seek to override or replace any mandatory 
provisions at European level. They are supplementary to legal obligations and do not affect consumers’ 
statutory rights. BEUC, the European Consumers’ Organisation, is the Brussels-based federation of 
independent national consumer organisations from all the Member States of the EU and from other 
European countries. See <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/e-commerce/e-conf_working_doc.pdf>. 
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All the benchmarked TMOs offer a dispute resolution programme. Sometimes the 
judging body is independent and external to the TMO, sometimes it is an internal 
committee, and this brings about the issues related to the TMO’s possible conflict of 
interests.199 However, TMO enforcement procedures generally lack transparency. TMOs do 
not generally provide statistics on the removal of trustmarks from e-merchants’ websites. In 
the best scenario, some provide general figures about the number of trustmarks issued or 
sometimes the number of disputes dealt with. In most cases, TMOs do not mention or 
publish information on sanctions imposed on e-merchants.200 The lack of information on 
enforcement outcomes makes it very hard to judge the effectiveness of TMO enforcement 
systems. It leaves open the question of whether the trustmark programme requirements are 
only statements of aspiration or whether they can be perceived as meaningful because 
TMOs have the resources to and will effectively police merchant compliance. 
 
5.5 Assessing TMO accountability 
 
The vast majority of the benchmarked TMOs tend to waive their liability for any 
damage sustained by e-consumers who rely on the trustmarks by using cautionary 
language, including disclaimers, in contractual clauses or notices which are displayed 
somewhere on the TMO’s website.201 
There is nothing wrong when an organisation implements certain measures to 
downplay the liability risk it may face. However, TMOs aim at enhancing e-consumer trust 
in the quality of e-merchant practices. Disclaimers appear to be odd instruments here. It is 
very unlikely that e-consumer trust in e-merchant security, privacy, and business practices 
will be enhanced if those that certify those practices refuse any kind of liability related to 
the information provided in the certificates. In most cases, however, e-consumers are not 
even aware of such disclaimers.202 
                                                 
199 See Subsection 5.1. 
200 With only one exception among the benchmarked TMOs. 
201 Clauses which tend to limit or exclude the liability of TMOs to e-consumers can be found on the 
‘Disclaimers’ page, in ‘Terms and Conditions’, in the ‘Certification Practice Statement’, the Seal Licence 
Agreement, or in the ‘Relying Party Agreement’. 
202 See Chapter 2, Subsection 5.2. 
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A selection of the most frequently used grounds on which TMOs try to limit or 
disclaim their liability is listed hereunder. 
 
The information provided in the trustmark “is not to be relied upon”. 
Sometimes, TMOs base the exclusion of their liability for damage to any person 
acting in reliance on the information they provide on the fact that the information is to 
meant merely for general guidance purposes and is not to be relied upon. For example, a 
disclaimer may state: “The information contained in this site is for general guidance on 
matters of interest only. No liability can be accepted by XXXX, its directors, or employees 
for any loss occasioned to any person or entity acting or failing to act as a result of 
anything contained in or omitted from the content of this website, or our conclusions as 
stated.” 
 
The information provided in the trustmark is to be used “at your own risk”. 
By such clause, TMOs state that users may use the information provided in the 
trustmarks at their own risk. For example, a disclaimer may provide: “You agree that your 
use of the seal is solely at your own risk.”  
 
Slight negligence liability liability is excluded.  
In some cases, TMOs only accept liability for wilful intent and gross negligence. For 
example, a disclaimer may provide: “Within the framework of the statutory regulations, 
XXXX shall only be liable for wilful intent and gross negligence liability; slight negligence 
shall be excluded.” 
 
TMOs use“AS IS” warranty. 
Occasionally, TMOs use the standard ‘AS IS’ warranty203 to specify that they issue 
no warranty that the information provided in the trustmark is accurate or complete. At the 
same time, they do not warrant the merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, 
                                                 
203 In Black’s Law Dictionary, “as is warranty” is defined as: “A warranty that goods are sold with all existing 
faults.” Garner, B.A. (2004) Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul MN: Thomson West). 
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satisfaction quality, and non-infringement of the trustmark as a product. In other words, 
they fully exclude any kind of liability. For example, a disclaimer may provide:  
“You agree that your use of the seal is solely at your own risk. You agree that 
all such seals are provided on an “as is” and “as available” basis, except as 
otherwise noted in this seal licence agreement. XXXX expressly disclaims all 
representations, warranties, guarantees, terms, or conditions of any kind, 
whether express or implied, including but not limited to the implied warranties 
of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, satisfaction quality and non-
infringement to the extent permitted by applicable law. XXXX does not make 
any representation, warranty of guarantee that the seal will meet your 
requirements, or that any service will be uninterrupted, timely, secure or error 
free, nor does XXXX make any representation, warranty or guarantee as to the 
results that may be obtained from the use of the seal or to the accuracy or 
reliability of any information obtained through XXXX.”  
 
TMOs invoke an indemnity or hold-harmless clause. 
Often TMOs combine the ‘AS IS’ warranty with the ‘indemnity’ or ‘hold-harmless’ 
clause204 by which they try to impose an obligation on the e-merchants who received the 
trustmarks to defend, indemnify, and hold the TMOs harmless from any liability, damages, 
costs, and expenses which originate from a third-party claim. For example, a disclaimer 
may provide:  
“Licensee will defend, indemnify and hold XXXX, and its officers, directors, 
employees and representatives harmless from and against any liability, 
damages, costs and expenses, including without limitation reasonable 
attorneys’ fees, in connection with any third party claims against XXXX, its 
officers, directors, employees or representatives, arising from or relating to the 
Site, Licensee’s use of the XXXX Mark(s) (except for claims that the XXXX 
Mark(s) or use of the XXXX Mark(s) infringes any trademark, service mark 
or certification mark rights of third parties) or Licensee’s non-compliance 
                                                 
204 In Black’s Law Dictionary, “indemnity clause” is defined as: “A contractual provision in which one party 
agrees to answer for any specific or unspecific liability or harm that the other party might incur. – Also 
termed hold-harmless clause; save harmless clause.” Garner, B.A. (2004) Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul 
MN: Thomson West). 
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with the Privacy Statement(s) (defined in the attached Schedule) or Program 
Requirements (which are set forth in the attached Schedule); provided that 
XXXX (i) provides prompt written notice of any such claim, action or 
demand; (ii) allows Licensee to control the defence and related settlement 
negotiations, provided, however, that XXXX shall have the right to participate 
in such defence with counsel of its own choosing at its own expense; (iii) 
provides Licensee, at Licensee’s request, with reasonable assistance in the 
defence of such claim, action or demand, so long as Licensee reimburses 
XXXX for XXXX’s reasonable out-of-pocket expenses associated therewith; 
and (iv) Licensee may not settle a claim in a manner that causes XXXX to 
incur unindemnified liability, take action, or suffer other injury, without 





The hypothesis put forward at the end of the previous chapter, i.e., that TMOs’ 
services seem to be unreliable,206 has been confirmed by the foregoing analysis of the 
TMOs’ practices. 
Unregulated market forces, characterised by the opportunistic behaviour of the 
market players, are increasingly driving TMOs towards an untrustworthy practice. A low-
price policy and the widespread use of private sponsorship put TMO independence under 
great pressure. Without the necessary independence, the whole TMO certification activity 
may be compromised. Furthermore, the analysis of the benchmarked TMOs’ practices 
shows that an audit of e-merchants by an independent third party is the exception while e-
merchant self-assessment is the rule. Active monitoring of e-merchant compliance and 
enforcement procedures are generally in place. However, due to the lack of transparency 
and information, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the present monitoring 
activities and enforcement practices. It is also legitimate to doubt, first, whether monitoring 
                                                 
205 Trustmarks are most of the time licensed to e-merchants for a determinate period of time. 
206 See Chapter 2, Section 8. 
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activities are in fact carried out and, second, whether enforcement procedures are activated 
at all. 
This analysis suggests that TMO practice is rather untrustworthy. The risks for e-
consumers to encounter inaccurate trustmarks on e-merchant websites are quite high. For 
example, TMOs can fail to detect e-merchants’ non-compliance with the trustmark 
programmes, or conflict of interests can prevent TMOs from revoking trustmarks from e-
merchants that no longer fulfil the requirements of the trustmark programmes. 
The reported situation is very likely to lead to a loss for e-consumers who rely on the 
trustmarks. Therefore, TMOs try to limit, if not fully exclude, their liability for damage to 
any person acting in reliance on the trustmark. 
At first glance, it seems that e-consumers cannot hold TMOs liable. However:  
 
“Are the liability disclaimers valid and will they stand up in court?”  
“Is there enough ground for e-consumers’ action against TMOs in tort or in 
contract?”  
“What is eventually the third-party liability of TMOs in the US and in Europe?”207  
 










                                                 
207 In light of the above, it would certainly be interesting to check possible TMO third-party liability with 
respect to the ‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’; and more precisely, pursuant to Articles 5, 6, and 7 
(Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practice in the internal market and amending Council Directive 
84/450/EEC), Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council. (OJ L 149, 11 June 
2005, p. 12). However, this goes beyond the purpose of the present study. Nevertheless, for the ones 
interested in deepening said liability aspects, see Weatherill, S. & Bernitz, U. (2007) The Regulation of 
Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive 2005/29. New Rules and New Techniques (Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing); Howells, G. et al. (2006) European Fair Trading Law. The Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive (Aldershot: Ashgate); De Vrey, R. W. (2006) Towards a European Unfair 











The paper Auditor Liability for Electronic Commerce Transaction Assurance: the 
CPA/CA WebTrust written by Carl Pacini and David Sinason is almost the only specific 
literature found on TMO liability in the US.208 Therefore, the information published in that 
paper will be used as the basis for the analysis carried out in this chapter which will then be 
integrated and updated with the findings of the present study. Moreover, to this day, there 
has been no reported case law which has specifically dealt with TMO third-party liability. 
However, there are some cases that may affect the third-party liability of professionals for 
the online provision of inaccurate business or financial information which may apply by 
analogy to TMO third-party liability.209 
These cases will be analysed in Section 6. Before that, a bit of background on the 
issues related to accountant third-party liability in the US will be provided in Section 2. 
The possible third-party actions against accountants will be listed in Section 3. The 
doctrinal positions on legal standards to determine third-party accountant liability will be 
presented in Section 4. Public policy theories will be dealt with in Section 5. In Section 7, 
TMO third-party liability scenarios will be outlined in case courts do not find relevant 
cases to apply to TMOs. The conclusions are discussed in Section 8. 
 
                                                 
208 Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999) Auditor Liability for Electronic Commerce Transaction Assurance: the 
CPA/CA WebTrust, American Business Law Journal 36, pp. 479-514. 
209 See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), p. 484. 
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2. Accountants - third parties: a controversial 
relationship 
 
The history of accountant third-party liability in the US is characterised by a large 
number of lawsuits. Most of the time, third parties ask auditors for compensation for the 
damage they suffered relying on lacking or inaccurate information (e.g., accountant failure 
to detect and report on errors, illegal client acts, and client creditworthiness). There are 
several reasons for this litigious relationship. Two of them appear very relevant for the 
present analysis. To put it down very pragmatically: first, auditors and third parties simply 
seem not to understand each other; second, auditors are generally considered to be more 
solvent defendants then their clients in a lawsuit.210  
The first motivation can be traced to the so-called ‘expectation gap theory’ which 
“refers to a difference between auditors’ understanding of their function and the 
expectations of the auditor’s role held by investors, creditors, and other users.”211 In fact, 
third parties tend to perceive auditors as guarantors of the accuracy of companies’ financial 
statements.212 Similarly, e-consumers may perceive that a trustmark provides a level of 
assurance (amounting to a guarantee) regarding transactions conducted over and 
information placed on the Internet.213 Many e-consumers may not understand the 
limitations of the assurances provided in TMOs’ engagements (e.g., Terms and Conditions, 
Certification Practice Statements, or Relying Party Agreements). It is therefore conceivable 
that e-consumers who lose money in an electronic commerce transaction will seek legal 
redress from the TMOs who provided assurances through the issuance of trustmarks.  
                                                 
210 See Feinman, J.M. (2003) Liability of Accountants for Negligent Auditing: Doctrine, Policy, and 
Ideology, Florida State University Law Review 31, p. 52; Raspante, J.F. & Rosario, R. (2001) 
Understanding and Minimizing CPA Liability, CPA Journal, p. 21; Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), p. 482-
484. 
211 Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), p. 482; see also; Epstein, M.J. & Geiger, M.A. (1994) Investor Views of 
Audit Assurance: Recent Evidence of the Expectation Gap, Journal of Accountancy 177, pp. 60-66; Porter, 
B. (1993) An Empirical Study of the Audit Expectation-Performance Gap, Accounting and Business 
Research 24, pp. 49-68; Hanks, J. (1992) The Expectations Gap - the Consumer Angle", Accountancy 109, 
pp. 33 et seq.; Costello, J. (1991) The Auditor’s Responsibilities for Fraud Detection and Disclosure: Do the 
Audit Standards Provide a Safe Harbor?, Maine Law Review 43, p. 267; Chaffee, N. (1988) The Role and 
Responsibility of Accountants in Today’s Society, Journal of Corporation Law 13 (3), p. 882. 
212 See Liggio, C. (1975) Accountants’ Civil Liability: Through the Looking Glass and Other “Impossible 
Things”, Litigation 1, p. 42.  
213 Houston, R.W. & Taylor, G.K. (1999).  
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The second reason for the accountants’ third-party litigious relationship can be 
explained by means of the so-called ‘insurance hypothesis’ according to which “the auditor 
is considered a potential indemnifier if an investment or credit loss is experienced.”214 
Accordingly, accountants are considered ‘deep pockets’ as they usually are both well 
capitalised and often have malpractice insurance, hence they can absorb losses resulting 
from their own negligence.215 
The notion of accountants as ‘deep pockets’ can be extended to assurance service 
providers such as TMOs.216 It is not difficult to imagine several scenarios, possibly 
involving fraud and/or bankruptcy, in which e-consumers have no recourse against a firm 
which they engaged in electronic commerce. As was already explained, it is very easy and 
quick to set up a website as well as to shut it down and disappear in the virtual void without 
leaving any trace.217 An e-consumer will then have no recourse against, for example, a 
cunning e-merchant that sets up a commercial website to defraud e-consumers and then 
disappears. 
 
3. Possible third-party actions against accountants: 
negligence or negligent misrepresentation 
 
There are two possible claims that a plaintiff in an auditor liability case can bring: 
first, that the accountant negligently performed the audit; second, that the information the 
                                                 
214 Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), p. 482. See also Hill, J. et al. (1993) Auditing’s Emerging Legal Peril 
Under the National Surety Doctrine: A Program for Research, Accounting Horizons 7, pp. 12-13. Third-
party attitude towards auditors does not come out of the blue. In fact, courts have often adopted the 
argument that auditors should provide insurance for losses suffered by corporate investors. See, e.g., 
Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Spherex, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d 1308 
(N.H. 1982). 
215 See Menon, K. & Williams, D. (1994) The Insurance Hypothesis and Market Prices, The Accounting 
Review 66, p 327-342; Baber, W. et al. (1995), Client Security Price Reactions to the Laventhol and 
Horwath Bankruptcy, Journal of Accounting Research 33, pp. 386-387; Stice, J.D. (1991) Using Financial 
and Market Information to Identify Pre-engagement Factors Associated with Lawsuits Against Auditors, 
The Accounting Review 66, p. 521. Moreover, the US Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the auditor-as-
insurer concept in U.S. v. Arthur Young & Co: “By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a 
corporation’s financial status, the independent public auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending 
any employment relationship with the client. The independent public accountant performing this special 
function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation’s creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing 
public. This “public watchdog” function demands that the accountant maintain total independence from the 
client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the public trust.” 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984). 
216 Although it has to be kept in mind that not all TMOs are so well capitalised. See Chapter 3, Sections 4 and 
5. 
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accountant provided to the plaintiff was misleading because the audit was negligently 
performed.218 The first claim technically corresponds to an action of negligence whereas 
the second is to an action of negligent misrepresentation. However, it will be immediately 
demonstrated that the theoretical differences between the two actions are not reflected in 
practice as in both cases the general requirements of negligence apply.  
In theory, a misrepresentation action requires third-party reliance on the defendant’s 
misrepresentation, pursuant to what is stated in Section 552 (1) of the Restatement Second 
of Torts. Furthermore, Section 552 (2) limits both the range of third parties and the type of 
transaction to which the defendant’s duty of care is owed. Contrariwise, no specific 
requirements are set out for a negligent action.219 
In practice, the differences between misrepresentation action and negligent action are 
often insignificant. Indeed, the specific requirements of the misrepresentation action are 
usually applied by the courts in order for the plaintiff to meet the more general 
requirements of the negligence action. For example, in order to establish the causal link 
between the breach of duty and the damage, courts require the plaintiff’s reliance on the 
defendant’s wrongful statement. Furthermore, the method used to limit the scope of duty 
established in Section 552 (2) of the Restatement Second of Torts is often used by courts in 
the duty analysis of negligence.220 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
217 See Chapter 1, Section 1. 
218 See Feinman, J.M. (2003), pp. 30-31. 
219 Restatement (Second) of Torts 552 (1977): “Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which 
he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the 
information if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information. (2)[T]he liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered (a) by the person or one of a 
limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that 
the recipient intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the 
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.”  
220 See Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 33. See also H. Rosemblum Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 146 (N.J. 1983); 
Greycas, Inc. v. Proud., 826 F2d 1560 (7th Circ. 1987); Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1007 
(La. 1993); Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 762 A.2d 582 (Md. 2000). Contrariwise, see Tri-
Professional Realty, Inc. v. Hillenburg, 669 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). In Raritan River Steel Co. v. 
Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co, 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 
1992). 
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4. Legal standards to determine liability to third 
parties for negligence 
 
There are three general approaches on the liability rule: the requirement of near 
privity, the foreseeability test, and the group and transaction test set forth in Section 552 of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
 
4.1 Near privity 
 
The requirement of near privity is actually an evolution of the requirement of privity, 
according to which a contractual relationship or direct connection between the accountant 
and the third party should be found in order for the third party to have a cause of action for 
negligence against the accountant.221 Through the years, the privity requirement has been 
eroded, transforming it to the so-called ‘near privity’.222 The first time that near privity was 
applied to auditor liability was in Ultramares v. Touche.223 As J.M. Feinman aptly 
described in his paper Liability of Accountants for Negligent Auditing: Doctrine, Policy, 
and Ideology,224 in this case the New York Court of Appeal, considering the threat of 
indeterminate liability, concluded that liability should be limited to those in privity with the 
defendant or those for whose benefit the information is provided. However, it was further 
explained that if the third party is not in a contractual relationship with the defendant 
accountant, the “end and aim” of the transaction must have been to provide the audit for the 
third party’s benefit so that, as in Glanzer v. Shepard, “[t]he bond was so close as to 
approach that of privity, if not completely one with it.”225 According to the rule established 
by the Court’s interpretation of Glanzer, “only if the third party could enforce the 
defendant’s contract as a third-party beneficiary would it be able to bring the action in 
                                                 
221 See Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919). 
222 See Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922). In this case the New York Court found a bin weigher 
liable for the economic loss suffered by the purchaser who relied on the wrong weight certified by the bin 
weigher. Notably, the bin weigher was under contract with the seller of beans. However, the court 
maintained that since the “end and aim” of the transaction was to provide a service to the purchaser, the 
latter had an action against the weigher either for negligent performance of its service or as the third-party 
beneficiary of the weigher’s contract with the seller. 
223 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
224 Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 34. 
225 See footnote 223. 
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negligence.” The near privity rule was then confirmed by the New York Court of Appeal in 
Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co. 226 
The relevant test to check whether the requirement of near privity is fulfilled in 
accountant third-party liability cases was actually established by the New York Court of 
Appeal in Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen & Co. In this case, the Court coined a 
threefold test according to which the defendant owes a duty to a third party who relies on 
his representations only if the following conditions are met:  
 
a) “The accountant must have known that the financial reports were to be used for a 
particular purpose or purposes; 
b) in the furtherance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and 
c) there must have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to 
that party, which indicates the accountant’s understanding of that party’s 
reliance.”227 
 
The ‘linking’ concept stated in the third condition – i.e., the need for an action carried 
out by the accountant which links him to the relying party – is defined in European 
American Bank v. Strauhs & Kay228 as a direct communication both in writing and orally 
and a number of personal meetings between the relying party and the accountant. It is 
interesting to point out that “near privity essentially takes accountant liability and other 
third-party liability cases out of the realm of tort law and places them within the sphere of 
contract law, allowing recovery only where there is privity or a third-party beneficiary 





                                                 
226 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985). For an in-depth analysis of the relationship between privity and near privity 
see Feinman, J.M. (2003), pp. 34-38. 
227 Id. at 118. The Credit Alliance test was later upheld by the New York Court in Security Pacific Business 
Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick main & Co. 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992).  
228 477 N.Y.S.2d 146, (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). Id. 
229 Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 38. 
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In the mid-1980s, a number of courts departed from the near privity approach to 
auditor third-party liability cases. In Rosenblum v. Adler,230 the leading case, auditor third-
party liability cases were dealt with as ordinary liability cases. Negligent misrepresentation 
was the basis of liability, irrespective of the existence of the near privity requirement 
between the accountant and the third party, and the rule of liability for foreseeable harm 
applied.231 In fact the New Jersey Supreme Court maintained that auditor duty extends to 
all: (a) whose reliance on the audited statements is reasonably foreseeable by the auditor,232 
and (b) that have been influenced in their decisions by the information provided in auditor 
statements. Moreover, the court specified further that the statement has to be provided by 
the audited company for a proper business scope: “the auditor owes a duty of care to all 
who obtain a firm’s financial statement directly from the audited entity, but owes no such 
duty of care to those who obtain it from an annual report in a library or from a government 
file.”233 Rosenblum v. Adler was followed straight away by the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
in Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co234 and a few years later by the Mississippi 
Supreme Court in Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co.235  
Although it was quite popular in the 1980s, since then the foreseeability approach to 
auditor third-party liability cases has not been followed much by courts.236 
 
4.3 Restatement approach 
 
                                                 
230 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983).  
231 See extensively foreseeability Keeton, W.P. et al. (1984) Prosser and Keeton on Torts (St. Paul MN: West 
Group), p. 1001. 
232 See Scherl, J.B. (1994) Evolution of Auditor Liability to Noncontractual Third Parties: Balancing the 
Equities and Weighing the Consequences, American University Law Review 44, p. 272. 
233 Causey, D. (1987) Accountants' Liability in An Indeterminate Amount for An Indeterminate Class: An 
Analysis of Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., Mississippi Law Journal 57, p. 380. 
Rosenblum radically altered accountants’ negligence liability by extending accountants' duty of care to 
reasonably foreseeable third parties under certain circumstances. See Hagen III, W.W. (1988) Accountants' 
Common Law Liability to Third Parties, Columbia Business Law Review 1, p. 189. The holding in 
Rosenblum is no longer followed even in its own home, as the New Jersey Legislature in 1994 adopted an 
accountant privity statute that substituted a near privity test for its foreseeability standard. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2A:53A-25 (West 2003). 
234 335 N.W. 2d 361 (Wis. 1983). Like the New Jersey court, the Wisconsin court concluded that accountant 
liability cases should be decided under ordinary principles of negligence law. According to those principles, 
“a tortfeasor is fully liable for all foreseeable consequences of his act except as those consequences are 
limited by policy factors”, id. at 366.  
235 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987). 
236 Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 38. 
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Despite near privity and foreseeability, Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts237 is by far the standard which courts use the most in accountants’ third-party liability 
cases.238 Applied for the first time in the 1968 case Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin by the 
Federal District Court in Rhode Island, it has been followed by almost all the courts in the 
US.239  
As Jay M. Feinman neatly explained in his paper Liability of Accountants for 
Negligent Auditing: Doctrine, Policy, and Ideology, pursuant to Section 552, there are 
seven conditions which need to be fulfilled in order for a third party to bring an action in 
negligent misrepresentation against an accountant: (1) the information is false; (2) the 
accountant supplies the information in the course of his business or in a transaction in 
which he has a pecuniary interest; (3) the accountant fails to exercise reasonable care in 
obtaining or communicating the information; (4) the third party justifiably relies on the 
information, and the reliance causes harm; (5) the third party is the person or is within the 
group for whom the defendant intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient 
of the information intends to supply it; (6) the third party relies on the information in a 
transaction that the defendant intends to influence or knows that the recipient of the 
information intends to influence, or in a substantially similar transaction; and (7) the third 
party suffers pecuniary loss.240  
In most accountant third-party liability cases, the information is inaccurate, it is 
provided by the accountant in the negligent performance of his profession, and the third 
party relying on the information suffers pecuniary loss.241  
However, “is there enough causal connection between third-party reliance and the 
loss he suffered?”  
                                                 
237 Restatement (Second) of Torts 552 (1977): “Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others 
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other transaction in which 
he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the 
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the 
information. (2)[T]he liability stated in subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered (a) by the person or one of a 
limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that 
the recipient intends to supply it; and (b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the 
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.” 
238 Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 41. 
239 284 F. Supp. 85 (D. R.I. 1968). The court expanded accountant liability for negligence from the near 
privity standard to specifically foreseen or known users. Applying Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts the Court maintained that an accountant should be liable in negligent misrepresentation for financial 
misinformation relied upon by actual foreseen and limited classes of persons. 
240 Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 43. 
241 Therefore, conditions 1, 2, 3 and 7 are either easily met or doctrinally simple. 
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And “is third-party reliance justifiable?”242  
Furthermore, “did the third party intend to supply the information to the third party, 
or to the group of persons which he belongs to?”  
Alternatively, “did the accountant know that the recipient of the information 
intended to supply it to the third party or to the group of persons which he belongs to?”243 
 Moreover, “did the accountant intend to influence the specific transaction, or a 
substantially similar one, in the course of which the third party relied on the information?” 
 Or instead of that, “Did the accountant know that the recipient of the information 
intended to influence the specific transaction, or a substantially similar one, in the course 
of which the third party relied on the information?”244  
These are the key questions which have troubled courts in the application of the 
Restatement rule. 245 
As to the first two questions on third-party reliance, if the accountant’s inaccurate 
information contributed to the third-party decision, there will be enough causal connection 
between third-party reliance and the loss he suffered. However, third-party negligent 
reliance on the accountant’s inaccurate information may reduce compensation for the loss 
suffered or even impede obtaining it from the court.246 The other questions are particularly 
significant when the third party is not identified individually in advance (e.g., Mr. Jones, 
the recipient of the accountant’s information) but he is a member of a group of persons who 
may possibly rely on the accountant’s information (e.g., Mr. Jones, one of the investors 
who may possibly rely on the accountant’s information). The answers to these questions 
vary considerably depending on how the courts interpret the concepts of ‘to intend’ and ‘to 
know’. Courts’ interpretation of these two concepts can actually range from: (a) requiring 
the accountant to have an actual knowledge of the potential reliance without emphasising 
the accountant’s intent and directly taking responsibility, to (b) requiring the accountant to 
have reason to know of the possible third-party reliance.247  
                                                 
242 These questions relate to condition 4. 
243 These questions relate to condition 5. 
244 These questions relate to condition 6. 
245 See Panttaja, R. (1994) Accountants’ Duty to Third Parties: A Search for a Fair Doctrine of Liability, 
Stetson Law Review 23, p. 941; Bethlehem Steel Corp v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Tenn. 
1991); Raritan River Steel v. Cherry, 367 S.E.2d 609, 617 (N.C. 1988). 
246 For more information, see Cordial v. Ernst & Young, 483 S.E.2d 248, at 261-262 (W. Va. 1996); ESCA 
Corp. v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 939 P.2d 1228, at 1232 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). 
247 See extensively on the matter Feinman, J.M. (2003), pp. 44-48. The leading case for the first type of 
interpretation is Bily v. Arthur Young & (Co. 834 P.2d 745 [Cal. 1992]) in which the California Supreme 
Court maintained that: “The representation must have been made with the intent to induce plaintiff, or a 
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5. Public policy 
 
“Which of the many available doctrines should the court apply?” 
“How should the court apply the doctrine it has selected?” 
 
The answer to these fundamental questions can be given through public policy 
analysis. Public policy analysis consists of arguments about the social desirability of rules 
or outcomes in terms of the social values of utility, right, morality, or legal institutional 
values such as judicial competence and administrability.248 When doctrine breaks down, 
and a case or a class of cases cannot be decided within the usual mode of doctrinal analysis, 
policy analysis prescribes and then interprets the controlling doctrine.249 Public policy 
analysis plays a substantial role in court decisions. In Section 6 (where the relevant case 
law is dealt with), it will be shown that in auditor liability cases, public policy arguments 
have indeed influenced courts’ decisions more than the law’s traditional categories of 
liability. 
Generally, no problem arises when an accountant is called upon to prepare an audit 
report for an identified third party who will eventually rely on it in order to take further 
decisions. In this case, the accountant owes both his client and the specific third party a 
                                                                                                                                                    
particular class of persons to which plaintiff belongs, to act in reliance upon the representation in a specific 
transaction, or a specific type of transaction, that defendant intended to influence. Defendant is deemed to 
have intended to influence [its client’s] transaction with plaintiff whenever defendant knows with substantial 
certainty that plaintiff, or the particular class of persons to which plaintiff belongs, will rely on the 
representation in the course of the transaction. If others become aware of the representation and act upon it, 
there is no liability even though defendant should reasonably have foreseen such a possibility.” Id. at 772-
773. The leading case for the second type of interpretation is Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & 
Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, (Tex. App. 1986) in which the Texas Court of Appeals argued that: “To allow liability 
to turn on the fortuitous occurrence that the accountant’s client specifically mentions a person or class of 
persons who are to receive the reports, when the accountant may have that same knowledge as a matter of 
business practice, is too tenuous a distinction for us to adopt as a rule of law. Instead, we hold that if, under 
current business practices and the circumstances of that case, an accountant preparing audited financial 
statements knows or should know that such statements will be relied upon by a limited class of persons, the 
accountant may be liable for injuries to members of that class relying on his certification of the audited 
reports.” Id. at 412.  
248 See Kennedy, D. (1997) A Critique of Adjudication (fin de siecle), (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 
pp. 97-105. 
249 “As it is evident in the auditor liability cases, doctrine does not dictate which rule (near privity, 
negligence, or misrepresentation) or which interpretation of an adopted rule (strict, broad, or in-between 
readings of the intent and knowledge requirement of section 552, for example) is authoritative.” Feinman, 
J.M. (2003), p. 49. 
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duty to prepare the requested information with reasonable care.250 The accountant knows 
that the client’s intent is to receive the audit for the third party’s interest. Moreover, the 
liability which would arise from the accountant’s negligent performance is quite 
predictable. In all other cases, the courts’ agreement on public policy arguments to be 
applied to accountant third-party liability breaks down. Two different approaches can be 
distinguished: the contractarian approach (or ‘limited liability theory’) and the relational 
approach (or ‘expanded liability theory’). 
 
 5.1 Contractarian approach 
 
Contractarians, in a nutshell, tend to exclude tort law from the realm of accountant 
third-party liability on the basis of three arguments.251 First, they see accountant 
responsibility to clients as more prominent than the one to third parties. Contractarians’ 
starting point is that the accountants’ report is not to be considered as a guarantee: (a) on 
the accuracy of the clients’ financial statements; (b) against the clients’ fraud in drafting 
their financial statements; and (c) on the reliability of the clients’ financial past in order to 
predict their future. In fact, the clients prepare their financial statements and thus, in  the 
contractarians’ view, the clients assume the primary responsibility for the accuracy of the 
information herein towards third parties, whereas the accountants’ responsibility is 
secondary.252 Second, as third parties are actually free to choose whether or not to rely on 
the information provided by accountants, third parties shall assume the risk accordingly. 
Third, according to contractarians, by applying tortious liability to accountants’ third-party 
liability cases, courts limit the parties’ autonomies to contractually regulate their 
relationships, disrupt the contractual distribution of rights and obligations, and eventually 
                                                 
250 In providing his professional service, the accountant has an obligation to provide accurate information to 
both his client and the third party. The accountant knows that the client’s intent is to receive the audit for the 
third party’s interest. 
251 On the contractarian approach, see, e.g., Epstein, R.A. (1995) Simple Rules for a Complex World 
(Cambridge, MS., London: Harvard University Press) pp. 71-90; Huber, P.W. (1988) Liability: the Legal 
Revolution and its Consequences (New York: Basic Books, Inc.) p. 5; see also Deakin, S. et al. (2003) 
Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford university Press), pp. 224 et seq. 
252 As the California court colourfully summarised in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.: “An auditor is a watchdog, 
not a bloodhound. As a matter of commercial reality, audits are performed in a client-controlled 
environment. (…) Moreover, an audit report is not a simple statement of verifiable fact that, like the weight 
of the load of beans in Glanzer v. Shepard, can be easily checked against uniform standards of indisputable 
accuracy. (…) The report is based on the auditor’s interpretation and application of hundreds of professional 
standards, many of which are broadly phrased and readily subject to different constructions. Although 
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expose accountants to the risk of indeterminate liability. In fact, this narrow liability 
approach is most of all functional to avoid the threat of the open-ended liability for 
accountants.253 Along this line of thinking, Cardozo in Ultramares v. Touche254 maintained 
that liability for negligence “may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.” Moreover, contractarians 
maintain that expanding liability does not create substantial incentives for accountants to 
carry out their profession with better care because malpractice liability, sanctions by 
regulators, concern for their reputation, and the threat of professional disciplinary 
proceedings represent already sufficient incentives.255 
 
 5.2 Relational approach 
 
Relationals, in opposition to contractarians, develop their expanded liability theory on 
extra contractual liability, believing that the role of the law is not limited to the 
enforcement of the contractual conditions agreed by the parties.256 Such theory is mainly 
based on three concepts: accountants’ professionalism, independency, and accountants’ 
role as guarantors of the accuracy of companies’ financial statements. First, relationals 
stress the fact that accountants have to be competent and practice their profession with due 
care. Second, accountants need to be independent. They have to be equidistant from the 
interests of their clients and of the persons who rely on their accounts.257 Third, relationals 
                                                                                                                                                    
ultimately expressed in a shorthand form, the report is the final product of a complex process involving 
discretion and judgement on the part of the auditor at every stage.” 834 P.2d 745 at 762-763 (Cal. 1992). 
253 See Siliciano, J.A. (1988) Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, Michigan 
Law Review 86, p. 1943. For more general information on the issue, Dobbs, D.B. (2000) The Law of Torts 
(St. Paul MN: West Group), p. 1282; Atiyah, P.S. (1985), Economic Loss in the United States, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, p. 488; Perlman, H.S. (1982) Interference with Contract and other Economic 
Expectancies, University of Chicago Law Review 61, pp. 71-72. 
254 174 N.E. 441 at 444 (N.Y. 1931). 
255 See Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 58; Siliciano, J.A. (1988), p. 1953. 
256 On the relational approach, see, e.g., Feinman, J.M. (1995) Economic Negligence: Liability of 
Professionals and Businesses to Third Parties for Economic Loss (Waltham, MA: Little Brown & Co Law 
& Business) § 7.3; Macneil, I.R. (1980), The New Social Contract: An Inquiry Into Modern Contractual 
Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press) pp. 71-117. Feinman, J.M. (2000) Relational Contract 
Theory in Context, Northwestern University Law Review 94, p. 737-748; Feinman, J.M. (1990) The 
Significance of Contract Theory, University of Cincinnati Law Review 58, pp. 1299-1304; Gottlieb, G. 
(1983) Relationism: Legal Theory for a Relational Society, University of Chicago Law Review 50 pp. 567-
612; Macneil, I.R. (1983) Values in Contract: Internal and External, Northwestern University Law Review 
78, pp. 340-418. 
257 See Bailey, L.P. (2002) Miller GAAS Guide 2002: A Comprehensive Restatement of Standards for 
Auditing, Attestation, Compilation, and Review (New York: Aspen Law & Business), 16-19;  
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acknowledge that accountants are better positioned than third parties to access and check 
companies’ financial accounts.258  
The fact that very often accountants’ reports are the only source of information on 
companies’ financial situation stimulates an almost complete reliance by third parties on 
them.259 Therefore, relationals – unlike contractarians – maintain that the audit provides 
assurance that things are what they appear to be. As Comptroller General David M. Walker 
stated after Enron, making special reference to the auditor’s role in the financial markets: 
“The auditor’s opinion on the financial statements is like an expert’s stamp of approval to 
the public and the capital markets.”260  
On the basis of accountants’ professionalism, independency, and their role as 
guarantors of the accuracy of companies’ financial statements, relationals support tortious 
third-party liability for accountants, thus going beyond liability for pure contractual 
obligations.261 Moreover, to the argument of potential accountant indeterminate liability, 
relationals reply that they do not see it as a major issue. They maintain that even if the 
foreseeability test – the broadest one liability-wise262 – is applied by courts, accountant 
liability will be limited to third parties whose reliance on the accountant’s report should 
have been foreseen at the time the report was prepared. In this way, the accountant will be 
liable to predict his liability and the related potential loss because he should reasonably 
know the scope of the transactions which the report will be used for. 
 
6. Analysis of the case law potentially applicable to 
TMOs 
 
                                                 
258 See the concept of information asymmetry dealt with in Chapter 2, Section 4. 
259 See Winier, H.B. (1983) Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent 
Misrepresentation, San Diego Law Review 233, p. 253. 
260 David M. Walker, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Protecting the Public Interest: Selected Governance, 
Regulatory Oversight, Auditing, Accounting, and Financial Reporting Issues (GAO-02-483T) 4 (Mar. 5, 
2002) (statement before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate). 
261 In light of Arthur Andersen’s participation in the Enron debacle, supporters of the expanded liability 
theory consider Cardozo’s view in Ultramares v. Touche outdated. In Ultramares v. Touche, consistent with 
the prevailing view of auditing at the time, Cardozo regarded the auditor’s report as “primarily for the 
benefit of the [auditor’s client], a convenient instrumentality for the development of the business, and only 
incidentally or collaterally for the use of those to whom [the company] might exhibit it thereafter.”  174 NE, 
441, 446 (NY 1931). See Allegaert, C. & Tinkelman, D. (2000) Reconsidering the “Lack of Duty” Defense 
to State Auditor Negligence Claims, Journal of Corporation Law 25, pp. 502-503. 
262 See Section 4. 
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As already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, no reported cases have 
specifically addressed TMO third-party liability. However, there is some case law on the 
third-party liability of professionals for the online provision of inaccurate business or 
financial information that may apply by analogy to TMO third-party liability. 
 
6.1 The Jaillet line of cases 
 
The main doctrine on TMOs263 has specifically identified a line of cases that 
originated from Jaillet v. Cashman264 (henceforth: the Jaillet line of cases) which may be 
applied to TMOs. As it will be explained further, the applicability of these cases to TMOs 
will grant them protection from negligent third-party actions. In other words, it will create a 
sort of ‘safe harbour’ for TMOs.265 
The Jaillet cases consist of the following:  
 
1. Jaillet v. Cashman  
2. Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co.266  
3. First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp.267  
4. Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc.268  
5. Gale v. Value Line269  
 
Jaillet v. Cashman 
 
As to the facts, in Jaillet v. Cashman, a New York court held that Dow Jones & Co. 
was not liable for incorrect information reported on a ticker tape, which caused the 
plaintiff, who saw the ticker report in his broker’s office, to sell certain stocks, resulting in 
an economic loss. The court held that a provider of financial information was in the same 
relationship with the public as a newspaper, and there could be no liability for negligence 
                                                 
263 See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), p. 484. 
264 189 N.Y.S. 743 (Sup. Ct. 1921), aff'd, 194 N.Y.S. 947 (App. Div. 1922), aff'd, 130 N.E. 714 (N.Y. 1923). 
265 See Subsections 6.2 and 6.3. 
266 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ.Ct. 1987). 
267 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989). 
268 490 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1986).  
269 640 F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1986). 
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absent a contractual or other special relationship. Furthermore, unless it results from a 
contract that the provider of information has given an explicit warranty regarding the 
correctness of the information or a specific ‘seal of approval’, an action in contract will not 
be allowed either. Moreover, the court expressed its concern about unlimited liability to an 
indeterminate class and added very pragmatically that the application of such a rule to the 
specific case seemed necessary as a matter of practical convenience.270 
 
Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co. 
 
In 1987, a New York trial court faced the issue of the liability of a media company 
that disseminated incorrect financial data over an electronic network. Daniel v. Dow Jones 
& Co.271 involved Daniel Eldridge, a subscriber to the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service. 
The service provided instantaneous news transmission by computer-to-computer linkup. 
Mr. Eldridge brought an action against Dow Jones alleging that he made investment 
decisions based on false news reports that he received from the Dow Jones News/Retrieval 
service which caused him to lose a substantial sum of money.272 The plaintiff argued that 
Dow Jones was liable because the parties had a contract that created a ‘special relationship’ 
justifying the imposition of liability for negligent misstatements.  
The court, relying on the Jaillet decision, dismissed Mr. Eldridge’s claim. In the 
decision, it was argued that a person who relies on information made electronically 
available through a computer-to-computer link-up mechanism was comparable to 
somebody who relies on news provided by paper-based means. From the public policy 
point of view, the court maintained that the defendant could not face unlimited third-party 
liability towards an indeterminate class of plaintiffs. In fact, applying the Section 552 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Tort standard, Mr. Eldridge was not considered “a person or one 
of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance” Dow Jones had provided 
                                                 
270 See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), pp. 492-493; Wolfson, J. (1997) Electronic Mass Information 
Providers and Section 522 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: The First Amendment Casts a Long 
Shadow, Rutgers Law Journal 29, p. 83. 
271 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Civ.Ct. 1987). 
272 More precisely, Mr. Eldridge made an investment relying on a price provided on the Dow Jones news 
report. However, it was not specified that all the prices quoted in the report were expressed in Canadian and 
not in US dollars. 
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information. Moreover, as the news retrieval service was supplied to more than 200,000 
persons, no ‘special relationship’ was found between the plaintiff and the defendant.273 
 
First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp. 
 
In First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp.,274 the plaintiff entered into a one-
year subscription agreement with Standard & Poor’s (henceforth: S&P) to receive 
Corporation Records, a loose-leaf summary of corporate finances and operations. First 
Equity, relying on information provided in Corporate Records, traded convertible secured 
trust notes issued by Pan America Airways. However, due to the inaccurateness of the 
information made available by S&P, First Equity suffered losses and consequently brought 
an action in negligence against S&P. The court, analysing the case at hand, observed that 
Corporate Records did not make any investment recommendation. Furthermore, a 
disclaimer placed in the agreement for the provision of Corporation Records set forth that 
no warranties on the accuracy of the information were made by S&P. The court, relying on 
the Jaillet rule, maintained that the subscription agreement entered into by and between 
First Equity and S&P did not amount to a ‘special relationship’ between the parties, thus, 
no extra-contractual duties towards First Equity would arise on S&P. Eventually First 
Equity’s claim against S&P was dismissed.275 
 
Gutter v. Dow Jones 
 
In Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc.,276 a securities investor sued Dow Jones after suffering 
financial losses by relying on an article published in the Wall Street Journal that incorrectly 
listed certain bonds as trading with interest. Incidentally, the Ohio Supreme Court had to 
answer the question of whether a newspaper was accountable to one of its subscribers for a 
non-defamatory negligent misrepresentation of a fact. On this point, reckoning with the 
Jaillet rule, the Court held that a subscriber of a newspaper cannot be considered part of a 
limited class of persons pursuant to Section 552 (2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
                                                 
273 See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), pp. 493-494. 
274 869 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1989). 
275 See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), p. 495. 
276 490 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 1986).  
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Hence, absent a ‘special relationship’, no extra-contractual duty to provide accurate 
information is owed to a subscriber by a newspaper.  
Moreover, the Court backed its purely legal statements by a public policy analysis 
based on the need to avoid indeterminate liability to an unlimited class of persons and the 
related chilling effect that the imposition of such liability on news providers may have on 
their business.277 Last but not least, the Court added that the defendant fell under the 
protective effect of the First Amendment, which shields media from liability for negligently 
providing inaccurate information.278 
 
Gale v. Value Line 
 
In Gale v. Value Line,279 Stanley Gale entered into a subscription contract with Value 
Line in order to receive a publication reporting on financial information (i.e., Value Line 
Convertibles). Due to a publication error, he traded warrants of TransWorld Airlines, 
relying on incorrect information published in Value Line Convertibles. Eventually, he had 
to bear an economic loss. Mr. Gale sued Value Line for negligent misrepresentation citing 
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Mr. Gale’s negligent misrepresentation 
claim was barred by the Federal District Court in Rhode Island basically for public policy 
reasons. As in Gutter v. Dow Jones, the Court mainly considered the ‘chilling’ (i.e., 
adverse) effect that the imposition on publishers of an absolute duty to provide subscribers 
with correct information may have. In fact, such liability would set an unbearable standard 
of care for publishers, putting at risk their whole business structure.280 
 
6.2 The Jaillet ‘safe harbour’  
 
The consistent court decisions in these cases have created a rule which excludes 
negligent third-party actions against those who negligently disseminate false financial or 
other information over a public medium – a sort of ‘safe harbour’. Actually, the rule goes 
so far that negligent misrepresentation claims are also restricted to those who have entered 
                                                 
277 See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), p. 496. 
278 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
279 640 F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1986). 
280 See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), pp. 496-497. 
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into a subscription agreement with the disseminator of business information.281 However, 
liability will be imposed where there is a breach of specific contractual obligation regarding 
information accuracy that might arise from either an express warranty or some indication 
that the publisher or disseminator has given an express ‘seal of approval’ to the 
information.282 Furthermore, liability will also be imposed where there is breach of 
fiduciary or other special relationship or duty; or an independent tortious duty, i.e., one 
imposed by statute or international act such as libel, slander, or fraud.283 The Jaillet rule 
does not apply to a specific medium.284 In fact, the rule has been applied to newspapers,285 
an investment letter,286 and an interactive computer networks.287  
The Jaillet rule can be considered a landmark for a number of reasons. In fact, it has 
been applied: 
 
a) in near privity288 and in non–near privity jurisdictions;289 
b) when the court used both near privity290 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 552 standard;291 
c) when the third party tried both an action in negligence292 and in negligent 
misrepresentation293 against the disseminator of financial information; and 
d) when the parties were bound by a contract294 and where there was no contractual 
relationship between them.295 
 
As to public policy, the Jaillet line of cases is an example of the consistent 
application of the contractarian approach (or limited liability theory).296 In fact, all the 
                                                 
281 See First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp. 
282 Wolfson, J. (1997), p. 83. 
283 See Miller, R. & Young, M. (1997) Financial Reporting and Risk Management in the 21st Century, 
Fordham Law Review 65, pp. 1998-1999; Wolfson, J. (1997), pp. 82-83. 
284 See Miller, R. & Young, M. (1997), p. 2000. 
285 See First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp.; Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc.; Gale v. Value Line. 
286 See Jaillet v. Cashman. 
287 See Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co. 
288 See Jaillet v. Cashman; Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co.; First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp. 
289 See Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc.; Gale v. Value Line. 
290 See Jaillet v. Cashman; First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp. 
291 See Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co; Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc.; Gale v. Value Line. 
292 See Jaillet v. Cashman; First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp. 
293 See Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co; Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc.; Gale v. Value Line. 
294 See Jaillet v. Cashman; Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co.; First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp; Gale v. 
Value Line. 
295 See Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc. 
296 See Subsection 5.1. 
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standards were interpreted in a restrictive way so that no third-party actions in negligence 
against one who disseminates false financial or other information over a public medium 
were allowed. There are mainly two policy considerations on which the courts relied in 
reaching their decisions:  
 
1. the spectre of unlimited liability to an indeterminate class; and  
2. the related ‘chilling’ effect that may bring the business of information 
distribution to a standstill, originated by the imposition of a high duty of care 
on those in this business to a wide class of people.297 
 
6.3 Applicability of the Jaillet rule to TMOs 
 
The prevalent doctrine maintains that the Jaillet rule can be applied to TMOs which 
will thus be shielded from third-party actions in negligence.298 In fact, a trustmark and the 
certificate that comes with the trustmark do not contain any language that constitutes an 
express warranty or seal of approval,299 which, following the Jaillet rule, is a necessary 
condition in order not to be held liable. Rather, TMOs specify in the contractual agreement 
they use300 that TMOs do not warrant that the information provided is accurate or complete.  
Moreover, TMOs usually state that the information they provide “is not to be relied 
upon” and that it can be used only at the recipients’ own risk.301 Therefore, TMOs should 
not face liability for breach of contract when performing their services because no express 
warranty or express language exists that will make negligent misstatement a breach of 
contract. Since near privity would not exist between the TMO and third-party e-consumers, 
an e-consumer’s action against TMOs for negligent misrepresentation of e-merchants’ 
practices would not lie. 
As to the other cases, few clarifications are useful to the present analysis. Concerning 
Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., the court maintained that the First Amendment applied to a 
                                                 
297 Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), pp. 495-496. 
298 See Id. pp. 491-500; Miller, R. & Young, M. (1997), pp. 1987-2064. 
299 See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), pp. 491-492. 
300 E.g., Terms and Conditions, Certification Practice Statement, Seal Licence Agreement, Relying Party 
Agreement. 
301 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.5. 
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computerised news retrieval service.302 However, this broad interpretation of the scope of 
the First Amendment may nevertheless not embrace TMOs’ services. In fact TMOs’ 
services may not fall within the definition of media services.303  
In relation to First Equity Corp. v. Standard & Poor’s Corp., although the case did not 
involve an accountant, logically the court’s reasoning is applicable to accountants, and thus 
the court’s rationale might also be implemented by analogy to TMOs. In fact, S&P’s loose-
leaf service is comparable to TMO’s trustmark service, i.e., to report information on the 
security, privacy or business practice of e-merchants with a reasonable degree of accuracy. 
 
6.4 Possible ways to impose negligent liability on TMOs 
 
According to what has been presented so far, TMOs have a good chance of enjoying 
the ‘Jaillet safe harbour’ thus protecting them from e-consumers’ claims in negligence. 
However, there may be other ways by which courts impose negligence liability on 
TMOs.304 
 
Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. 
 
Cem Kaner in his paper Liability for Defective Content notably wrote: “If you 
promise that your material is safe or accurate, and if it is to your commercial advantage if 
people rely on your material, and if you invite people to rely on it, then it would be wise to 
be right. The classic case is Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.”305 
As to the facts, in Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.,306 an action for negligent 
misrepresentation was brought against Hearst, a publishing company which had 
represented in its magazine that specific shoes had ‘Good Housekeeping’s Consumers’ 
Guaranty Seal’ and had certified that the product was a good one. The plaintiff, while 
wearing the certified shoes, slipped on her kitchen floor, allegedly because the shoes were 
                                                 
302 The facts in Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co. may not directly relate to TMO services but the court's opinion 
recognised the need for the law to adapt itself to changing technology. 
303 See, e.g., Miller, R. & Young, M. (1997), p. 2001. 
304 See Miller, R. & Young, M. (1997), p. 2002. 
305 Kaner, C. (1996) Liability for Defective Content, Software QA 3 (3), p. 56 Available at 
<http://www.kaner.com/pdfs/content.pdf>. 
306 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Ct. App. 1969). 
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defective, suffering physical injury as a consequence. The California Court of Appeals 
recognised the plaintiff’s cause of action, considering the defendant’s endorsement of the 
products. Moreover, the Court maintained that while Hearst was not in any contractual 
relationship with Ms. Hanberry – as with other people -- who may have potentially relied 
on its endorsement, this “does not mean it is relieved from the responsibility to exercise 
ordinary care toward them.”307 Once again, public policy arguments played a major role in 
the court’s decision. The issuance of the ‘Good Housekeeping’ seal was interpreted by the 
court as that through which the defendant “has taken reasonable steps to make an 
independent examination of the product endorsed.”308  
 
LaSalle National Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co. 
 
In LaSalle National Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co.,309 a number of 
investors, relying on an ‘AA’ credit rating provided by Duff & Phelps, bought bonds issued 
by Towers Financial Corporation. The bonds went into default and the investors lodged an 
action before the New York Court against Duff & Phelps based on negligent 
misrepresentation. The Court recognised a cause of action on the basis of the Credit 
Alliance threefold near privity test.310 In fact, according to the Court: (a) the credit rating 
was provided to a selected and identified group of investors; (b) the purposes of the 
investors were known; and (c) the linking requirement was fulfilled by the communications 
between the defendant and the plaintiffs.311 
 
6.5 Checking the potential applicability of Hanberry and 
LaSalle to TMOs 
 
                                                 
307 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, pp. 684-685 (Ct. App. 1969). 
308 Id. at 522. See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), pp. 497-499. 
309 951 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
310 See Section 4 Near privity. 
311 See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), p. 499. 
 95
A number of arguments have been raised by the main doctrine against the 
applicability of Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. and LaSalle National Bank v. Duff & Phelps 
Credit Rating Co. to TMOs.312 
As to the Hanberry case, in principle, the court’s rationale about the defendant 
engaging in an ‘independent examination’ could be applied to an assurance provider, i.e., a 
TMO. However, Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. can be distinguished from a typical TMO third-
party liability case313 for a number of reasons.”314 First and foremost, the Hanberry decision 
is based on Section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts315 which applies only to 
physical harm and not to economic losses. Second, it may be argued that trustmarks do not 
include any representation as to the quality of the e-merchants’ goods or services, or their 
suitability for any e-consumers’ intended purpose. Third, the rules set out in Hanberry v. 
Hearst Corp. have not been followed much in other cases.316  
Considering LaSalle National Bank v. Duff & Phelps Credit Rating Co., unlike a 
trustmark/seal of assurance, which may be viewed by anyone with access to the Internet, 
the Duff & Phelps credit rating was distributed to a select and identifiable group of 
investors. Moreover, the court found the plaintiffs to have had sufficient communication 
with Duff & Phelps to satisfy the linking conduct requirement of Credit Alliance.  
In a typical e-commerce transaction, however, the e-consumer who purchases goods 
or services through an e-merchant website will not have any direct communication with the 
TMO that may be considered sufficient to satisfy the linking conduct requirement. Hence, 
the facts in LaSalle National Bank are easily distinguishable from an e-commerce 
transaction made by an e-consumer relying on a trustmark. 
 
                                                 
312 See Id. pp. 497-498. 
313 See Chapter 1, Section 2. 
314 See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), pp. 497-498. 
315 Section 311 provides as follows: 311. (1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject 
to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such 
information, where such harm results (a) to the other, or (b) to such third person as the actor should expect 
to be put in peril by the action taken. (2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care 
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or (b) in the manner in which it is communicated. 
316 See Miller, R. & Young, M. (1997), p. 2004; Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 
1991) in which the publisher of The Encyclopaedia of Mushrooms could not be sued for negligent 
misrepresentation by plaintiffs who became ill after eating poisonous mushrooms because the defendant had 
not undertaken an independent examination and issued any type of warranty; see also Yanase v. Auto. Club, 
260 Cal. Rptr. 513, 518--19 (Ct. App. 1989) in which the widow and children of a man who was killed by 
an unknown assailant in a motel parking lot could not sue AAA for negligent misrepresentation because 
motel accommodations, not neighbourhood safety, were endorsed or represented in an AAA Tourbook. 
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6.6 Critical remarks on the possible application of the 
analysed case law to TMOs 
 
As correctly reported by the prevalent doctrine, when TMOs do not place in their 
agreements (e.g., Terms and Conditions, Certification Practice Statements, or Relying Party 
Agreements) or on trustmarks any language that expresses a warranty about the accuracy of 
the information provided, then TMOs may enjoy the protection granted by the Jaillet ‘safe 
harbour’ against third-party action in negligence. However, trustmarks are indisputably 
displayed on the e-merchant website as seals of approval of e-merchant security, privacy, 
or business practice. Hence, TMOs may better take seriously Cem Kaner’s warning “[i]f 
you promise that your material is safe or accurate, and if it is to your commercial advantage 
if people rely on your material, and if you invite people to rely on it, then it would be wise 
to be right.”317  
In fact, a trustmark gives an unquestionable impression to e-consumers that the TMO 
has taken reasonable steps to make an independent examination of the certified e-merchant 
services.318 The very same impression given by the ‘Good Housekeeping’ seal made the 
court in Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. allow third-party action in negligence against Hearst 
Corp., the company which issued the seal. Moreover, the argument advanced by the 
prevalent doctrine that Hanberry v. Hearst Corp. cannot be applied to a typical TMO third-
party liability case because Hanberry is based on a rule which applies only to physical harm 
and not to economic losses is not conclusive. In fact, courts have already allowed third-
party action in negligent misrepresentation, viewing damages for physical injury as 
analogous to damage for economic loss.319  
However, a trustmark on an e-merchant website is available and thus can be relied 
upon by potentially all e-consumers in the world. Therefore, the group of third-party e-
consumers tends to be unidentifiable and potentially unlimited. As already pointed out, 
public policy influences a court’s decision more than the law’s traditional categories of 
liability. In fact, if the court will take into account the spectre of unlimited liability and 
considerations on the chilling effect of imposing a high standard of care on TMOs 
                                                 
317 Kaner, C. (1996). 
318 See Chapter 2, Section 5. See also Dean, H. & Biswas, A. (2001), pp. 41-57; McKnight, H. et al. (2002), 
pp. 334-359. 
319 See Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 145-146. 
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(involving a wide class of people), future TMO cases will probably enjoy the Jaillet ‘safe 
harbour’. 
On the contrary, if the court will regard the trustmark as an ‘expert stamp of approval 
to the public’, as Comptroller General David M. Walker urged to consider audit financial 
statements after the Enron debacle,320 the applicability of the Jaillet rule will be put under 
discussion and there may be room for third-party action in negligence against TMOs. 
 
7. If the case law does not apply to TMOs 
 
“What if the US courts apply neither the Jaillet line of cases nor any of the other 
cited cases to a typical TMO third-party liability case that they will be possibly called to 
decide?” 
“Which approach to TMO third-party liability for the provision of inaccurate 
trustmarks will the courts take?” 
In this section, the application of the three main standards to determine liability to 
third parties for negligence will be tested on a typical TMO third-party liability case. 
 
7.1 Near privity standard 
 
In order to meet the near privity standard, e-consumers should be ‘known parties’ to 
TMOs or, at least, capable of identification. Furthermore, TMOs should be aware of the 
particular purposes for which e-consumers intend to rely on the trustmarks. On the one 
hand, TMOs are surely aware that e-consumers will rely on the trustmarks in order to 
assess e-merchant security, privacy or business practices. On the other hand, the number of 
e-consumers who may potentially rely on a trustmark is virtually unlimited, hence e-
consumers are not capable of identification. On this point, it has been shown in the present 
analysis that for public policy reasons, courts are reluctant to impose liability on 
professionals who provide information to an unlimited number of third parties. More 
                                                 
320 David M. Walker, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Protecting the Public Interest: Selected Governance, 
Regulatory Oversight, Auditing, Accounting, and Financial Reporting Issues (GAO-02-483T) 4 (Mar. 5, 
2002) (statement before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate). 
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precisely, professionals’ potential unlimited liability to an indeterminate class and the 
related ‘chilling’ effect – originated by the imposition of a high duty of care to a large class 
of people – which may paralyse their business, are the two main policy concerns.321  
By the same arguments, courts may not allow a cause of action against TMOs for e-
consumers in a typical TMO third-party liability case, not to mention that TMOs will most 
likely not fulfil the third requirement of the Credit Alliance near privity test: the ‘linking 
requirement’. As regards the case of European American Bank v. Strauhs & Kay,322 the 
‘linking requirement’ would mean a direct communication, both orally and in writing, and 
a series of personal meetings between e-consumers and the TMOs. It is thus reasonable to 
conclude that under the near privity standard, TMOs would owe no duty to e-consumers 
who suffer loss by relying on inaccurate trustmarks. 
 
7.2 Reasonable foreseeability 
 
Given a typical TMO third-party liability case, according to the reasonable 
foreseeability standard, TMOs may owe a duty to provide accurate trustmarks to all e-
consumers that TMOs should reasonably foresee to rely upon them and who were in fact 
influenced in their decision to transact with the e-merchants by the trustmark posted on 
their websites.323 However, it has to be stressed that, although the chance that TMOs will 
be held liable under the reasonable foreseeability standard are quite big, this standard has 
been followed by very few courts,324 hence the inherent third-party liability risk to TMOs is 
very small. 
 
                                                 
321 See Subsection 6.2 and Subsection 6.1 Jailet v. Cashman; Daniel v. Down Jones & Co.; First Equity Corp. 
v. Standard & Poor’s Corp; Gale v. Value Line. Moreover. See Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), pp. 495-
496; The emblematic Cardozo’s statement in Ultramares v. Touche, where he maintained that liability for 
negligence “may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to 
an indeterminate class.” 174 N.E. 441 at 444 (N.Y. 1931). See also Siliciano, J.A. (1988), p. 1943. For more 
general information on the issue, Dobbs, D.B. (2000), p. 1282; Atiyah, P.S. (1985), p. 488; Perlman, H.S. 
(1982), pp. 71-72. 
322 477 N.Y.S.2d 146, (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). Id. 
323 See Subsection 4.2; See also Rosenblum v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Scherl, J.B. (1994), p. 272. 
Keeton, W.P. et al. (1984), p. 1001; Hagen III, W.W. (1988), p. 189. 
324 See, e.g., Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 38. Moreover, the holding in Rosenblum is no longer followed even in 
its own home, as the New Jersey Legislature in 1994 adopted an accountant privity statute that substituted a 




As already pointed out, the ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ requirements play a crucial role 
in the restatement test.325 Courts’ interpretation of these two concepts can actually range 
from: (a) requiring the accountant to have an actual knowledge of the potential reliance 
without emphasising the accountant’s intent and directly undertaking of responsibility, to 
(b) requiring the accountant to have reason to know of the possible third-party reliance.326 
Applying the courts’ approach to the typical TMO third-party liability case, if the courts 
will maintain that TMOs owe a duty to e-consumers (who, to the TMOs’ knowledge, are 
actually aware that they will rely on the trustmarks), the related liability risk to TMOs is 
almost none given the fact that trustmarks can be relied upon by an unlimited number of e-
consumers. However, if courts will allow e-consumers’ action when the TMOs have reason 
to know of their reliance – getting in this way very close to the reasonable foreseeability 
standard – TMOs may be held liable with respect to aggrieved e-consumers who suffered 




The analysis of the case law, of the body of law potentially applicable to TMOs, of 
the public policy arguments, and of the doctrine shows that the chances that TMOs will not 
                                                 
325 See Subsection 4.3. Moreover, for more extensive discussion on the matter, see extensively on the matter 
Feinman, J.M. (2003), pp. 44-48. 
326 The leading case for the first type of interpretation is Bily v. Arthur Young & (Co. 834 P.2d 745 [Cal. 
1992]) in which the California Supreme Court maintained that “the representation must have been made 
with the intent to induce plaintiff, or a particular class of persons to which plaintiff belongs, to act in 
reliance upon the representation in a specific transaction, or a specific type of transaction, that defendant 
intended to influence. Defendant is deemed to have intended to influence [its client’s] transaction with 
plaintiff whenever defendant knows with substantial certainty that plaintiff, or the particular class of persons 
to which plaintiff belongs, will rely on the representation in the course of the transaction. If others become 
aware of the representation and act upon it, there is no liability even though defendant should reasonably 
have foreseen such a possibility.” Id. at 772-773. The leading case for the second type of interpretation is 
Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, (Tex. App. 1986) in which the Texas 
Court of Appeals argued that: “To allow liability to turn on the fortuitous occurrence that the accountant’s 
client specifically mentions a person or class of persons who are to receive the reports, when the accountant 
may have that same knowledge as a matter of business practice, is too tenuous a distinction for us to adopt 
as a rule of law. Instead, we hold that if, under current business practices and the circumstances of that case, 
an accountant preparing audited financial statements knows or should know that such statements will be 
relied upon by a limited class of persons, the accountant may be liable for injuries to members of that class 
relying on his certification of the audited reports.” Id.. at 412.  
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be liable towards aggrieved third-party e-consumers who have relied on the misleading or 
false information provided in the trustmark, or in the related certificate, are bigger than the 
chances that TMOs will be liable. 
However, both the case law and the law allow the courts big room for interpretation. 
In fact, “as it is in auditor liability cases, the doctrine does not dictate which rule (e.g., 
privity, near privity, negligence or misrepresentation) or which interpretation of an adopted 
rule (strict, broad, or in-between readings of, e.g., the ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ 
requirements of Section 552 of the Restatement [Second] of Torts) is authoritative.”327 
Public policy analysis plays a key role in prescribing and then interpreting the controlling 
rule. The contractarian approach,328 which supports the limited liability theory, has so far 
prevailed in public policy analysis of cases concerning professionals who provided 
inaccurate financial or business information to third parties, also through electronic 
medium.329  
The main question in future TMO third-party liability cases is whether the court will 
decide on the basis of the same public policy considerations. The prevalent doctrine is quite 
positive about that.330 However, there are some signals of a possible ‘wind of change’ in 
public policy analysis which should not be underestimated. A couple of relevant examples 
are provided here.  
It was recently reported that the FTC considered misleading and unfair the data 
security practice of a significant number of companies. More precisely, the FTC 
maintained that such companies misrepresented their data security practices. Furthermore, 
they did not have reasonable security measures in place.331 For example, the FTC charged 
Choice-Point that its security practice violated consumer privacy rights and federal law. 
Choice-Point agreed to settle the charges. The company had to pay $15 million ($10 
million in civil penalties and $5 million in consumer redress). Moreover, the FTC required 
                                                 
327 Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 49. 
328 See Subsection 5.1; Moreover, on the contractarian approach, see, e.g., Epstein, R.A. (1995), pp. 71-90; 
Huber, P.W. (1988), p. 5; see also Deakin, S. et al. (2003), pp. 224 et seq. 
329 See the ‘Jaillet line of cases’ Subsections 6.1 and 6.2. 
330 See, e.g., Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), pp. 491-501. 
331 See Driver, A. W. (2006) Navigate the Privacy Maze in the U.S. and Abroad, The Metropolitan Corporate 




Choice-Point to implement a comprehensive information security programme and to obtain 
audits by an independent third party every two years for twenty years.332  
CardSystems Solutions was also charged with unfair practices by the FTC. In 
particular, CardSystems failed to take appropriate security measures to protect sensitive 
data. It opted for a settlement under which it was required – as with Choice-Point – to 
implement a comprehensive data security programme and to obtain third-party audits 
biennially.333 Hence the FTC seems to assign a significant role to independent third parties 
which carry out e-merchant security and privacy audits, i.e., TMOs. 
Actually, the words that Comptroller General David M. Walker stated after the Enron 
debacle, making special reference to the auditor’s role in the financial markets, may also be 
quite significant: “The auditor’s opinion on the financial statements is like an expert’s 
stamp of approval to the public and the capital markets.”334 In fact, the same reasoning can 
be applied to the role of TMOs in e-commerce, supporting in this way the application of the 
expanded liability theory (as opposed to the limited liability theory) to TMOs.  
However, TMOs have proven not to be very trustworthy.335 
So “how to stimulate TMOs’ best practice?” 
John A. Siciliano, in his paper Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental 
Tort Reform, maintains that expanded liability produces little incentive for accountants to 
exercise care because they already have sufficient incentives to audit with due care.336 
These incentives include malpractice liability to the client, sanctions by regulators in 
securities cases or other regulated matters, concern for reputation, and the threats of 
professional disciplinary proceedings.337 The same argument, however, is not applicable to 
TMOs. The malpractice liability to client is contractually waved by disclaimers.338 
Furthermore, there are no sanctions by regulators and no threats of professional disciplinary 
                                                 
332 United States of America (for the Federal Trade Commission) v. ChoicePoint Inc. (United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division), FTC File No. 052-3069. Available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/choicepoint/choicepoint.htm>. 
333 In the Matter of CardSystems Solutions, Inc., and Solidus Networks, Inc., Doing Business as Pay By 
Touch Solutions, File No. 052 3148. Available at <http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523148/0523148.htm>. 
334 David M. Walker, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Protecting the Public Interest: Selected Governance, 
Regulatory Oversight, Auditing, Accounting, and Financial Reporting Issues (GAO-02-483T) 4 (March 5, 
2002) (statement before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate). 
335 See Chapter 2, Section 6. 
336 See Siliciano, J.A. (1988), p. 1953. 
337 See id. 
338 See Chapter 3 Subsections 5.5 “AS IS” warranty and Indemnity or hold harmless clause. 
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proceedings. Moreover, the only incentive TMOs have is the concern for reputation,339 
which has already proven not to be adequate.340 Hence, the spectre of third-party liability 
could be used to bring TMOs’ service quality up to the level expected by the FTC. 
A counter argument to third-party liability for TMOs is that if TMOs are required to 
function as insurers of e-commerce transactions – providing a sort of guarantee with related 
indemnification in case e-consumers experience loss in transactions with e-merchants – e-
consumers will enjoy risk-free purchases.341 Such situation brings about at least two policy 
concerns. First, having received gratuitously substantial information on e-merchant 
security, privacy or business practice through the trustmarks, e-consumers may be seen as 
Internet ‘free riders’. Second, it may work as a deterrent for e-consumers to pay due 
attention in transacting with e-merchants.342 This argument is in line with the caveat 
emptor doctrine: ‘let the e-consumer beware’, which is nowadays popular in online 
consumer protection.343 However, e-consumers are not able to defend themselves from 
security and privacy risks because they lack knowledge on these matters.344 Moreover, 




                                                 
339 See Chapter 2 Subsection 5.2. 
340 See Chapter 2 Section 6. 
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In England, as in the US, no reported legal cases have addressed directly the liability 
of TMOs. There is also no trace of specific statutory provisions on the matter. Therefore, 
the analysis of TMO third-party liability will be carried out within the domain of the 
general principles of professional negligence. More precisely, the relevant legal question 
that will be answered in this chapter is whether it would be reasonable to impose a duty of 
care towards e-consumers on TMOs. Looking at the same issue from another perspective, 
the question can also be presented as whether e-consumers who detrimentally rely on 
trustmarks and suffer loss will have a cause of action against TMOs that negligently 
performed their services.  
An introduction to third-party duty of care in professional negligence cases will be 
offered in Section 2. In Section 3, the general rules on the imposition of third-party liability 
for the provision of negligent misstatement and their applicability to TMOs will be 
presented. An in-depth analysis of the elements of the duty of care will be carried out in 
Section 4. In Section 5, a specific line of cases potentially applicable to TMOs will be 
outlined. The effects of the rules distilled from the line of cases on TMOs’ duty of care 
towards third-party e-consumers will be dealt with in Section 6. In Section 7, the 
applicability by analogy of CSP third-party liability rules to TMO will be analysed.346 
Section 8 contains the conclusions. 
 
                                                 
346 See Chapter 1, Subsection 3.1. 
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2. Third-party duty of care in professional negligence 
cases: a disputed matter 
 
Third-party claims against professionals are usually based on the tort of negligence.347 
In principle, there are three necessary conditions which need to be fulfilled in order to bring 
an action in negligence:  
 
a) The defendant owes a duty of care to the plaintiff;  
b) The defendant has acted or spoken in such a way as to break that duty of care; and  
c) The plaintiff has suffered relevant damage as a consequence of the breach.348  
 
Therefore, in order to check if a third-party has a cause of action in tort against a 
professional, the first question to be considered will be whether a professional’s duty of 
care towards the third party exists. Two relevant sub-questions then follow: whether the 
professional acted with reasonable care in discharging his duty towards the third party, and 
whether the loss suffered by such third party falls within the scope of the professional duty 
of care. In England, as in the US,349 there has been a quite large amount of third-party 
liability cases brought against professionals in the last 50 years.350 A couple of reasons for 
this phenomenon are actually the same as in the US. Third parties tend to see professionals 
as independent, trustworthy sources of information to rely upon. Furthermore, since 
                                                 
347 See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007) Jackson & Powell on Professional Liability (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell), pp. 68 et seq.; Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007) Tort Law Text and Materials (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), pp. 375 et seq.; Walton, C. et al. (2006) Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell), pp. 507 et seq.; Rogers, W.V. H. (2006) Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (Lodon: Sweet 
& Maxwell), pp. 485 et seq.; Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006) Clerk & Lindsdell on Torts (London. 
Sweet & Maxwell), pp. 571-572; Van Dam, C. (2006) European Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press), pp. 174-179. Hodgson, J. (2004) Tort Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 123 et seq.; 
Giliker, P. & Beckwith, S. (2004) Tort (London: Sweet & Maxwell), pp. 85 et seq.; Deakin, S. et al. (2003), 
pp. 114 et seq.; Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. (2000) The Common Law of Tort (London: Butterworths), pp. 189 
et seq.; Hodgin, R. (1999) Professional Liability: Law and Insurance (London / Hong Kong: LLP 
Professional Publishing), pp. 48 et seq.; Zweigert, K. & Kötz, H. (1998), pp. 613-615. 
348 See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), p. 13; See also, Walton, C. et al. (2006), p. 11; Rogers, W.V. H. 
(2006), pp. 74-75; Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), p. 383; Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 
120-124; Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 94-95; Giliker, P. & Beckwith, S. (2004), p. 22; Hodgson, J. (2004), pp. 
73-74; Deakin, S. et al. (2003), pp. 74-83; Van Gerven, W. et al. (2000) Cases, Materials on National, 
Supernational and International Tort Law (Oxford and Portland Oregon: Hart Publishing), pp. 44-45; 
Zweigert, K. & Kötz, H. (1998), p. 609. 
349 See Chapter 4, Section 2. 
350 See, e.g., Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), pp. 68-69. 
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professionals are usually insured, they are perceived by third parties as ‘deep pockets’.351 In 
other words, third parties see professionals as attractive targets to satisfy their request for 
compensation. Last but not least, the resistance of courts in England to grant damages for 
negligence causing pure economic loss is lessened in case of negligent information or 
advice provided by professionals.352 However, if professionals were liable to all who relied 
upon them to act with due care, their liability would tend to be unlimited.353 On the other 
hand, if professionals were only liable to clients, this would not match the reasonable 
expectations of society.354 Courts bear the challenging task of balancing professionals’ 
interests and society expectations. 
In order to carry out a preliminary assessment of TMO third-party liability from the 
very outset, it is significant to present one of the milestones of relevant English case law to 
understand the method that courts apply in deciding on third-party professional liability: 
Candler v. Crane, Christmas and Co.355 Here the plaintiff, relying on inaccurate (due to 
negligently prepared) company’s accounts, made an investment which eventually lost 
completely. The Court of Appeal decided that no duty to the plaintiff was owed by the 
accountants. However, Denning L.J., in his dissenting judgement – later endorsed and 
consistently relied upon by the House of Lords356 – argued in favour of a duty. He basically 
singled out the three following fundamental questions in order to identify whether a third-
party duty of care for the provision of professional statements exists, apart from a contract:  
                                                 
351 See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), p. 69; Pacini, C. et. al. (2002) Commonwealth Convergence 
Toward a Narrower Scope of Auditor Liability to Third Parties for Negligent Misstatements, Abacus 38 (3), 
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354 See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), pp. 69; Witting, C. (2004), pp. 165 et seq. 
355 [1951] 2 K.B. 164. 
356 See Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd, [1964] A.C. 465. See also more recent landmark 
cases on surveyor’ and accountant’ liability such as Smith v. Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 A.C. 844–845; and 
Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 621–623 and 656–657. For an in-depth analysis of the 
influence of the dissenting judgement of Denning L.J. on Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd v Heller and Partners 
Ltd, Smith v. Eric S. Bush, and Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, see, e.g., Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. 
(2007), pp. 404-429; Giliker, P. & Beckwith, S. (2004), pp. 86-95; 356 See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), 
p. 17; Hodgin, R. (1999), p. 283. 
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1. “What persons are under such duty?”357 
2. “To whom do these professional people owe this duty?” 358 
3. “To what transactions does the duty of care extend?”359 
 
In the dissenting opinion, Denning L.J. maintained that “persons such as accountants, 
surveyors, valuers, and analysts, whose profession and occupation is to examine books, 
accounts etc. and to make reports on which people – other than their clients – rely in the 
course of ordinary business” are under a duty of care to third parties.360 He further 
explained that the reason why professionals owed the duty was because their calling 
required particular knowledge and skill. Thus, the level of performance required by the 
duty is not unreasonable or excessively burdensome. In fact, the special knowledge and 
skill of professionals work as benchmarks to decide whether or not it is reasonable for a 
third party to rely on them. Furthermore, the duty is owed to the client and to those third 
parties with whom the professional deals directly with the purpose of influencing their 
future conduct (e.g., by making an investment or loan). It also extends to third parties to 
whom the professional knows his statement will be passed on by his client for the same 
purpose.361 This limits the class of those to whom the duty is owed. To translate this 
concept into legal words, the persons who may possibly count on the information provided 
by the professional were not confined to clients in contractual relationships, but included 
all others who met the requirements of proximity.362 Moreover, Denning L.J. recognised 
that there are limits to the extent to which it is reasonable to impose a duty of care on a 
professional as well as limits to the extent to which it is reasonable for a third party to rely 
on the information provided by the professional. It is reasonable to impose liability (and for 
there to be reliance) in case the advice or information is conveyed by the professional 
himself or by his client in circumstances whether the former is to be taken as knowing that 
it will be communicated and relied upon. In conclusion, Denning L.J. limited the duty to 
the specific transaction for which the professional knew that the advice or information was 
                                                 
357 [1951] 2 K.B. 179. 
358 [1951] 2 K.B. 180-181. 
359 [1951] 2 K.B. 182-183. 
360 [1951] 2 K.B. 179. 
361 See [1951] 2 K.B. 180-181. 
362 See [1951] 2 K.B. 180-181.185. 
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required. In this respect, he stressed the crucial importance of the purposes for which 
professionals provide information or issue advice.363 
 
3. Preliminary consideration on TMO third-party 
liability and focus on the key question 
 
As anticipated in the previous section, the typical TMO third-party liability case will 
now be examined in the light of Denning L.J.’s reasoning in order to preliminarily assess 
TMO third-party liability and identify the crucial issues in order to proceed with the 
relevant investigations.  
Considering the first question answered by Denning L.J.,364 TMOs can also be seen as 
professionals under a duty of care towards e-consumers. In fact, as already pointed out in 
Chapter 1, TMOs can be compared to surveyors, accountants, and, by the same token, to 
valuers. The TMO profession is to examine e-merchant security, privacy or business 
practice, and to issue trustmarks (i.e., reports) on which e-consumers (i.e., people other 
than their clients) rely in the ordinary course of business.  
As to the second question,365 Denning L.J. maintained that accountants’ duty (but the 
same reasoning also applies to surveyors, valuers, and analysts) extends to any person they 
know that their client is going to show the accounts, with the view of inducing him to 
invest money or taking some other action on them. However, he added that the duty cannot 
be extended to strangers of whom accountants have heard nothing and to whom their 
clients may choose to show their accounts, setting out the proximity test as follows: “Did 
the accountants know that the accounts were required for submission to the plaintiff and 
use by him?”366 In this way, Denning L.J. recognised that there are limits to the extent to 
which it is reasonable to impose a duty of care on professionals and thus limits to the extent 
to which it is reasonable for a third party to rely on the information provided by the 
professionals. Mutatis mutandis, TMOs owe the duty to whom they know e-merchants (i.e., 
                                                 
363 See [1951] 2 K.B. 182–183. On Denning L.J.’s dissenting judgement, see extensively Powell, J.L. & 
Stewart, R. (2007), pp. 69-72. 
364 “What persons are under the duty of care in statement apart from a contract in their behalf?” 
365 “To whom do these professional people owe this duty?” 
366 [1951] 2 K.B. 180–181. 
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their clients) are going to show the trustmark (which is comparable to accounts367) so as to 
induce the third party to take some action on it. Thus, going down this line of reasoning, 
TMOs potentially owe the duty to all e-consumers because the trustmark, as evidence of 
trustworthy security, privacy or business practices, is usually on the homepage of the e-
merchant’s website to possibly induce all e-consumers to do business online with that e-
merchant. In this respect, however, the test of proximity deployed by Denning L.J. does not 
seem to help limit the number of people to whom the duty is owed. In fact, the TMOs know 
that the trustmarks were required for submission to possibly all e-consumers and used by 
them as evidence of trustworthy security, privacy or business practices to rely upon. TMOs 
owe, then, the duty to a group of people which may be considered definite as a category (e-
consumers) but potentially unlimited in number (potentially all e-consumers). Thus, there is 
the risk of exposing TMOs to a liability to an indeterminate number of people for an 
indeterminate amount, which, according to the so-called floodgate liability theory, is often 
not accepted in English law.368  
Finally, the answer to the third question369 was given by referring to the very scope of 
the accounts: “Only to those transactions for which the accountants knew their accounts 
were required.”370 The same can once again apply to TMOs. Their duty of care extends 
only to those transactions (to be understood in its broad meaning) for which the trustmark 
was required. In other words, the duty of care extends to the transactions for which the 
information in the trustmark is meant. In a nutshell, the duty of care goes as far as the scope 
of the trustmark goes. However, this is just of little help to limit TMOs’ exposure to an 
open-ended liability for two reasons. First, trustmarks and the information on e-merchant 
security, privacy or business practices are meant for most of the types of transactions 
between e-merchants and e-consumers. Second, even if the use of the trustmarks is 
explicitly limited to only one type of transaction, the number of transactions of that type 
will remain potentially unlimited. 
                                                 
367 See Chapter 1, Subsection 3.1. 
368 The rationale of the floodgate liability theory was very well summarised by Cardozo C.J. in Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche who maintained that to allow such recovery would “expose [defendants] to a liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class” ([1931] 255 N.Y. 179). In other 
words the meaning of this metaphor is that the defendant – who negligently drafts an inaccurate statement 
which is relied upon by a potentially unlimited number of people and causes them economic losses – would 
be flooded with claims, resulting in his financial ruin. On the floodgates arguments see extensively, Lunney, 
M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), p. 458; Hodgin, R. (1999), pp. 61-62; Van Dam, C. (2006), p. 170; Cane, P. 
(1996) Tort Law and Economic Interests (Oxford: Carendon Press), p. 455 et seq. 
369 “To what transaction does the duty of care extend?” 
370 [1951] 2 K.B. 182-183. 
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This preliminary analysis highlights that it is everything but easy to determine 
whether TMOs owe a duty of care towards e-consumers. In theory, a duty of care can arise 
by comparing TMOs with accountants, surveyors, and valuers. In practice, however, the 
imposition of a duty of care on TMOs towards e-consumers gives rise to specific concrete 
issues, which are mainly related to the possible TMOs’ exposure to an unlimited number of 
third-party claims for an undetermined amount. Consequently, further investigations are 
needed in order to assess whether it will be possible to impose on TMOs a duty of care 
towards e-consumers, or, in other words, whether e-consumers who detrimentally rely on 
trustmarks and suffer loss will have a cause of action against TMOs that negligently 
performed their services. 
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive test to define the circumstances in which a 
person owes a duty of care to another, the breach of which causes loss which will give rise 
to a claim for damages. Instead, the answer is to be found on a case by case basis.371 To say 
it with May L.J. in Merret v. Babb: “It is reaching for the moon – and not required by 
authority – to expect to accommodate every circumstance which may arise within a single 
short abstract formulation. The question in each case is whether the law recognises that 
there is a duty of care.”372 Therefore, the most helpful guidance will be obtained by 
analysing the specific cases in which duties of care have been imposed. Accordingly, in the 
next sections, first an analysis of the general principles on duties to third parties will be 
carried out in order to lay down the basis of the study. Second, the relevant cases in which 
the duty of care has been imposed will be analysed. After that, there will be enough 
grounds to provide an informed answer to the key question of whether TMO third-party 
liability can be found in English law. 
 
4. Duty of Care 
 
                                                 
371 See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), pp. 525-526; Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 123-124; 
Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), p. 384; Rogers, W.V. H. (2006), p. 134; Witting, C. (2004), pp. 14 
et seq.; Giliker, P. & Beckwith, S. (2004), pp. 24-25; Hodgin, R. (1999), p. 63. 
372 [2001] Lloyd’s L. Rep. P.N. 468 at para. 41. 
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A duty of care neither arises ‘“in the air”’373 nor is owed ‘“to the whole world”’374; 
generally, a duty – if it arises – is owed to a specific person or to a definable class of 
persons.375 This rule applies especially in cases of professional negligent misstatements 
causing pure economic loss. Foreseeability, proximity, and policy arguments are generally 
the necessary requirements for the existence of a duty of care.376 They will be dealt with 
after having introduced Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd,377 the case which 
actually opened the way to third-party claims for negligent misstatements causing 
economic loss and set the standards to verify whether a duty of care exists in such cases.378 
Thus, this is the case to start off with the analysis. As to the facts, in Hedley Byrne & Co 
Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd, the plaintiffs acted in reliance on favourable references on a 
company provided by the bankers. However, that company went bankrupt and, as an 
obvious consequence, the plaintiff suffered economic loss. The House of Lords decided 
that the bankers did not owe a duty of care towards the plaintiffs because the references 
were provided “without responsibility”; in so arguing, the Court implicitly recognised that 
– contract aside – a professional who issues statements could owe a duty to take reasonable 
care towards the recipient of the information, breach of which could make the professional 
liable for third-party economic loss. Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd 
instituted the so-called ‘reliance principle’ according to which a professional who issues a 
statement to a person who is entitled to and does rely on it should be liable accordingly. 
Since then, this principle has been well established. However, quite often courts have used 
proximity and policy considerations to draw the boundaries of such professional liability.  
Therefore, in order to properly understand when a duty of care arises, the analysis 
will continue by touching upon the straightforward requirement of foreseeability and then 
focusing on the far more complex proximity and policy arguments. The reader should keep 
in mind that the three elements are very much interrelated and thus it is not always possible 
                                                 
373 Bourhill v . Young [1943] AC 92, 108, HL (Lord Wright). See also Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] AC 
562, 618, HL (Lord Macmillan). 
374 Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605, 621, HL (Lord Bridge).  
375 See Witting, C. (2004), p. 14. 
376 Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 124 et seq.; Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), pp. 42-49; Dugdale, 
A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), pp. 4391-397; Rogers, W.V. H. (2006), pp. 158-170; Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. 
(2000), pp. 159-163. 
377 [1964] A.C. 465. 
378 Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 403 et seq.; Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), p. 17; Walton, C. et 
al. (2006), pp. 516-517; Rogers, W.V. H. (2006), pp. 486-488; Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), pp. 
444-446; Giliker, P. & Beckwith, S. (2004), pp. 29-30; Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. (2000), pp. 191 et seq.; 
Hodgin, R. (1999), pp. 51-53. 
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to deal with them in a separate way.379 Therefore, some flexibility is needed to read the 
following subsections. 
 
4.1 Foreseeability of persons 
 
For the scope of the present analysis, it suffices to say that, as a general rule, the first 
step that a court takes in order to establish if a duty of care towards the plaintiff may exist 
for the defendant is to check whether for a reasonable person in the defendant’s position it 
would have been possible to foresee that his carelessness might have caused a loss to the 
plaintiff, or to the class of persons the plaintiff belongs to.380 However, in cases of 
professionals’ negligent misstatements causing economic loss to third party who 
detrimentally relied on them, ‘foreseeability’ is indeed necessary to establish professional 
liability but absolutely not sufficient. Such statement was also confirmed by the House of 
Lords in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, in which it was argued as follows: “the 
postulate of a simple duty to avoid harm that is, with hindsight, reasonably capable of being 
foreseen becomes untenable without the imposition of some intelligible limits to keep the 
law of negligence within the bounds of common sense of practicality. Those limits have 
been found by the requirement of what has been called a ‘relationship of proximity’ 
between plaintiff and defendant and by the imposition of a further requirement that the 
attachment of liability for harm which has occurred be ‘just and reasonable’.”381 Hence 




The second step that courts usually take it is to assess whether there is enough 
proximity between the defendant and the plaintiff. ‘Proximity’ is about the relationship 
between the parties: being sufficiently proximate, the defendant would know that his 
failures might directly affect the plaintiff. It plays a significant role in establishing the 
                                                 
379 See, e.g., Witting, C. (2004),pp. 25 et seq. 
380 On foreseeability, see extensively, e.g., Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), pp. 391-392; Walton, C. et 
al. (2006), pp. 30-32; Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 129-138; Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. (2000), pp. 
159-160. 
381 [1990] 2 AC 633, HL. 
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necessary causal link between the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s loss.382 Unfortunately, 
there is no simple formula to check in every case whether enough proximity between the 
defendant and the plaintiff exists.383 Yet there are many factors which concurrently can 
help to establish proximity. The most relevant of these factors (i.e., special relationships or 
relationships equivalent to contracts, mutuality, assumption of responsibility, defendant’s 
skill or special knowledge, defendant’s knowledge of the recipient or class, defendant’s 
purpose of information or advice, and plaintiff’s reliance) are briefly mentioned here 
below.384 
Sometimes courts have asked for proof of the existence of a ‘special relationship’ 
between the parties, or of a ‘relationship equivalent to contract’.385 Other times courts have, 
nevertheless, pointed out that it does not make much sense to require a relationship 
equivalent to a contract between the parties of a third-party liability for a negligent 
misstatement case. In fact, most likely the parties would have never had any kind of 
communication with each other. However, no matter how the courts call it, what they look 
for is a relationship which may justify the assumption that the defendant had the knowledge 
of the loss that his failure could have caused to the plaintiff and the plaintiff trusted in the 
professional skills of the defendant. Moreover, as it was already stressed, in most of the 
cases the parties would not have had any contact with each other, but proximity may still be 
found. If the parties had some relationship, however, this would help very much to 
establish proximity. In this respect, courts speak about ‘mutuality’, defined as the fact “that 
both plaintiff and defendant played an active part in the transaction from which the liability 
arose…[T]he plaintiff initiated the relationship by request for a reference; the defendants 
acted upon the request; and the plaintiffs relied on what they had done.”386 Mutuality is 
quite a flexible concept; the proof of it can vary from demonstrating the existence of an 
ongoing commercial relationship between the parties to a simple plaintiff’s request for 
information or advice to the defendant who might provide it directly or through an 
                                                 
382 See Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 142-143; Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), pp. 391-392; 
Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. (2000), pp. 159-160; Hodgin, R. (1999), pp. 57-58. 
383 In Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, the House of Lord maintained that “there is no simple formula or 
touch-stone to which recourse can be had in order to provide in every case a ready answer.” ([1990] 2 AC 
628, HL) 
384 See extensively on the factors influencing proximity Witting, C. (2004), pp. 170-200. 
385 See, e.g., Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 486, 509, 515, 528, 536, and 539; 
Smith v. Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 871, HL See also Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 
W.L.R. 835, HL. 
386 White v. Jones [1995] 2AC 283-284, HL. 
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intermediary. Needless to say, if the defendant had assumed relevant responsibility toward 
the plaintiff who suffered loss upon relying on the defendant’s negligent statement, the 
defendant’s liability will arise. Furthermore, the concept of ‘assumption of responsibility’ 
has been recognised as having a broad meaning. In fact, it can be an express statement of 
the plaintiff, but also assumed by the facts which consistently point at the recognition of 
defendant’s responsibility (e.g., defendant’s undertaking of onerous obligations).387 A 
crucial element in order to determine whether it was reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on 
defendant’s statement, and thus a necessary element to establish proximity between the 
parties, is represented by ‘defendant’s skills or special knowledge’. In order to define such 
element, it is useful to recall the concept of information asymmetry as explained in Chapter 
2, Section 4. Accordingly, there needs to be information asymmetry388 between the 
defendant and the plaintiff for proximity to be established. Applying this concept to the 
situation at hand and simplifying it as much as possible, the plaintiff’s reliance on the 
defendant’s statement is justified only when the defendant is a professional on the matter 
(e.g., he is in the business of providing advice on the relevant issue or has maintained to 
have the necessary skills or competences to make pertinent statements) and the plaintiff is, 
on the contrary, ignorant of it or does not have access to the information he needs while the 
defendant does.389  
Another proximity factor is the so-called ‘defendant’s knowledge of the recipient or 
class’. The overlap between foreseeability and proximity is clear. By ‘defendant’s 
knowledge of the recipient or class’, what is meant is the defendant’s knowledge of the 
person or the class of persons who are likely to rely on his statement.390 More precisely, 
courts do not usually require that the defendant knows the actual identity of the plaintiff, 
since the reasonable knowledge that the plaintiff, or the class which he belongs to, would 
have most likely relied on the statement for purposes within the scope of the information 
                                                 
387 See, e.g., Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 503, HL; Smith v. Eric S Bush 
[1990] 1 AC 862, HL; Williams v. Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 W.L.R. 835, HL. The House of 
Lords broad interpretation of defendant’s ‘assumption of responsibility’ in these cases reflects the expansion 
of professional third-party liability for negligent misstatement. 
388 Generally, information asymmetry occurs when one party to a transaction has more or better information 
than the other party. See Chapter 2, Section 4. 
389 See, e.g., Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 502-503, 505, 510, and 538-539 
HL; Henderson v. Merret Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 180 HL. 
390 It is considered a proximity factor because of its function of linking the defendant and the plaintiff. In fact, 
defendant knowledge of plaintiff reliance brings the latter within the group class of persons directly affected 
by the act or omission of the former. 
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would be enough to fulfil this proximity factor.391 Furthermore, the just mentioned scope 
for which the information or the advice is provided by the defendant is another proximity 
factor: the ‘defendant’s purpose of information or advice’. It assumes crucial importance 
especially in cases in which the statement issued by the defendant is available to a large 
number of third parties.392 However, the defendant’s purpose of information or advice does 
not need to be exactly the one of the plaintiff’s reliance on it; it is enough if they are 
sufficiently congruent.393 In conclusion, the ‘plaintiff’s reliance’ is an important factor to 
establish the causal link between the defendant’s misstatement and the plaintiff’s loss.394 In 
fact, a statement causes damage only when somebody acts in reliance on it. However, the 
plaintiff’s reliance needs to be reasonable. It will be considered reasonable if in the case at 
hand other proximity factors, among the ones already mentioned, coexist (i.e., defendant’s 
specific professional skill and knowledge that the plaintiff or people of the class he belongs 
to is likely to rely on the statement; and the purposes for which the plaintiff uses the 




Even if foreseeability and proximity are found, this does not mean that a third-party 
liability claim for economic loss suffered due to reliance on negligently provided 
information will go. In other words, foreseeability and proximity are necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for the recognition of a third-party duty of care upon a professional 
who negligently provides an inaccurate statement. In addition, the imposition of a duty of 
care must be fair, just, and reasonable.396 Fairness, justice, and reasonableness are concepts 
which enjoy a certain degree of abstraction created to leave some discretion to courts in 
their decision. Especially in third-party liability claims for negligent misrepresentation 
                                                 
391 See, e.g., Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465, 482, and 494 HL; Aiken v. 
Stewart Wrightson Agency [1995] 1 WLR 1281. Contrariwise, see Reeman v. Department of Transport 
[1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 648, CA. 
392 See Sections 2 and 3. 
393 See, e.g., Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 503 HL; Western Trust & Savings 
Ltd v. Strutt & Parker [1999] PNLR 154, CA. Contrariwise, see Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 
AC 605, HL where the House of Lords maintained that the identification of the specific purposes for which 
a statement is issued would not only help in establishing plaintiff’s probability of reliance but, more 
importantly, his entitlement to rely on it. 
394 See Witting, C. (2004), pp. 321-322. 
395 See Id., p. 197. 
396 See, e.g., Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 618, HL. 
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causing pure economic loss, which bring about a shared fear for professionals’ unlimited 
liability, these concepts are often used by courts to bar plaintiffs’ actions (in jargon: to 
close the floodgates).397  
As already pointed out in Section 2, if professionals are under the obligation to act 
with due care towards all who possibly rely upon the information, the professionals’ 
liability would tend to be unlimited.398 On the other hand, if professionals are liable only to 
clients, this would not match the reasonable expectations of society.399 Courts bear the 
challenging task to balance professionals’ interests and society expectations. Therefore, 
policy arguments go beyond the pure legal evaluation of the matter at stake and do not only 
focus on the specific plaintiff and defendant. Courts often consider the potential effects of 
their decisions on the professional category to which the defendant belongs as a whole, as 
well as the impacts on parties which may be incidentally affected by the recognition or not 
of a duty of care.400 Last but not least, courts may also take into consideration the effect 
that recognising or not a duty of care may have on their own work and on the 
administration of justice. 
5. Analysis of the case law potentially applicable to 
TMOs 
 
The study of the elements of third-party liability for negligent misstatement set the 
theoretical basis for an informed analysis of relevant case law. Presently, no cases of TMOs 
have been reported in England. However, proceeding with the comparison between TMOs 
and surveyors and auditors, a line of cases which deals with third-party liability for 
negligent misstatements under specific conditions (e.g., in the absence of direct dealings 
between parties, of a defendant’s ‘assumption of responsibility’ for the task, and even of 
reliance on the plaintiff’s statement) may be applied by analogy to the typical TMO cases 
                                                 
397 See, e.g., Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 143-144; Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), pp. 
392-398; Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. (2000), pp. 160-161.  
398 See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), pp. 69; Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), p. 571; Witting, C. 
(2004), pp. 165 et seq.; Giliker, P. & Beckwith, S. (2004), pp. 94-95; Deakin, S. et al. (2003), p. 115; See 
the floodgates arguments, Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), p. 458; Hodgin, R. (1999), pp. 61-62; Van 
Dam, C. (2006), p. 170. 
399 See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), pp. 69; Witting, C. (2004), pp. 165 et seq. 
400 See, e.g., Bolitho v. City & Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232, HL; Phelps v. Hillingdon London 
BC [2001] 2 AC 619, HL. 
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in which e-consumers suffer a loss from relying on wrong information negligently provided 
by TMOs through trustmarks. 
 
5.1 ‘Extended Hedley Byrne liability’ line of cases 
 
As already mentioned at the beginning of the previous section, Hedley Byrne & Co 
Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd set the ground for tortious liability for the issuance of a 
negligent misstatement which caused a pure economic loss to third parties that had relied 
on it. More precisely, for the liability to arise under the Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & 
Partners Ltd standard, the circumstances must be ‘equivalent to contract’ and the defendant 
must have ‘assumed a responsibility’ to the plaintiff.401 However, since Hedley Byrne & 
Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd, the liability for negligent misstatement has evolved. The 
so-called ‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’ line of cases has developed.402 Basically, in 
such cases, the duty of care arises in the absence of direct dealings between or amongst the 
parties, of a defendant’s ‘assumption of responsibility’, and even of reliance on the 
plaintiff’s statement. More precisely, as Christian Witting aptly described in his book 
Liability for Negligent Misstatements,403 the ‘extended Hedley Byrne’ liability line of cases 
presents the following specific features: 
 
a) Three parties are involved. 
b)  It is the third party that claims to have suffered a loss resulting from the inaccuracy 
of advice or information provided by the defendant. 
c) The defendant has no subjective ‘assumption of responsibility’ for the task.404 
d) There might be an express exclusion of liability to the plaintiff or to the class he or 
she belongs to.405 
e) Ordinarily, there is no mutuality406 between or amongst the parties. Neither is there 
a request for advice or information and action by the defendant in direct response to 
it.407 
                                                 
401 See Section 4. 
402 See Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 413 et seq.; Witting, C. (2004), pp. 213 et seq.; Deakin, S. et 
al. (2003), pp. 124 et seq.; Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. (2000), pp. 199-203. 
403 Witting, C. (2004), pp. 213-214. 
404 See, e.g., Smith v. Eric S Bush [1990] 1AC 862, HL; White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 256 and 262, HL. 
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f) There is often no actual reliance by the plaintiff upon a statement containing 
inaccurate or misleading advice or information.408 
 
“On what basis is the duty of care recognised in these cases, anyway?” 
 
Smith v. Eric S Bush and Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council,409 Spring v. 
Guardian Assurance plc,410 and White v. Jones411 are the major House of Lords decisions 
on the ‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’.412 Smith v. Eric S Bush and Harris v. Wyre 
Forest District Council are the most relevant cases for the present analysis, as they present 
several elements which may be used in the analysis of TMO third-party liability. Hence, 
they will be dealt with in detail hereunder. 
 
Smith v. Eric S Bush and Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council 
In both Smith v. Eric S Bush and Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council,413 the 
plaintiffs suffered economic loss from buying real estate from reliance on negligently 
prepared valuations. In fact, the plaintiffs purchased such real estate through a mortgage 
loan. Before granting the mortgage, the mortgagees asked the valuers to issue esteems of 
the relevant real estate, which turned out to be inaccurate. Hence, the plaintiffs purchased 
the real estates on mortgage loans which were much higher than their actual value. A 
couple of details crucial to the decisions need to be stressed at this stage: (a) the valuation 
was at the plaintiffs’ expenses (in fact, the plaintiffs paid the valuation fees to the 
mortgagees); and (b) the real estate properties purchased by the plaintiffs consist of houses 
at the lower end of the market.  
In both cases, the third-party liability disclaimers set forth by the defendants were 
considered unreasonable and thus void, pursuant to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 
                                                                                                                                                    
405 See, e.g., Smith v. Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831, HL. 
406 See Section 4. 
407 See White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 271-272, HL. 
408 See, e.g., White v. Jones [1995] 2 AC 262 and 272, HL. 
409 [1990] 1 AC 831, HL. 
410 [1995] 2 AC 296, HL. See also Wade v. State of Victoria [1999] 1 VR 121. 
411 [1995] 2 AC 207, HL. 
412 Witting, C. (2004), pp. 215-221. 
413 [1990] 1 AC 831, HL. 
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(henceforth: UCTA), and the defendants were held liable towards the plaintiffs for their 
negligent valuations. Literally, Lord Templeman stated that:  
 
“in the absence of a (valid) disclaimer of liability the valuer who values a house 
for the purpose of a mortgage, knowing that the mortgagee will rely and the 
mortgagor will probably rely on the valuation, knowing that the purchaser 
mortgagor has in effect paid for the valuation, is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable skill and care and that duty is owed to both parties to the 
mortgage.”414  
 
The House of Lords maintained that the facts showed a high degree of knowledge on 
the valuers’ side that their failure would cause loss to the plaintiffs. The assumption 
operated by the House of Lords was based on the conviction that purchasers of houses at 
the lower end of the market almost never commission an independent valuation. They 
usually rely on the one received by the mortgagees instead. Therefore, the defendants’ 
knowledge of the fact that their failures would most likely directly affect the plaintiffs and 
cause them loss was considered sufficient to establish proximity between the parties. More 
precisely, it fulfilled the proximity factor of ‘defendant’s assumption of responsibility’.415 
The defendants’ knowledge of the plaintiffs’ probable reliance also played a crucial role in 
the public policy analysis of the Court, which accordingly established in the defendants a 
duty of care towards the plaintiffs against the desire of the former that the latter should not 
rely on the former’s valuations. The House of Lords’ rationale is well represented by the 
words of Lord Jauncey, who literally maintained that:  
 
“[i]t must, however, be remembered that this is a decision in respect of a 
dwelling house of modest value in which it is widely recognised by surveyors that 
purchasers are in fact relying on their care and skill. It will obviously be of 
general application in broadly similar circumstances. But I expressly reserve my 
position in respect of valuations of quite different types of property for mortgage 
                                                 
414 Id. at 848. 
415 See Section 4. On this point, Lord Griffith stated, “[t]he phrase ‘assumption of responsibility’ can only 
have any real meaning if it is understood as referring to the circumstances in which the law will deem the 
maker of the statement to have assumed responsibility to the person who acts upon the advice” [1990] 1 AC 
862, HL. 
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purposes, such as industrial property, large blocks of flats or very expensive 
houses.”416 
 
5.2 Duty’s factors under the ‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’ 
test 
 
A number of recurrent arguments on the necessary elements for the imposition of a 
duty of care (especially as far as proximity and policy analysis are concerned) may be 
found in the ‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’ line of cases.  
 
Proximity 
From the decisions of the House of Lords, there can be distilled a sort of proximity 
test used by the Courts in the ‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’ line of cases. The test is 
composed of three concurrent requirements.417  
First, the defendants are professionals in the matter about which they issued the 
statements, having more knowledge of the issues at stake or better access to relevant 
information than the plaintiff.418  
Second, the defendants’ knowledge of the fact that their failures will most likely 
directly affect the plaintiffs and cause them loss are either provable by the plaintiff or 
clearly indicated by the facts.419  
Third, the plaintiffs could prove that the defendants knew that the plaintiffs, or the 
class of persons they belonged to, would likely rely on their statements and thus made an 
informed decision in undertaking their professional activity. As in the previous 
requirement, this one could be assumed by the facts.420 
 
                                                 
416 Id. at 859. Such considerations were also relevant to the application of the Unfair Contract Terms Act. 
417 Witting, C. (2004), pp. 222-225. 
418 See in Section 4 the proximity factor: ‘defendant’s skill or special knowledge’. 
419 See in Section 4 the proximity factor: ‘defendant’s assumption of responsibility’. 
420 See in Section 4 the proximity factor: ‘defendant’s knowledge of the recipient or class’. 
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Exclusion and limitation of liability clauses 
It is worth pointing out for the present analysis that specifically in both Smith v. Eric 
S Bush and Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council, the valuers disclaimed their 
responsibilities towards third parties. However, the House of Lords held those disclaimers 
unreasonable because, pursuant to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (henceforth: 
UCTA), enough proximity was established between valuers and purchasers. In fact, the 
House of Lords rejected the following arguments in which the Council for valuers 
maintained that it was fair and reasonable for a valuer to rely on an exclusion clause: 
 
a) The exclusion clause was clear, understandable, reiterated, and forcefully drawn to 
the attention of the purchaser. 
b) The purchaser cannot rely on the mortgage valuation and must obtain and pay for 
his own survey. 
c) If valuers cannot disclaim liability, they will face more claims from purchasers, 
some of whom will be unmeritorious but difficult and expensive to resist. 
d) A valuer will become more cautious, take more time, and produce more gloomy 
reports, which will make house transactions more difficult. 
e) If a duty of care cannot be disclaimed, the cost of negligence insurance for valuers, 
and therefore the cost of valuation fees to the public, will increase.421 
 
Lord Templeman replied on these points, as follows: “All these submissions are 
inconsistent with the ambit and thrust of the act of 1977. The valuer is a professional man 
who offers his services for reward. He is paid for those services. The valuer knows that 90 
per cent of purchasers in fact rely on a mortgage valuation and do not commission their 
own survey. There is great pressure on a purchaser to rely on the mortgage valuation. Many 
purchasers cannot afford a second valuation. If a purchaser obtains a second valuation, the 
sale may go off and then both valuation fees will be wasted. Moreover, he knows that 
mortgagees, such as building societies and the council…are trustworthy and that they 
appoint careful and competent valuers and he trusts the professional man so appointed. 
Finally the valuer knows full well that failure on his part to exercise reasonable skill and 
                                                 
421 See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), pp. 553. 
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care may be disastrous for the purchaser.”422 Moreover, it is interesting to emphasise that 
Lord Griffiths, in supporting Lord Templeman arguments, pointed out a number of 
additional factors that had influenced the Court’s decision on the validity of  the valuers’ 
exclusion of liability clauses: parties’ bargaining power, availability of alternative sources 
of advice (taking into account time and cost), nature of the task undertaken by the 
defendant (its difficulty or danger), insurability, and practical consequences of (in-) 
validating the exclusion clause.423 
 
Policy arguments 
As far as policy arguments are concerned, a couple of them are characteristic of the 
‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’ line of cases. In these cases, the House of Lords 
maintained that it was not only fair, just, and reasonable to place on the defendants a 
tortious duty of care towards third-party plaintiffs,424 but also that such duty was not 
incompatible with the contractual one the professionals owed their clients. Moreover, a 
defining reason, among the other ones that have already been dealt with,425 put forward by 
the House of Lords for the imposition of the third-party duty of care bordered on the fact 
that the defendants discharged a so-called socially important function.426 Nevertheless, it 
has to be kept in mind that generalisations on policy arguments are never recommendable 
because they depend very much on the specific case. Accordingly, it is useful for the 
present analysis to point out a crucial policy consideration in the decision to place a duty of 
care on the valuers in Smith v. Eric S Bush and Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council. In 
these cases, consideration of the nature of the interests in question and the value of the 
assets purchased played a significant role in the House of Lords’ decision on whether it was 
reasonable to expect the plaintiffs to obtain independent valuations.427 More precisely, the 
unreasonableness of requiring the purchasers of real estates at the lower level of the market 
to pay for a second valuation after having already paid valuation fees to the mortgagees 
                                                 
422 [1990] 1 AC 852 HL. 
423 Id. at 858-859 HL. 
424 See Subsection 4.3. 
425 See above in this Section Smith v. Eric S Bush and Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council. 
426 That is, a valuer who prepares a valuation of a house at the lower level of the market for the purchasers in 
Smith v. Eric S Bush and Harris v. Wire Forest District Council; an employer who prepares a reference 
about a former employee who is applying for a new job in Spring v. Guardian Assurance plc.; a solicitor 
who carries out instructions for the alteration of a will prior to the death of the testator in White v. Jones.  
427 See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), pp. 553. 
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was crucial in affirming the imposition of a duty on the valuers in Smith v. Eric S Bush and 
Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council. 
 
6. Applicability of the ‘extended Hadley Byrne liability’ 
rules to TMOs 
 
The typical TMO third-party liability case428 in which an e-consumer suffers loss by 
relying on an inaccurate trustmark negligently issued by a TMO presents the specific 
features of the ‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’ line of cases. In fact: 
 
a) it involves three parties, i.e., the TMO, the e-merchant, and the e-consumer; 
b) it is the third-party e-consumer who claims to have suffered loss as a result of the 
inaccuracy of the information provided by the defendant TMO; 
c) there is no assumption of responsibility by the defendant TMO for the issuance of 
accurate information on e-merchant security, privacy, or business practices 
provided in the trustmark; 
d) (on the contrary,) there is an express exclusion of liability to third-party 
e-consumers through disclaimers;429 
e) there is no mutuality of relations between parties. In fact, the TMO does not act in 
response to an e-consumer’s request for information or advice; and 
f) the plaintiff e-consumer’s actual reliance on the inaccurate information in the 
trustmark is often absent.  
 
Moreover, the typical TMO third-party liability case presents many similarities with 
Smith v. Eric S Bush and Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council. First, e-consumers may 
be compared with purchasers of real estates at the lower end of the market. It is very 
unlikely for such purchasers to obtain a second valuation of houses as it is for e-consumers 
to obtain a second assessment of e-merchant security, privacy or business practices. The 
reason is that both purchasers of real estates at the lower level of the market and e-
consumers do not transact for business purposes. Furthermore, they do not have 
                                                 
428 See Chapter 1, Section 2. 
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professional competencies in the transaction at stake. In addition, they usually do not plan 
to spend more money than the amount necessary to complete the transaction. Often, they 
cannot even afford a second opinion. Therefore, purchasers of real estates at the lower end 
of the market are very dependent on valuers as e-consumers are on TMOs. Accordingly, 
the facts indicate a high degree of knowledge on the part of the defendant TMOs of the 
probability of loss to the plaintiffs should the auditing of the e-merchant security, privacy 
or business practices be negligently performed. The only significant difference is that e-
consumers do not directly pay for the TMO’s service whilst purchasers of real estates at the 
lower level of the market usually pay valuation fees to the mortgagees. However, it could 
be argued that e-consumers indirectly pay for the TMO’s service. In fact, e-merchants’ 





Proximity, in a nutshell, is about how one party is placed with regard to another.430 In 
this respect, defendant TMOs are professionals that possess a specific knowledge of online 
security, privacy, or business practices. Furthermore, they are better placed to provide 
relevant advice than the plaintiff e-consumers, as TMOs have the capability to access more 
relevant information. The relationship between TMOs and e-consumers is therefore 
unequal in this way.431 Moreover, according to the rules on third-party liability for 
negligent misstatements, the plaintiff e-consumers should provide a number of evidence in 
order to establish proximity.  
First, either it has to be proven or the facts must clearly demonstrate that defendant 
TMOs had actual knowledge of the likelihood of harming e-consumers should the 
trustmark service be inadequately performed and, thus, the information related to the e-
merchant was inaccurate. As mentioned above, commenting on the similarities between or 
amongst a typical TMO third-party liability case, Smith v. Eric S Bush, and Harris v. Wyre 
Forest District Council, the facts indicate a high degree of knowledge on the part of the 
                                                                                                                                                    
429 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.5. 
430 See Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 142-143; Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), pp. 391-392; 
Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. (2000), pp. 159-160; Hodgin, R. (1999), pp. 57-58. 
431 See the concept of ‘information asymmetry’ in Chapter 2, Section 4. 
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defendant TMOs of the probability of loss to the plaintiffs should the auditing of the e-
merchant security, privacy or business practices be negligently performed. However, there 
is no evidence that 90 percent of e-consumers rely on trustmarks, as it was maintained by 
Lord Templeman for purchasers of real estates at the lower level of the market in Smith v. 
Eric S Bush and Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council.432 It could be argued, though, that 
the TMOs’ business model is based on e-consumers’ reliance on trustmarks. In fact, if e-
consumers do not rely on trustmarks, e-merchants will not demand them; thus, there will be 
no reason for TMOs to exist. This observation may reinforce the assumption of TMOs’ 
actual knowledge of the likelihood of loss to the plaintiffs if the certification service is 
inadequately performed.433 
Second, plaintiff e-consumers have to prove, or it must be clearly indicated by the 
facts, that TMOs, in light of the aforementioned knowledge, made a conscious decision to 
provide information on e-merchant security, privacy, or business practices by supplying 
trustmarks. As the provision of trustmarks represents the core business of TMOs, it should 
be possible to assume (or not too difficult to prove, anyway) that TMOs, aware of the 
related risks, consciously decided to enter the business. 
Third, plaintiffs would be generally asked to prove the tightness of the causal 
connection between the TMOs’ inadequate performance of the service and the subsequent 
damage they suffered. E-consumers would succeed if they could prove that few (if any) 
decisions or acts of e-consumers would intervene in the sequence of events leading to 
damage.434 The proof that e-consumers were unable to protect themselves from loss and 
inevitable damage would help. In the typical TMO third-party liability case, an e-consumer 
relies on the trustmark and transacts with the e-merchant (as a purchaser of real estate at the 
lower level of the market relies on the valuation and buys the house; or an investor relies on 
an audit report and buys shares of the audited company). Subsequently, as a result of the 
undetected (or unreported) inadequate security of the e-merchant’s system, or of the unfair 
e-merchant’s privacy policy or business practice, the e-consumer suffers damage which 
may range from violation of the e-consumer’s privacy and data protection rights to pure 
economic loss (as a purchaser of a house suffers damage for undetected defects of the 
house; or the investor suffers damage for undetected financial problems of the audited 
                                                 
432 See Subsection 5.2, Exclusion and limitation of liability clauses. 
433 See in Section 4 the proximity factor: defendant’s ‘assumption of responsibility’. 
434 See Witting, C. (2004), p. 224. 
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company). In fact, for example: (a) the e-consumer did not receive the good or the service 
he had paid for; (b) without prior consent from the e-consumer, the e-merchant processed 
his personal data for purposes other than the fulfilment of the relevant contractual 
obligations (e.g., used for profiling- and marketing-related purposes, shared with or sold to 
third parties), with the e-consumer eventually receiving unsolicited marketing e-mails and 
phone calls from the e-merchant or third parties; (c) the e-consumer’s payment details were 
used directly by the e-merchant to defraud the e-consumer, were shared or sold by the e-
merchant to third parties to ultimately defraud the e-consumer, or stolen during the 
transaction or from the e-merchant’s client database by a cunning third party that took 
advantage of the poor security of the e-merchant’s IT infrastructure.435 Between the TMOs’ 
negligent performance and the subsequent damage to e-consumers is just a ‘click’. 
Moreover, there is evidently no chance for e-consumers to protect themselves from loss 
and inevitable damage. As a matter of fact, e-consumers cannot intervene in the e-merchant 
security measures, privacy or business practice. 
In conclusion, this analysis suggests that proximity between TMOs and third-party e-
consumers may be established under the ‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’ rule. In fact, it is 
possible to prove the existence, at some stages prior to the TMOs’ failure to take care, of a 
significant causal link by which TMOs’ failure could have resulted in loss to e-consumers, 
so as to assist the court in identifying TMOs as the subjects with substantial ability to cause 
loss to e-consumers. 
 
6.2 Validity of TMOs’ third-party liability disclaimers 
 
In Smith v. Eric S Bush and Harris v. Wire Forest District Council, the House of 
Lords held that disclaimers were unreasonable and thus contrary to the provisions of the 
UCTA. As a consequence, given the high degree of proximity between parties, the 
defendants were liable for their negligent misstatements.436 Therefore, in order to assess 
whether the TMOs’ liability to e-consumers exists, there is a need to check whether or not 
the TMOs’ disclaimers are reasonable. 
                                                 
435 See the typical TMO third-party liability case, Chapter 1, Section 2. 
436 See Subsection 5.2, Exclusion and limitation of liability clauses. 
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TMOs, through contractual clauses or notices,437 tend to waive their liability for any 
loss incurred by e-consumers for relying on the trustmarks. Usually, a contract exists only 
between TMOs and e-merchants. However, common law rules do not always exclude the 
possibility that the effects of a contract may extend to third parties.438 Moreover, TMOs try 
sometimes to place those disclaimers in what they define as Relying Party Agreements or 
Third Party Agreements, which are meant to impose on e-consumers (which may be 
defined as ‘relying parties’ or ‘third parties’) the TMOs’ disclaimers on third-party liability. 
Relying Party Agreements are posted on TMOs’ websites but are not very easy to find. 
They are practically impossible for e-consumers to read, understand, and enter into; thus, 
Relying Party Agreements may be compared more with notices than with contracts. Non-
contractual notices (e.g., legal notices, security notices, privacy notices) are another means 
of TMOs to exclude or limit their third-party liability.439  
In any case, the validity of the TMOs’ disclaimers must be assessed. The UCTA 
regulates a range of situations in which civil liability is excluded or limited.440 Both 
contractual clauses and notices are subject to the reasonableness requirement set forth in 
Section 2 (2) of the UCTA.441 In determining whether or not exclusion or limitation clauses 
or notices are valid, the courts will take an ‘in substance’ approach, as the House of Lords 
did in Smith v. Eric S Bush and Harris v. Wire Forest District Council. In other words, any 
attempt to narrow ordinary boundaries of liability must be reasonable. Most of the 
arguments used by the House of Lords in Smith v. Eric S Bush to reject the defence of the 
Council for valuers may actually apply to the typical TMO third-party liability case.442 It is 
certainly possible to recognise in the Council for valuers’ defence of the fairness and 
                                                 
437 E.g., Terms and Conditions, Certification Practice Statement, Seal Licence Agreement, Relying Party 
Agreement. 
438 Courts have indicated at times the need to accommodate the contractual arrangements by which risks of 
liability have been allocated, so that third parties could take the benefit of a contractual term or to be, in 
effect, burdened by it. See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), pp. 142-144; Witting, C. (2004), pp. 439 et 
seq. 
439 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.5. 
440 See also the related provision of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations, Statutory Instrument 
1999/2083. The view that has been taken is that these provisions are unlikely to catch any exclusion or 
limitation clause which has not been rendered invalid by the UCTA. See Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), 
pp. 140-143. 
441 Section 2. Negligence Liability. (1) A person cannot by reference to any contract term or to a notice given 
to persons generally or to particular persons exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal injury 
resulting from negligence. (2) In the case of other loss or damage, a person cannot so exclude or restrict his 
liability for negligence except insofar as the term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness. 
(3) Where a contract term or notice purports to exclude or restrict liability for negligence, a person’s 
agreement to or awareness of it is not of itself to be taken as indicating his voluntary acceptance of any risk. 
442 See Subsection 5.2, Exclusion and limitation of liability clauses. 
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reasonableness of the exclusion clause a possible TMOs’ defence of their third-party 
liability disclaimers. In fact, TMOs will also put forward arguments such as: 
 
a) The disclaimers are both clearly written and understandable and are strongly 
brought to the e-consumers’ attention by, e.g., capitalising the letters of the text of 
the disclaimers; 
b) e-consumers cannot rely on the information in the trustmarks; 
c) e-consumers should obtain and pay for their own audit of the e-merchant security, 
privacy or business practice; 
d) If TMOs cannot disclaim their liability to third-party e-consumers, they will face a 
flood of claims, some of which will be unmeritorious but difficult and expensive to 
resist; 
e) TMOs need to be much more cautious in providing trustmarks; the cost of carrying 
out the audit of e-merchant security, privacy, or business practices will be 
extremely high, not to mention the cost of negligence insurance for TMOs. All 
together, the costs will probably be unbearable for TMOs. Consequently, the price 
of trustmarks will be too high and TMOs will probably exit the market. 
 
The courts, on the other hand, may argue for the inconsistency of TMOs, pursuant to 
the UCTA, by saying that, although there is no evidence that 90% of e-consumers rely on 
trustmarks, the TMOs’ business model is based on e-consumers’ reliance on trustmarks. In 
fact, if e-consumers do not rely on trustmarks, e-merchants will not request those 
(trustmarks); consequently, there will be no reason for TMOs to exist. Therefore, TMOs 
know that if the trustmarks’ service is inadequately performed, plaintiff e-consumers are 
very likely to suffer loss.443 
Furthermore, e-consumers do not usually plan to spend more money than the amount 
necessary to complete the transaction. The cost of a second audit of the e-merchant 
security, privacy or business practices will be unbearable in terms of time and cost. All 
together thus, a second audit is unfeasible for e-consumers who usually visit several 
websites in a day and purchase goods of modest value. In fact, this will clash with the 
successful formula of e-commerce, which is: e-commerce = fast + cheap transactions. 
                                                 
443 See Subsection 6.1. 
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Therefore, it seems unfair and unreasonable to ask e-consumers not to rely on trustmarks 
and to carry out a second audit of e-merchant security, privacy or business practices at their 
expense. 
Moreover, TMOs are TTPs,444 which are, by definition, independent and trustworthy 
professionals. Last but not least, TMOs advertise themselves as independent and 
trustworthy professionals through massive marketing operations aimed at inducing e-
consumers to rely on their trustmarks by creating a fiduciary relationship with them.445 This 
may even be seen as the TMOs’ de facto assumption of responsibility towards e-
consumers.446  
More generally, on the one hand, the e-consumers’ bargaining power is much less 
than the e-merchants’, if it is not inexistent. In fact, there is no bargaining activity between 
the parties. Disclaimers are just unilaterally drafted by TMOs. Additionally, other sources 
of advice are available only at a time and cost that is unthinkable in an e-commerce 
transaction. On the other hand, the task undertaken by TMOs is a difficult one.447 Probably, 
no insurance company will insure TMOs if they cannot disclaim their liability for negligent 
misstatement. And, if disclaimers will be considered invalid, TMOs may face a flood of 
third-party claims. 
In conclusion, there is no clear-cut answer to the question on the validity of TMO 
third-party liability disclaimers. A number of arguments for and against the unfairness of 
the disclaimers have been unfolded. In the end, the courts will most likely decide on the 
basis of policy arguments.448 
 
6.3 Policy arguments 
 
There are two main policy considerations highlighted in the ‘extended Hedley Byrne 
liability’ line of cases. The first, and more general one, is that the courts saw the imposition 
of a third-party duty of care on the defendant as fair, just, and reasonable on the basis that 
                                                 
444 See Chapter 1, Section 1. 
445 See Chapter 2, Subsection 6.2 
446 See in Section 4 the proximity factor: defendant’s ‘assumption of responsibility’. 
447 See Chapter 3 and Chapter 9, Subsection 3.2, Bai-boom trust stage, and Subsection 6.2. 
448 For more information on e-consumer protection in information technology contracts in England, see Girot, 
C. (2000) User Protection in IT Contracts. A Comparative Study of the Protection of the User against 
Defective Performance in Information Technology (Amsterdam: Kluwer Law International), pp. 21-24. 
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the defendants were performing socially important functions which eventually exposed the 
plaintiff to the harm in question. The second one, which was specific to Smith v. Eric S 
Bush and Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council, is that it was not reasonable to expect a 
purchaser of a house at the lower level of the market to obtain an independent valuation.449 
However, as already argued, policy arguments are really dependent on the 
circumstances and thus have to be dealt with case by case. As there has been no case of a 
TMO third-party liability, after having dealt with the two specific policy arguments of the 
‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’ line of cases, a number of more general policy arguments 
will be tested in the typical TMO third-party liability case in order to anticipate related 
court arguments. 
 
Do TMOs discharge a socially important function? 
In the ‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’ line of cases, duties of care are imposed on 
the basis that the defendant was performing a socially important function. Whether TMOs 
perform a socially important function is up to the courts to decide. It is arguable that e-
consumer trust is crucial to reaping the full benefit of e-commerce.450 E-consumers are not 
capable of scrutinising e-merchants’ policies. Ideally, through trustmarks, e-consumers 
may receive a sort of guarantee from TMOs (i.e., independent third parties) of the quality 
of the e-merchant security, privacy or business practice. Moreover, trustmarks are easy to 
recognise and may improve e-consumers’ perception of potential online ‘business 
partners’, provide ‘always available’, ‘independent’, and trustworthy information on e-
merchants and thus enhance e-consumers’ trust in online transactions. Given this, it can be 
said that the TMOs perform a socially important function. Consequently, if TMOs 
negligently fail to provide their services, it will be fair, just, and reasonable to impose on 
them a duty of care. 
 
Is it reasonable to require that e-consumers obtain an independent evaluation? 
The argument used by the court in Smith v. Eric S Bush and in Harris v. Wyre Forest 
District Council cannot be directly applied to the typical TMO case. In fact, as a purchaser 
                                                 
449 See Subsection 5.2, Policy arguments. 
450 See Chapter 1, Section 1. 
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of a house pays for the costs of the valuation conducted on behalf of the mortgagee, an e-
consumer does not pay directly for the trustmark. Nevertheless, it is also unreasonable to 
require e-consumers to obtain an independent evaluation of e-merchant security, privacy, or 
business practice. In fact, it is simply ridiculous to expect that e-consumers who usually 
visit several websites in a day and purchase goods of modest value will obtain an 
independent assessment of the security, privacy, or business practices of all e-merchant 
websites in order to decide whether or not to transact with them. Therefore, the 




Floodgates and fear of indeterminacy are the most recurrent policy arguments related 
to third-party liability for negligent misstatement. They are definitely applicable to the 
TMO third-party liability for negligently issued trustmarks. In fact, the worldwide 
accessibility of trustmarks in e-merchant websites creates the possibility that an indefinite 
number of e-consumers will potentially rely on the trustmark. Allowing a cause of action 
against TMOs for aggrieved e-consumers who relied on trustmarks would be like opening 
the floodgates. Meaning, defendant TMOs would be flooded by claims, possibly resulting 
in their financial ruin. Courts could adopt two approaches towards floodgates arguments. 
They could ‘close’ the floodgates by maintaining that TMOs should be in a position where 
they are able to weigh the costs of taking precautions against the possible size of claims 
that could be made against them and that TMOs should be able to predict the number of 
persons that their negligence might affect. Evidently, TMOs are neither able to estimate the 
cost of claims they might face nor predict the number of persons that their negligence 
might effect. The courts could conclude that it would not be fair, just, and reasonable to 
impose a duty of care towards e-consumers and deny them a cause of action.  
However, the House of Lords had already approached the floodgates concern with 
suspicion,451 expressing the view that the “[d]enial of the existence of a cause of action is 
seldom, if ever, the appropriate response to fears of its abuse.”452 In this respect, in Smith v. 
Eric S Bush and in Harris v. Wyre Forest District Council, a cause of action for purchasers 
                                                 
451 See, e.g., McLoughlin v. O’Brian [1983] 1AC 425, HL. 
452 See, e.g., Phelps v. Hillingdon London BC [2001] 2 AC 667, HL. 
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of real estate at the lower level of the market against valuers was allowed. Nevertheless, 
valuers’ exposure to claims was far less than the TMOs’. In fact, the valuation, as a paper-
based document, has a limited and rather slow diffusion. Therefore, it can be seen and 
relied upon by potential purchasers of the house in that region of England. Trustmarks, as 
electronic documents available online, can be seen and relied upon worldwide; hence, 
claims against TMOs may come from all around the world. Moreover, as it will be 
explained in the next section, the English legislator has already codified the existence of a 
cause of action in case of third-party liability for the negligent issuance of digital 
certificates against CSPs.453 In fact, CSPs are TTPs which are exposed to the same risk of 
claims as TMOs. The digital certificate is, in fact, attached to all signatory signatures and is 
available worldwide on the Certification Revocation List (CRL). 
 
7. Parallel TMOs-CSPs: applicability by analogy of 
CSP third-party liability rules to TMOs 
 
Next to the option of comparing TMOs with surveyors, auditors, and accountants, 
TMOs can be compared with CSPs.454 The third-party liability of CSPs is set out in Article 
6455 of the Electronic Signatures Directive.456 England implemented Article 6 of the 
                                                 
453 See Section 4 of the Electronic Signatures Regulation 2002. 
454 See Chapter 1, Subsection 3.1. 
455 Article 6. Liability. 1. As a minimum, Member States shall ensure that by issuing a certificate as a 
qualified certificate to the public or by guaranteeing such a certificate to the public, a certification service 
provider is liable for damage caused to any entity or legal or natural person who reasonably relies on that 
certificate: (a) as regards the accuracy at the time of issuance of all information contained in the qualified 
certificate and as regards the fact that the certificate contains all the details prescribed for a qualified 
certificate; (b) for assurance that at the time of the issuance of the certificate, the signatory identified in the 
qualified certificate held the signature-creation data corresponding to the signature-verification data given or 
identified in the certificate; (c) for assurance that the signature-creation data and the signature-verification 
data can be used in a complementary manner in cases where the certification service provider generates 
them both; unless the certification service provider proves that he has not acted negligently. 2. As a 
minimum Member States shall ensure that a certification service provider who has issued a certificate as a 
qualified certificate to the public is liable for damage caused to any entity or legal or natural person who 
reasonably relies on the certificate for failure to register revocation of the certificate unless the certification 
service provider proves that he has not acted negligently. 3. Member States shall ensure that a certification 
service provider may indicate in a qualified certificate limitations on the use of that certificate, provided that 
the limitations are recognisable to third parties. The certification service provider shall not be liable for 
damage arising from use of a qualified certificate which exceeds the limitations placed on it. 4. Member 
States shall ensure that a certification service provider may indicate in the qualified certificate a limit on the 
value of transactions for which the certificate can be used, provided that the limit is recognisable to third 
parties. The certification service provider shall not be liable for damage resulting from this maximum limit 
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Electronic Signatures Directive in Section 4 of the Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 318 
(henceforth: The Electronic Signatures Regulation 2002), as follows: 
 
Liability of certification-service-providers 4.  
(1) Where - (a) a certification-service-provider either - (i) issues a certificate as a qualified 
certificate to the public, or (ii) guarantees a qualified certificate to the public, (b) a person 
reasonably relies on that certificate for any of the following matters - (i) the accuracy of any of 
the information contained in the qualified certificate at the time of issue, (ii) the inclusion in the 
qualified certificate of all the details referred to in Schedule 1, (iii) the holding by the signatory 
identified in the qualified certificate at the time of its issue of the signature-creation data 
corresponding to the signature-verification data given or identified in the certificate, or (iv) the 
ability of the signature-creation data and the signature-verification data to be used in a 
complementary manner in cases where the certification-service-provider generates them both, 
(c) that person suffers loss as a result of such reliance, and (d) the certification-service-provider 
would be liable in damages in respect of any extent of the loss - (i) had a duty of care existed 
between him and the person referred to in sub-paragraph (b) above, and (ii) had the 
certification-service-provider been negligent, then that certification-service-provider shall be so 
liable to the same extent notwithstanding that there is no proof that the certification-service-
provider was negligent unless the certification-service-provider proves that he was not 
negligent. 
(2) For the purposes of the certification-service-provider's liability under paragraph (1) above 
there shall be a duty of care between that certification-service-provider and the person referred 
to in paragraph (1) (b) above. 
(3) Where - (a) a certification-service-provider issues a certificate as a qualified certificate to 
the public, (b) a person reasonably relies on that certificate, (c) that person suffers loss as a 
result of any failure by the certification-service-provider to register revocation of the certificate, 
and (d) the certification-service-provider would be liable in damages in respect of any extent of 
the loss - (i) had a duty of care existed between him and the person referred to in sub-paragraph 
(b) above, and (ii) had the certification-service-provider been negligent, then that certification-
service-provider shall be so liable to the same extent notwithstanding that there is no proof that 
the certification-service-provider was negligent unless the certification-service-provider proves 
that he was not negligent. 
(4) For the purposes of the certification-service-provider's liability under paragraph (3) above 
there shall be a duty of care between that certification-service-provider and the person referred 
to in paragraph (3) (b) above. 
 
For our analysis, it is important to stress that a CSP is liable to a person who 
reasonably relies on the CSP’s certificate – and suffers loss as a result of such reliance – for 
the accuracy of the information contained in the certificate at the time of issue, 
notwithstanding the absence of proof of the CSP’s negligence, unless the CSP proves it was 
not negligent (see Section 4 (1)). The English legislator sets forth that CSPs have the duty 
to provide certificates containing information which is accurate at the time of issue. 
Moreover, the English legislator operates a presumption of the CSPs’ liability towards third 
                                                                                                                                                    
being exceeded. 5. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall be without prejudice to Council Directive 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.  
456 For an in-depth analysis of CSP liability as set forth in Article 6 of the Electronic Signatures Directive, see 
Balboni, P. (2004), pp. 211-242. 
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parties who suffer loss as a result of their reasonable reliance on the CSPs’ certificates. 
However, CSPs could prove that they were not negligent.  
As Section 4 of the Electronic Signatures Regulation is the only statutory provision in 
England on the liability of a TTP, it is possible that the courts will take it into consideration 
once they have to decide on the liability of other TTPs (e.g., TMOs). If this is the case, 
TMOs will be liable to e-consumers who reasonably rely on TMOs’ trustmarks – and suffer 
loss as a result of such reliance – for the accuracy of the information contained in the 
trustmark at the time of issue, notwithstanding the absence of proof of the TMOs’ 
negligence, unless the TMOs prove that they were not negligent. The TMOs’ standard of 
care will thus consist of providing accurate information on e-merchants in their trustmarks. 
Aggrieved e-consumers who reasonably rely on TMOs’ trustmarks may ask compensation 
from the TMOs for the latter’s negligent performance, without having to prove such 
negligence. The TMOs will be held liable unless they prove they were not negligent. 
It is then crucial at this point to establish reasonability of the e-consumers’ reliance. 
This is a proximity question.457 In this respect, it could be argued that the e-consumers’ 
reliance is reasonable, as in a typical TMO third-party liability case, in which the proximity 
factors are all satisfied.458 
Moreover, it should be noted that in the implementation of Article 6 of the Electronic 
Signatures Directive, the English legislator left out the chance for CSPs to limit their 
liability towards third parties. In fact, the wording of Article 6 (3) and (4)459 cannot be 
traced in Section 4 of the Electronic Signatures Regulation 2002. This omission may be 
used as an extra argument to consider the TMO third-party liability disclaimer 
unreasonable460 and thus to strengthen the proximity relation between TMOs and third-
party e-consumers. 
 
                                                 
457 See Subsection 4.2. 
458 See Subsection 5.2. 
459 Article 6: (…) 3. Member States shall ensure that a certification service provider may indicate in a 
qualified certificate limitations on the use of that certificate, provided that the limitations are recognisable to 
third parties. The certification service provider shall not be liable for damage arising from use of a qualified 
certificate which exceeds the limitations placed on it. (4). Member States shall ensure that a certification 
service provider may indicate in the qualified certificate a limit on the value of transactions for which the 
certificate can be used, provided that the limit is recognisable to third parties. The certification service 
provider shall not be liable for damage resulting from this maximum limit being exceeded. 




Given the absence of case law and statutory instruments on the third-party liability of 
TMOs, the central question that has been addressed in this chapter is whether it is 
reasonable to impose on TMOs a duty of care towards e-consumers; or, looking at the issue 
from another angle, whether e-consumers who detrimentally relied on trustmarks and 
suffered loss as a consequence have a cause of action against TMOs that negligently 
performed their services. 
It has been pointed out that among the three elements of the duty of care, matters of 
proximity and policy arguments hold the key to duty issues in which misstatement cases 
are to be analysed whereas foreseeability is of minor importance in the present analysis.461 
A proximity relation between TMOs and e-consumers seems to be established under the 
‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’ rules.462 Policy arguments will eventually play a crucial 
role in the courts’ decisions on whether or not it is reasonable to impose on TMOs a duty of 
care towards e-consumers and thus allow a cause of action for aggrieved e-consumers 
against TMOs that negligently provided wrongful information on e-merchants. More 
precisely, the answer to the central question addressed in this chapter will most likely 
depend on the approach that courts will take to floodgates arguments.463 Courts usually 
tend to ‘close’ the floodgates, trying to avoid potential liability to an unlimited number of 
people for an indeterminate amount. However, the rule set out in Section 4 of the 
Electronic Signatures Regulation 2002 imposes on CSPs a duty of care towards users who 
rely on the information contained in the electronic certificate. It has been observed that 
CSPs are TTPs comparable with TMOs.464 This rule may either be applied by analogy to 
TMOs or considered by the courts as a tendency of the English legislator to impose a third-
party duty of care on TMO-like professionals. Courts may thus allow a cause of action for 
aggrieved e-consumers against TMOs that negligently provide their services. 
 
 
                                                 
461 See Section 5. 
462 See Subsection 6.1. 
463 See Subsection 6.3, Floodgates arguments. 












As in England, neither case law nor literature has specifically addressed the issue of 
TMO third-party liability in Germany. Neither is there a trace of specific statutory 
provisions on the matter. This chapter thus aims to determine whether e-consumers who 
relied on inaccurate trustmarks and suffered loss as a consequence could ask TMOs for 
compensation either in general tort or contract law.  
Section 2 explains the overlap between tort and contract law in matters related to 
third-party professional liability for negligent misstatements and deals with the relevant tort 
and contract provisions. In Section 3, the applicability of the relevant tort and contract 
provisions to a typical TMO third-party liability case is analysed. A selection of Federal 
Supreme Court decisions potentially applicable to TMOs is offered in Section 4. The 
applicability and the possible impact of the selected case law on TMO third-party liability 
is explained in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the applicability by analogy of CSP third-
party liability rules to TMOs. Section 7 contains the conclusions. 
 
2. Third-party professional liability for negligent 




At first glance, the German legal system does not seem to offer much ground to 
grant compensation for pure economic loss caused by negligent statements.465 The two 
general tort liability clauses: Sections 823466 and 826467 of the German Civil Code 
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, henceforth: BGB) grant protection against (a) injury to life, 
health, property, or ‘other rights’ – varying from right to privacy and data protection to 
freedom of speech – (Section 823 (1)); (b) violation of ‘protective norms’ – provision 
protecting individual interests and assets – (Section 823 (2));468 and (c) economic loss but 
only when it is caused by an intentional conduct contra bonos mores (Sittenverstoß). 
Accordingly, pure economic loss caused by inaccurate information/statements provided by 
professionals on whom third parties had relied does not enjoy protection under Sections 
823 and 826.469 
The documented gap stimulated a debate, across the 1970s and 1980s, on the 
possible extension of tort liability in order to protect the aforementioned instances of 
economic loss.470 Three main theories were developed. The first was presented by Christian 
von Bar, who proposed to create the brand-new Section 828 BGB, which would have set 
forth tort liability for damage caused in a business relationship (Schädigungen im 
geschäftlichen Verkehr) by negligent false information or advice provided by a professional 
who, for the task he undertakes and the status he enjoys, is especially trusted by third 
parties.471 The second theory was put forward by Konrad Huber, who maintained that 
professionals’ duty of care to persons who rely on the information they supply should be 
                                                 
465 See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 75-76. For an overview of the German approach to third-party professional 
liability for negligent misstatements, see Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), pp. 598 et seq.; Markesinis, B. S. 
& Uberath, H. (2002) The German Law of Torts: A Comparative Treatise (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: 
Hart Publishing), pp. 57 et seq. For more details on pure economic loss, see Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 172-
173; Magnus, U. (2001) Germany. In Magnus, U. (ed.) Unification of Tort Law: Damages (The 
Hague/London/Boston: Kluver Law International), p. 95. 
466 Section 823 – Duty to compensate for damage: (1) A person who, wilfully or negligently, unlawfully 
injures the life, body, health, freedom, property or other right of another is bound to compensate him for any 
damage arising therefrom. (2) The same obligation is placed upon a person who infringes a statute intended 
for the protection of others. If, according to the provisions of the statute, an infringement of this is possible 
even without fault, the duty to make compensation arises only in the event of fault. 
467 Section 826 – Wilful damage contrary to public policy: A person who wilfully causes damage to another 
in a manner contrary to public policy is bound to compensate the other for the damage. 
468 E.g., in case of fraud, a claim for pure economic loss may be based on Section 823 (2) BGB, in connection 
with Section 263 of the German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch – StGB). For an extensive discussion on 
the matter, see Van Gerven, W. et al. (2000), pp. 227-228. 
469 See Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 57-64; Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 172-173. 
470 See Schlechtriem, P. (1998) Civil Liability for Economic Loss Germany, 15th International Congress of 
comparative Law Bristol, England, 26 July to 1 August, 1998, pp. 13-15. Available at <http://www.jura.uni-
freiburg.de/einrichtungen/gfr/Bristol/Schlechtriem/schlechtriem.pdf>. 
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considered a ‘protective norm’ under Section 823 (1) BGB. Auditors, consultants, lawyers 
and other professionals who provide informed statements would accordingly be held liable 
for pure economic loss caused to third parties who had relied on inaccurate information 
which they had possibly supplied.472 The third theory was proposed by Claus-Wilhelm 
Canaris, who observed that third-party reliance on presumed accurate information was the 
very reason for economic loss, the common feature of negligent misrepresentation cases. 
Therefore, he elaborated a theory of professionals’ responsibility for ‘reliance loss’.473 
None of the three theories ever found their way into case law.474  
Nevertheless, the need to protect the economic interests of third parties was 
unquestionable.475 Therefore, courts found a way to protect aggrieved third parties through 
contract law, assuming the existence of a contract between the professional who provided 
information and the third party that relied on it.476 These contractual or quasi-contractual 
means used by the courts are as follows: the contract with protective effects towards third 
parties (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter, henceforth: VmSzD); the implied 
contract for the provision of correct information (stillschweigend geschlossener 
Auskunftsvertrag, henceforth: sgA); and the contractual principle of culpa in contrahendo, 
the principle that parties to a relationship akin to a contract have taken each other’s 
interests into consideration. VmSzD and sgA are the ones used mostly by courts in decisions 
on third-party professional liability.477 
The phenomenon of courts creating contractual construction to overcome the 
absence of tortuous remedies for economic loss was significantly described by John 
Fleming as: “the German willingness, indeed eagerness, to extend tort 
protection…[despite] the Civil Code’s categorical exclusion of tort damages for pure 
                                                                                                                                                    
471 See Von Bar, C. (1981) Deliktsrecht. In Bundesministerium der Justiz (ed.) Gutachten und Vorschläge 
zur. Überarbeitung des Schuldrechts, vol. 2 (Cologne: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsges), p. 1761. 
472 See Konrad, H. (1978) Verkehrspflichten zum Schutz fremden Vermögens. In Festschrift für Ernst v. 
Caemmerer zum 70. Geburtstag (Tübingen: Mohr), p. 359 et seq. 
473 See Canaris, C. W. (1971) Die Vertrauenshaftung im deutschen Privatrecht (Munich: Beck). 
474 See Schlechtriem, P. (1998), pp. 14-15.  
475 See Hirte, H. (1996) Berufshaftung (Munich: C.H. Beck). 
476 See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 75-76; Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1996) Einführung in die Rechtsvergleichung 
(Tubingen: Mohr), p. 617; BGH 23.1.1985 in JZ 1985, pp. 951 et seq., noted by Honsell, Zur 
Ausckunftsvertrag mit Schutzwirkung für Dritte; Canaris, C. (1983) Norme di protezione, obblighi del 
traffico, doveri di protezione, Riv. Cr. Dir. Priv. 1 (3), pp. 567 et seq.; Kreuzer, K.F. (1976) Entscheidungen 
Bürgerliches Recht, JZ, p. 778; Lorenz, W. (1973) Das Problem der Haftung fur primare Vermogenschaden 
bei der Erteilung einer unrichtiger Auskunft. In Festschrift für Karl Larenz (Munich: Beck), pp. 575 et seq. 
477 See Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 57-64 and pp. 265-295. 
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economic loss and the great weight reputedly given by German law to theoretical 
orthodoxy over pragmatism.”478  
After this brief excursus, it is already clear that third-party professional liability lies 
on the borderline between contract and tort. Furthermore, third parties’ reasonable reliance 
on the negligent misstatement provided by professionals seems to play a crucial role in the 
compensation of pure economic loss. The following questions seem relevant to the present 
analysis:  
 
“Can protection in tort be completely ruled out?”  
“How do the quasi-contractual constructions work?” 
“Under which conditions may third-party reliance assumed to be reasonable?”  
 
In order to provide informed answers, the relevant tortious and contractual 
provisions need to be dealt with in greater detail.  
 
2.1 Analysis of the relevant tort provisions 
 
Section 823 (1) BGB 
A person who, wilfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, 
health, freedom, property or other right of another is bound to compensate 
him for any damage arising therefrom. 
 
The present provision sets forth the criterion for the compensation of damages 
caused by a negligent, unlawful conduct. Accordingly, only a plaintiff who suffers damages 
related to the breach of one of the legal interests specified – life, body, health, freedom, 
ownership or any other right of another – can recover them under Section 823 (1) BGB. It 
is worth stressing for the sake of the present analysis that the concept of ‘other right[s]’ 
embraces in principle all the interests protected according to the German legal system erga 
omnes, which has also included, since recently, the right to privacy and data protection.479 
                                                 
478 Fleming, J. (1989) Property Damage – Economic Loss: A Comparative View, LQR 105, p. 508; Van Dam, 
C. (2006), pp. 172-173. 
479 Bassenge P. et al. (2006) Palandt Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Munich: C. H. Beck), p. 1248; Van Gerven, 
W. et al. (2000), p. 142. 
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As to economic loss, the rule is that a plaintiff who suffered economic loss as a 
consequence of a defendant’s negligent conduct, breaching one of the plaintiff’s legal 
interests specified in the provision, or ‘other right[s]’, may recover it. Otherwise, there 
would be no ground for a claim for ‘pure’ economic loss unrelated to any of such breaches 
of protected interests or rights.480 
 
Section 823 (2) BGB 
The same obligation is placed upon a person who infringes a statute intended 
for the protection of others. If, according to the provisions of the statute, an 
infringement of this is possible even without fault, the duty to make 
compensation arises only in the event of fault. 
 
The second paragraph of Section 823 BGB, which naturally has to be read in 
connection with the first paragraph, extends the protection of damages suffered by 
negligent conduct. Liability is expanded to the defendant’s actions or omissions which 
infringe specific rules set forth in statutes protecting other persons’ rights or interests. In 
fact, in the German legal system, compensation for ‘pure’ economic loss may be sought 
only under Section 823 (2) BGB or, as it will be explained further below, pursuant to 
Section 826 BGB. More precisely, Section 823 (2) is the only provision of the BGB which 
allows the plaintiff’s recovery of pure economic loss caused by the defendant’s negligent 
conduct. Accordingly, there must be a special legitimating element in a specific statute for 
Section 823 (2) to apply.481 In other words, a claim under this provision will arise only if 
the damage resulted from the very violation of the rights and interests that a statute aims to 
protect. For example, if the statute sets forth rules for the protection of personal injuries or 
damage to properties only, pure economic loss may not be claimed pursuant to Section 823 
(2) BGB.482 
 
Section 826 BGB 
A person who wilfully causes damage to another in a manner contrary to 
public policy is bound to compensate the other for the damage. 
                                                 
480 See Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 52 et seq.; Van Gerven, W. et al. (2000), pp. 227-228. 
481 See Larenz, K. & Canaris, C. W. (1994), pp. 436-437. 
482 See Van Gerven, W. et al. (2000), p. 228; Larenz, K. & Canaris, C. W. (1994), pp. 435 and 439. 
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As mentioned right before, compensation for pure economic loss may be sought 
pursuant to Section 826 BGB. There are two requirements for a claim for pure economic 
loss under Section 826 BGB to succeed: the defendant must have acted contra bonos mores 
(Sittenwidrig) and with intent (Vorsatz). In contrast to Section 823, the defendant’s conduct 
does not have to violate selected plaintiff’s rights and interests or specific statutes. In other 
words, this general clause grants protection to violations of all rights and interests, pure 
economic loss included, provided that such violations are contra bonos mores and carried 
out with intent.  
Some words need to be spent on the mentioned requirements.  
A conduct is contra bonos mores when it offends the “fundamental concepts of 
morally acceptable conduct towards persons with whom one is in a legal relationship.”483 
Furthermore, boni mores entail a set of legal-ethical principles which changes with the 
developments of the society they refer to. For example, standards of proper economic 
conduct in commercial practices can fit into the concept of boni mores. Recently, it has 
been widely accepted that “acting contra bonos mores implies conduct contrary to the 
existing economic and legal order or the ordre public.”484 In this respect, providing 
someone with incorrect information is a type of conduct which falls within the scope of 
Section 826 BGB.485 
Turning now to the concept of intent, it has a broader meaning than its literal one. It 
refers not only to the ‘will to harm’ but also to deception (Täuschung) and recklessness 
(Leichtfertigkeit).486 Accordingly, the requisite of intent is not only fulfilled when “the 
defendant actually intended to cause the harm; it is enough if he was conscious of the 
possibility that harm might occur and acquiesced in its doing so.”487 In other words, it is 
sufficient that the defendant is aware of the possible harmful consequences of his conduct 
but nevertheless accepts them as inevitable, even without desiring them. (i.e., dolus 
eventualis).488 A professional who, for example, provides inaccurate information on the 
creditworthiness of another party, being aware that third parties who will possibly rely on 
                                                 
483 Grundanschauungen loyalen Umgangs unter Rechtsgenossen: BGH, 2 June 1981, NJW 1981, 2184 p. 
2185. 
484 Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 401-402; see also Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 889-890; Larenz, 
K. & Canaris, C. W. (1994), p. 448. 
485 See Van Dam, C. (2006), p. 402. 
486 Larenz, K. & Canaris, C. W. (1994), pp. 452-453. 
487 Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), p. 603. 
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such information may as a consequence suffer loss, could be held liable pursuant to Section 
826 BGB.489 The requirement of intent has thus been expanded to cover thoughtless acts in 
cases where the risk of causing loss to third parties has been accepted. 490 
Evidently, Section 826 BGB plays a crucial role in third-party professional liability; 
it is indeed used quite often in cases of negligent misstatement.491 
 
2.2 Analysis of the relevant contractual or quasi-contractual 
provisions 
 
Given the letter of Section 676 BGB: “[a] person who gives advice or a 
recommendation to another is not bound to compensate for any damage arising from 
following the advice or recommendation, without prejudice to his responsibility arising 
from contract or tort” and the manifest difficulty in recovering pure economic loss in tort; 
courts have created ways to claim pure economic loss in contract.492 More precisely, in 
cases of third-party liability for negligent misstatement, courts operate a sort of ‘fiction’ to 
set up a contract. The basic idea is that courts would consider requests for information or 
advice as offers – to execute a contract for the provision of information or advices – and the 
positive answer of the professionals (e.g., auditors, accountants, surveyors, banks) as an 
acceptance.493 This way, a quasi-contract (so defined by the main doctrine494) is concluded 
by and between professionals and the party who has asked for information or advice. From 
the basic idea, courts have developed quite far-reaching quasi-contractual frameworks, 
                                                                                                                                                    
488 See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 71 and 172; Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 292 and 889. 
489 However, it must be noted that gross negligence (i.e., an objectively gross deviation from reasonably 
careful conduct) does not in itself qualify as wilfulness for the purposes of Section 826, although in practice 
‘lesser’ forms of wilfulness such as recklessness may very well cover gross negligence cases. See Larenz, K. 
& Canaris, C. W. (1994), pp. 454-455. 
490 See Von Bar, C. (1994) Liability for Information and Opinions Causing Pure Economic Loss to Third 
parties: Comparison of English and German Case Law. In Markesinis, B. (ed.) The Gradual Convergence 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 103 et seq. 
491 See Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 890-891. 
492 See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 75-76; Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1996), p. 617; BGH 23.1.1985 in JZ 1985, 
pp. 951 et seq., noted by Honsell, Zur Ausckunftsvertrag mit Schutzwirkung für Dritte; Canaris, C. (1983), 
pp. 567 et seq.; Kreuzer, K.F. (1976), p. 778; Lorenz, W. (1973), pp. 575 et seq. 
493 e.g., when a bank gave information about the creditworthiness of one of its clients to another person (BGH 
NJW 1972, p. 1200.), when a finance newsletter recommended certain investments (BGHZ 70, 356; BGHZ 
74, 103, 107), or when an architect gave information to the mortgage bank about the progress of the 
construction of a building (OLG Hamm, ZfBR 1987, 42.), and such information later turned out to be 
inaccurate, the losses suffered by those relying on it were made recoverable by assuming the formation of a 
contract. See Lorenz, W. (1973), pp. 575 et seq.; see also BGH 23.1.1985 in JZ 1985, pp. 951 et seq., noted 
by Honsell, Zur Ausckunftsvertrag mit Schutzwirkung für Dritte. 
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such as VmSzD – the contract with protective effects on towards third parties (Vertrag mit 
Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter); sgA, the implied contract for the provision of correct 
information (stillschweigend geschlossener Auskunftsvertrag); and culpa in contrahendo – 
the principle that parties to a relationship akin to a contract have, to some extent, taken 
each other’s interests into consideration, in order to compensate pure economic loss 
suffered from persons who had relied on the information or advice, also in cases where 
they did not ask for them. How VmSzD, sgA and culpa in contrahendo exactly work is 
explained hereunder. 
 
Contract with protective effects towards third-parties (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung 
zugunsten Dritter – VmSzD) 
Since 1965, the VmSzD has been used to compensate third-party economic loss 
caused by professional negligence.495 This has been defined as a judicially created variant 
of the contract for the benefit of third parties (Vertrag zugunsten Dritter - VzD).496 The VzD 
is regulated by Sections 328 ss. BGB.497 Accordingly, a subject may wilfully oblige 
himself, by means of a contract with another subject, to undertake a performance to a third 
party. The consequence of this action is that “the third party directly acquires the right to 
demand the performance” (Section 328 (1)).498 A major difference between the VzD and 
the VmSzD rests in the fact that in the latter, the intent of the professional to take on 
contractual obligations towards third parties is assumed by the courts. In fact, if the 
professional who provides information will be asked, he will most likely deny his will to 
include third parties as beneficiaries of the contractual performance.499 Moreover, the third 
party does not need to be either specifically identified in advance or somehow in a close 
relationship with the contractual creditor. To check whether a VmSzD can be found, courts 
generally evaluate if in fact it is possible to infer from the interests involved that the parties 
have agreed (also implicitly) to establish the duty of the professional providing information 
                                                                                                                                                    
494 See, e.g., Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), p. 58; Schlechtriem, P. (1998), p. 14. 
495 BGH NJW 1965, 1955. For a more general view of the important role played by VmSzD in third-party 
professional liability, see Hirte, H. (1996), p. 388.  
496 See Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 59-64 and p. 292. 
497 On such provisions, see extensively Bassenge P. et al. (2006), pp. 530 et seq. 
498 For an analysis of the VzD, see Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), pp. 459-460. 
499 See Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), p. 294. Such interpretation may also be supported by looking 
at the disclaimers on third-party liability that professionals usually set forth in the contracts on the provision 
of their services. 
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towards third parties.500 Moreover, third parties’ (reasonable) reliance on the accuracy of 
professionals’ statements, coupled with the special skills of the latter, may play on a case-
by-case basis a significant role. A relevant example is given by ‘case 3’,501 in which 
although the conflicting interests involved did not suggest that the parties had agreed to 
stipulate for a contractual duty towards third parties, a VmSzD was nevertheless found on 
the basis of reasonable third party reliance.502 
If, on the one hand, courts are not very consistent on the requisite to grant 
compensation to third parties under VmSzD, on the other hand, the trend to move for an 
expansion of the ‘contractual umbrella’ is clear.503 Such courts’ approach poses, however, 
the issue of how to define and thus limit the group of third parties which may recover pure 
economic loss under VmSzD. The analysis of the relevant case law will help find an answer 
to this question.504 
 
Implied contract on the provision of correct information (Stillschweigend 
geschlossener Auskunftsvertrag – sgA) 
An alternative to the VmSzD, the sgA is used by German courts as a quasi-
contractual legal ground to compensate a third party for pure economic loss suffered from 
relying on inaccurate information provided by professionals. To justify the imposition of 
third-party liability on a professional under an sgA, courts consider that by disseminating 
information, the professional is aware that it will be relied on by third parties and hence 
implicitly takes on the related liability. As a general rule, a direct interaction between the 
professional and the third party to whom he provided the information would help courts 
assume the existence of an sgA. In the absence of such a contact between the parties, courts 
tend to choose the VmSzD over the sgA as grounds for third-party professional liability.505 
Moreover, there are a number of elements which play a significant role in the courts’ 
decision on the existence of an sgA. In fact, if (a) the professional knew that the 
                                                 
500 See BGH NJW 1984, pp. 355-356. 
501 See Subsection 4.3. 
502 For the difference between the VzD and the VmSzD, see extensively Larenz, K. (1956) Schuldrecht I, p. 
16. For the condition required by courts for a VmSzD to exist, see Beyer, O. (1996) Vertraglicher Drittschuz, 
JuS, p. 473; Sonnenschein, J. (1989) Der Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung fur Dritte – und immer neue Fragen, 
JA, p. 225. 
503 See Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 64-65. 
504 See Section 4. 
505 See Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 265-300; Von Bar (1994), p. 111. 
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information he had provided was significant to a third party’s further decisions; (b) the 
professional prepared and issued the information using his professional expertise; (c) the 
professional had economic interest in providing such information;506 (d) the professional 
issued a warranty on the quality of information provided; (e) the third party used the 
information within the scope for which it had been issued by the professional;507 an sgA 
would most likely be found.508 
 
Culpa in contrahendo 
The principle of culpa in contrahendo, whose doctrine was developed by the 
famous German jurist Rudolf von Jhering,509 is a means to broaden contractual liability. In 
fact, through this concept, contractual remedies are extended to the pre-contractual phase, 
i.e., the negotiation phase. For example, when a professional warrants that the contract will 
most likely have a positive outcome, knowing that the other contracting party will take 
actions upon such sort of assurance, but eventually the professional’s performance falls 
short in some way of what has been promised, there may be a claim based on culpa in 
contrahendo against the professional.510 In the perspective of the present analysis, one 
might think of a professional who, during the negotiations, personally induced the third 
party’s confidence in the trustworthiness of the information provided. However, culpa in 
contrahendo almost does not have any impact on third-party professional liability for 
negligent misstatements when compared with the role played by sgA and VmSzD.511 
 
                                                 
506 Such elements are especially useful to prove the requisite of intent to assume responsibilities towards third 
parties on the side of the professional in an sgA. See the court’s wording in the following decision: die 
Gesamtumstände unter Berücksichtigung der Verkehrsauffassung un des Verkehrsbedürfnisses den 
Rückschluß zulassen daß beide Teile nach dem objektiven Inhalt ihrer Erklärungen die Auskunft zum 
Gegenstand vertraglicher Rechte un Pflichten gemacht haben’. BGH NJW 1992, 2080, p. 2082. See also, on 
the point, BGH WM 1985, 1531, p. 1532; BGH NJW 1992, 2080, p. 2082; BGJ NJW 1998, 1244.  
507 See, e.g., BGH WM 1986, 711. 
508 Quite few similarities may be found with the requirements for establishing ‘proximity’ under English law. 
See Chapter 5, Section 4 and Subsection 6.1. 
509 See Jhering, R. (1861) Culpa in contrahendo oder Schadenersatz bei nichtigen oder nicht zur Perfektion 
gelangten Verträgen, in Jhering (ed.) Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des heutigen römischen und deutschen 
Rechts 4, pp. 1-112. See also Medicus, D. (1986), Entdeckungsgeschichte der culpa in contrahendo, in 
Festschrift für Max Kaser zum 80. Geburtstag, p. 169. 
510 See BGH NJW 1972, 1189; BGH WM 1967, 798; BGH NJW 1965, 812. 
511 See Canaris (1999), p. 220. 
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3. Impact of tort and contract provisions on third-
party TMO liability  
 
Losses caused by inaccurate trustmarks issued by TMOs may not fall under the 
protection of Section 823 (1) BGB. It is very unlikely that inaccurate trustmarks will cause 
injury to e-consumers’ legal interests, such as life, body, health, freedom, or ownership. 
However, in the instance that e-consumers suffer damage for breach of their privacy rights, 
this may fall under the definition of ‘other rights’ and thus make Section 823 (1) BGB 
applicable in this specific case. 512 As to Section 823 (2) BGB, it could only apply if the 
losses suffered by e-consumers who had relied on inaccurate trustmarks are specifically 
protected by the law. Section 826 BGB might not apply to TMO cases unless the TMO 
issued the inaccurate trustmark with the intention to cause harm to e-consumers. However, 
as already pointed out, the ‘intent’ required by Section 826 BGB has recently been 
interpreted to also include thoughtless acts and recklessness (Leichtfertigkeit).513 Therefore, 
it seems enough for the ‘intent’ element to be fulfilled to be aware of the consequences of 
one’s conduct and to accept them as inevitable even without desiring them (dolus 
eventualis).514 According to this interpretation, if TMOs’ negligence is deemed a result of 
recklessness, e-consumers may have a cause of action against TMOs under Section 826 
BGB. However, ‘dolus eventualis’ is a necessary but not sufficient condition for Section 
826 BGB to apply. In addition to it, TMOs must have been conscious of the risk of 
damaging third-party e-consumers and have accepted it. Moreover, the TMOs’ conduct 
must be considered contra bonos mores, such as a behaviour that significantly offends the 
fundamental concept of morally acceptable conduct towards persons with whom one is in a 
legal relationship (e.g., acting against standards for proper economic conduct in 
commercial practices).515  
                                                 
512 See Subsection 2.1; Bassenge P. et al. (2006, p. 1248. Van Gerven, W. et al. (2000), p. 142. 
513 See Subsection 2.1; Larenz, K. & Canaris, C. W. (1994), pp. 452-453; Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), p. 
603. 
514 See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 71 and 172; Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 292 and 889. 
515 Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 401-402; see also Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 889-890; Larenz, 
K. & Canaris, C. W. (1994), p. 448. 
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E-consumers, however, may not only have an action against TMOs in tort; they may 
also seek redress in contract or, to be more precise, in ‘quasi-contract’. 516 Quasi-
contractual means, such as VmSzD and sgA, and, to a lesser extent, the contractual principle 
of culpa in contrahendo, may offer a third party who has suffered loss from relying on 
inaccurate trustmarks some legal ground to recover such loss.517 
The VmSzD seems in principle applicable to the typical TMO case. In fact, TMOs’ 
intent to oblige themselves towards third-party e-consumers could be assumed; e-
consumers do not need to be specifically identified in advance or to be in a close 
relationship with the certified e-merchants; and TMOs are professionals specifically skilled 
in providing information on e-merchant security, privacy, and business practice. However, 
it remains to be assessed, case by case, whether the reliance of e-consumers on the 
trustmarks is reasonable and if the interests involved are such for the courts to infer that 
TMOs and e-merchants agreed (even implicitly) to establish a duty of TMOs towards e-
consumers.518  
As far as the sgA is concerned, there is no direct contact between TMOs and third-
party e-consumers. Usually, in this situation, the courts tend to choose VmSzD over sgA.519 
Apart from this, the relevant elements to determine whether a sgA exists are all fulfilled, 
with the exception of the fact that TMOs do not usually issue a warranty on the quality of 
their trustmarks.520 Recalling the elements which play a significant role in court decisions 
on whether or not a sgA can be found, first, TMOs know that the information on trustmarks 
is of great relevance for third-party e-consumers and that it is the basis for important 
decisions. Second, TMOs use their professional skills in order to issue trustmarks. Third, 
TMOs have financial interests in providing trustmarks; in fact they are paid for it. Fourth, 
TMOs do not provide, however, any warranty on the quality of the information provided on 
                                                 
516 See Subsection 2.2; see also Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 75-76; Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1996), p. 617; BGH 
23.1.1985 in JZ 1985, pp. 951 et seq., noted by Honsell, Zur Auskunftsvertrag mit Schutzwirkung für Dritte; 
Canaris, C. (1983), pp. 567 et seq.; Kreuzer, K.F. (1976), p. 778; Lorenz, W. (1973), pp. 575 et seq. 
517 See Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 57-64 and 265-295. 
518 See Subsection 2.2; on the conditions required by courts for a VmSzD to exist, see Markesinis, B. S. & 
Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 62-64; Beyer, O. (1996), p. 473; Sonnenschein, J. (1989), p. 225; see also BGH 
NJW 1984, pp. 355-356. 
519 See Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 265-300; Von Bar (1994), p. 111. 
520 In subsection 2.2 it was explained that “if: a) the professional knew that the information he provided was 
of significant relevance for third-party further decisions; b) the professional prepared and issued the 
information using his professional expertises; c) the professional has got economic interest in providing 
such information; d) the professional issued a warranty on the quality of the information provided; e) the 
third party used the information within the scopes for which it was issued by the professional; a sgA will 
most likely be found.” 
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their trustmarks; they try to waive any responsibility for the accurateness of the 
information.521 Fifth, it remains to be checked, case by case, whether the use that e-
consumers make of the trustmarks does not exceed the scope for which they are issued. 
The principle of culpa in contrahendo seems theoretically applicable to the typical 
TMO case. TMOs can be seen as professionals that – to some extent – tent to induce third-
party e-consumers’ confidence in the trustworthiness of the information provided. In fact, it 
could be argued that the scope of TMO services is to stimulate e-consumers to transact with 
e-merchants relying on the information provided in the trustmarks, hence the principle of 
culpa in contrahendo may apply. As already pointed out, however, in practice only a very 
few times was third-party professional liability based on culpa in contrahendo.522  
 
4. Case law potentially applicable to TMOs 
 
The German case law on third-party professional liability for negligent 
misstatements is abundant yet not very consistent. The only tendency that can be identified 
is that courts tend to move towards an expansion of professional contractual (or quasi- 
contractual) liability towards third parties. By the same metaphor used in the previous 
sections, it could be said that courts have been manifestly inclined to widen the ‘contractual 
umbrella’.523 From the methodological point of view, it is important to analyse the specific 
reasons on which courts based their decisions to impose liability on professionals case by 
case, focusing attention especially on the purpose of the duty owed by the professionals 
towards third parties.524 The following cases that deal with economic loss caused by 
negligent statements – typically taking the form of some kind of certification – are 
extracted from the selection provided by Basil Markesinis in his book The German Law of 
Tort.525 They are presented to point out the criteria that led the Federal Supreme Court to 
impose third-party liability in such instances. 
 
                                                 
521 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.5. 
522 See Subsection 2.2; see also Canaris (1999), p. 220. 
523 See Subsection 2.2 and Section 3. 
524 This is the method of analysis also suggested by Peter Schlechtriem in his paper Schutzpflichten und 
geschützte Personen. See Schlechtriem, P. (1999) Schutzpflichten und geschützte Personen in Beuthien et 
al. (eds) Festschrift für Dieter Medicus, (Cologne: Heymanns) p. 529.  
525 Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 265 et seq. 
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4.1 Case 1: Federal Supreme Court (sixth civil senate) 12 
February 1979526 
 
In the present case, the German branch of a bank asked its headquarters to provide 
information on the creditworthiness of a third party. Such information was to be passed on 
to a group of potential investors with whom the German branch was in contact. The 
information provided by the bank turned out to be inaccurate and one of the potential 
investors sued the bank, asking compensation for the damages that she suffered by relying 
on it. The case reached the Federal Supreme Court, which stated that the defendant was 
liable for breach of its contractual obligations towards the plaintiff, confirming the decision 
of the lower courts. The Federal Supreme Court stressed that the bank knew that the 
information which was provided would have been showed to potential investors. Actually, 
that was the very scope of collecting the information and drafting the related notice. On this 
point the Federal Supreme Court specified that the information-notice provided by the bank 
was manifestly prepared to appeal to private individuals (i.e., potential investors). 
Furthermore, the Federal Supreme Court agreed with the position held by the Court of 
Appeal about the fact that it was clear the defendant was aware that the information was of 
significant relevance for the plaintiff’s further decisions. Moreover, the information 
provided by the bank was manifestly inaccurate as the defendant omitted facts that were 
definitely important for a potential investor. On the basis of the assessment made, the 
Federal Supreme Court then operated a contractual ‘assumption’. The Court maintained 
that, in the case at stake, all the necessary conditions which lead to liability for negligent 
misstatements were fulfilled.527 More precisely, given the scope of the information 
provided, the bank should have realised that the potential investor (as one of the persons to 
be expected to rely on it) would perceive it as a legally binding statement. Therefore, 
explained the Court, in this sort of cases, if one of the potential recipients of the 
information relies on it in good faith in order take further decisions, a contractual 
relationship arises. Following this line of reasoning, the Federal Supreme Court found a 
sgA to exist between the defendant and the plaintiff and thus the former was under an 
                                                 
526 Bundesgerichtshof (sixth civil senate) 12 February 1979, WM 1979, 548 = NJW 1979, 1595. 
527 See Subsection 2.2. 
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obligation to provide accurate information to the latter.528 The bank provided inaccurate 
information; therefore, it was held liable for breach of its contractual obligation towards the 
plaintiff.  
This is a typical case in which the problem of indeterminate liability arises. Courts 
generally agree on the fact that it is not necessary that the defendant knows the identity of 
the relying parties. However, the relying parties need to be part of a determinate group of 
persons. In the present case, the Federal Supreme Court maintained that the persons to 
whom the bank provided the relevant information could be identified by virtue of their 
interests and are part of a calculable group. No relevance was given to the fact that the bank 
did not know the plaintiff. 
 
4.2 Case 2: Federal Supreme Court (fourth civil senate) 2 
November 1983529 
 
A dealer asked an officially appointed sworn valuer to provide him with his expert 
opinion on the value of some real estate properties and the related estimated income. The 
dealer was in contact with some potential buyers for the mentioned real estate properties. 
Once he had obtained the opinion from the  valuer, the dealer showed it to the potential 
buyers. One of them bought the real estate properties relying on the information provided 
in the expert opinion, which eventually turned out to be inaccurate. More precisely, the 
valuer did not consider that the real estate properties were subject to ‘social housing’ 
restrictions. It is worth pointing out, however, that the valuer placed in his expert opinion a 
specific liability disclaimer on this particular issue. The following was stated on this point: 
“I do not know whether the premises were put up by private finance or whether they 
represent social housing. It is not the task of a sworn expert to consider this question. I took 
great care in ascertaining the rental values in the neighbourhood (…).” Coming back to the 
buyer, he sued the valuer claiming for the damages suffered by relying on the valuer’s 
expert opinion. Contextually, the buyer maintained that if he had known the correct annual 
income for the relevant real estate properties, he would not have bought them. In other 
                                                 
528 See Subsection 2.2, Implied contract on the provision of correct information (Stillschweigend 
geschlossener Auskunftsvertrag – sgA). 
529 WM 1984, 34 = NJW 1984, 355. 
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words, he stressed the direct causal connection between the valuer’s mistake and the 
damages he, the buyer, suffered. Moreover, he insisted that the valuer was fully aware of 
the fact that the dealer had asked his expert opinion to show it to his potential buyers. Such 
assertion was not denied by the valuer. Eventually the case reached the Federal Supreme 
Court after the claim had been denied by both the competent District Court and the Appeal 
Court. The Federal Supreme Court’s decision reversed the previous decisions and allowed 
the plaintiff’s claim. The crucial point in the Federal Supreme Court’s reasoning was that 
the absence of a VzD between the plaintiff and the defendant was not a reason enough to 
exclude defendant’s liability. In fact, the Court of Appeal had declared that the dealer’s 
request to provide an expert opinion was not to be considered an offer to the valuer to enter 
a contract for the benefit of third parties – VzD. Hence, the valuer’s acceptance to provide 
the dealer the requested service did not give rise to a VzD. On this point, the Federal 
Supreme Court maintained that in the absence of the substantial conditions for a traditional 
VzD to exist, it was necessary to check whether the plaintiff-buyer was nevertheless under 
the protective effects of the contractual relationship between the dealer and the valuer (in 
other words whether a contract with protective effects towards third parties – a VmSzD – 
existed).530 In deciding that the plaintiff indeed enjoyed the protective effects of the 
contract, the Federal Supreme Court set forth some general principles on professional third-
party liability for negligent misstatements under contract with protective effects to third 
parties. First, there is no need for the professional to know either who the third parties are 
or their exact number for the protective effects towards third parties of a contract and the 
related duties to arise. What is necessary is that the group of third parties to which the duty 
of care is owed by the professional is capable of being objectively determined. Second, the 
professional’s negligent performance (i.e., the provision of inaccurate information) must 
have determined the plaintiff’s decision which eventually led him to suffer a loss. Third, 
the Federal Supreme Court, taking into consideration a potential plaintiff’s contributory 
negligence, stated that in the present case the plaintiff, as well as the dealer, did not have 
the necessary technical knowledge to assess the risk related to the purchase of the real 
estate properties. This was the reason the support of the valuer was needed. Thus, the 
plaintiff in this case could not be contributory liable for not having recognised the 
inaccuracy of the valuer’s expert opinion. The Federal Supreme Court went further with its 
                                                 
530 See Subsection 2.2 Contract with protective effects towards third-parties (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung 
zugunsten Dritter – VmSzD). 
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reasoning, stating that, more generally, every contract for the provision of information or 
advice is based on the assumption that the professional, who provides the information, 
possesses more knowledge and insight on the matter at stake than the persons who receive 
it.531 Thus, if the recipients do not recognise that the information provided by the 
professional is wrong, this will usually not lead to contributory negligence; and in no 
instance would contributory negligence of this kind exclude third-party professional 
liability altogether.  
In conclusion, the Federal Supreme Court established that third-party claims for 
damage caused by the reliance on inaccurate information provided by a professional may 
be possible also in absence of the necessary conditions for a ‘traditional’ contract for the 
benefit of third parties – VzD. The Court in fact used its variant: the contract with 
protective effects towards third parties – VmSzD. 
 
4.3 Case 3: Federal Supreme Court (third civil senate) 10 
November 1994532 
 
 This case is particularly interesting because the Federal Supreme Court decided in 
favour of third-party liability for negligent misstatement even if the professional (i.e., a 
surveyor) provided inaccurate information (i.e., a valuation of a real estate) because he 
received misleading information from his contractual party (i.e., the real estate owner). As 
to the facts, the owner of a piece of real estate asked a surveyor to issue a valuation of his 
property. The owner, who was in contact with a potential buyer for his real estate, provided 
the surveyor with wrong information to obtain a valuation higher than the real value of his 
property. Relying on the information received by the owner, the surveyor issued an 
inaccurate valuation. Eventually, the potential buyer purchased the real estate for a much 
higher price than the actual value of the property because he relied on the information 
supplied by the surveyor. Once the buyer realised that he had overpaid for the real estate, 
he immediately sued directly the surveyor and asked him for damages, since the vendor 
contractually disclaimed any kind of liability towards the buyer for visible or hidden defect 
of the real estate. 
                                                 
531 See the information asymmetry argument in Chapter 2, Section 4. 
532 BGHZ 127, 378 = NJW 1995, 392. 
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 The case reached the Federal Supreme Court, which allowed the third-party action 
towards the surveyor, overruling the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Federal Supreme 
Court reached such conclusion by interpreting the contract between the surveyor and the 
owner of the real estate as one having protective effects towards the third-party purchaser – 
VmSzD. More precisely, the Court took the view that the vendor had a factual interest in 
including the potential buyer in the protective scope of the agreement with the surveyor.  
 The argument put forward by the Federal Supreme Court was, in first place, that the 
vendor’s and potential purchaser’s interests were opposite. The former aimed to have a 
high valuation of his real estate, the latter a low one. Hence, it was difficult to see how the 
contractual intention of the vendor was to benefit the third party. However, the Federal 
Supreme Court stated that in cases of third-party liability for negligent misstatements, such 
conflict of interests is not relevant to the formation of a contract with protective effects for 
third parties.533 
 Another criticism was moved against the Federal Supreme Court’s line of 
reasoning. The Court was accused of imposing on the surveyor liability towards the third-
party potential purchaser, more than deriving it from the surveyor’s contractual will and 
related explicit or implicit obligations. More precisely, it was pointed out that it was not 
very likely that the surveyor would have agreed to assume a duty towards the third party, 
had it been discussed before entering into the contract with the vendor. However, the Court 
argued that the surveyor implicitly accepted such duty because he knew that the 
information he provided was to be relied upon by the third party in order to make an 
important decision. Furthermore, it is very interesting that the Court stressed the 
importance of the ‘trust’ which the potential buyer placed on the surveyor and thus on the 
information he supplied. The Federal Supreme Court argued that the fact that the potential 
buyer would most likely give greater weight to the information provided by the surveyor, 
than to the one supplied by the vendor, justifies the protection for the third party’s trust, 
especially when a malicious vendor tries to conceal the defect of the real estate for sale. 
Accordingly, the fact that the vendor acted against good faith by providing the surveyor 
with misleading information on the real estate to value had no bearing on the inclusion of 
the potential buyer in the protective effects of the contract and the related surveyor’s duty 
to provide the potential buyer with reasonably correct information.  
                                                 
533 See also BGH NJW 1987, 1758-9. 
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 The Court specified further that it was clear that the plaintiff would not have 
purchased the real estate if the surveyor had issued an accurate valuation, establishing in 
this way the causal link between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s loss. Once 
again, in this sort of cases, it was considered irrelevant that the defendant did not know to 
whom the information was to be submitted, being enough for his duty of care to arise that 
he was aware of the fact that his valuation was intended for a potential buyer.534  
 For all these reasons the Federal Supreme Court decided that a contract with 
protective effects towards the plaintiff – VmSzD – was established and the defendant was 
liable for breach of his related duties. The Court specified further that the interpretation 
given to the facts would not expose professionals who provide information to third parties 
to an excessive liability risk. In fact, if professionals had to provide information without 
having the chance to verify relevant facts themselves, they would have to state it clearly in 
their reports and eventually exclude their liability for the accurateness of the information 
provided. 
 
4.4 Case 4: Federal Supreme Court (third civil senate) 2 April 
1998535 
 
In the present case, the plaintiff bought a significant amount of shares of a 
company, relying on the company’s annual audits issued by the defendants-auditors 
pursuant to Section 316 ff. Handelsgesetzbuch (henceforth: HGB). The audits reported 
inaccurate information, reporting the company’s share price as higher than the actual value. 
Consequently, the plaintiff suffered an economic loss. The Federal Supreme Court allowed 
the action brought by the plaintiff against the auditors. 
In fact, the Court applied also to auditors who carry out the compulsory audit of a 
company, the familiar principles already described in the cases previously represented in 
order to establish third-party liability for the provision of negligent misstatements. Firstly, 
the Federal Supreme Court pointed out that the case law has accepted that protective duties 
towards third parties can originate from a contract in which one party requests an expert 
opinion from a professional whose knowledge on the matter has been officially recognised 
                                                 
534 See also case 2. 
535 BGHZ 138, 257 = NJW 1998 = JZ 1998, 1013. 
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(e.g., auditors, publicly appointed experts). More precisely, the duties arise on the 
professional towards the third parties to whom the opinion will be passed on. Secondly, and 
as a corollary of the first argument, the Court stressed that the inner scope of the 
professional opinion is to induce trust in third parties who can rely on the opinion’s 
evidential value. This will compensate for the fact that the party who commissioned the 
expert opinion and the third party have conflicting interests for the creation of contract with 
protective effect to third parties.536 Thirdly, the Federal Supreme Court specified further 
that the provision of inaccurate information by the professional will disappoint third-party 
trust and eventually may cause them a loss. No legal reasons have been found to deny an 
action for negligence misstatement against the professional to third parties who rely on the 
inaccurate information to their detriment. However, the Federal Supreme Court took into 
consideration the intention of the legislator to limit the third-party liability risk of auditors 
who carry out compulsory audits codified in Section 323 HGB. Nevertheless, the Court, 
arguing that the ratio of Section 323 is to avoid the extension of auditors’ liability towards 
third parties who are not part of a determinate group of persons, allowed third-party cause 
of action in the present case. It is worth pointing out that, in its decision, the Federal 
Supreme Court also considered that, from the way the audit was drafted, it was possible to 
infer that the audit was obviously intended for the use of a third party. Moreover, it was 
also clear that the third party would not have purchased the shares of the company if the 
real value of the shares was reported in the audit. 
 
4.5 Some remarks on the cases 
 
The analysed case law confirms the preference of the Federal Supreme Court to 
allow a cause of action in contract law instead of in tort law to third parties who relied on 
negligent misstatements provided by professionals and suffered loss. Moreover, it clearly 
emerges that even if the parties do not expressly commit themselves to contracts which will 
give rise to duties towards third parties, the Court may derive them from assumptions.537 
 
                                                 
536 See also case three in which the Federal Supreme Court used the same argument. 
537 See the two striking fictions operated by the Federal Supreme Court in case three. 
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The contract with protective effect towards third persons – VmSzD – as the 
residual means to establish third-party cause of action 
Among the available contractual means, the Federal Supreme Court very often uses 
the contract with protective effect for third persons. As already explained, this contract is a 
judicially created variant of the VzD by which the Court manages to include parties who are 
not even considered in the contract relationship under the contractual ‘protective umbrella’, 
allowing third-party direct action to recover pure economic loss from the professional who 
negligently provides inaccurate information.538 The contract with protective effect for third 
persons was used by the Federal Supreme Court as a sort of back-up means to establish a 
contractual ground for the third-party liability of the professional in case the elements to 
assert the existence of a VzD or a sgA were missing.539 In case 2, the Federal Supreme 
Court made this point clear by maintaining that the fact that the Court of Appeal denied 
that the instruction given to the defendant by the dealer of the real estates to supply an 
expert opinion constitutes a VmSzD did not alone exclude any ground for the plaintiff to 
bring his claim for damages. Consequently, it was necessary to examine whether the 
plaintiff was included in the area protected by the contract. Generally, the fact that the 
defendant professional knew both that the plaintiff was considering to rely on the 
information the professional provided and that such information would be of great 
significance to the recipient for taking important decisions were pointed out by the Federal 
Supreme Curt as the necessary conditions for a contract with protective effect for third 
persons to exist.540  
The Federal Supreme Court usually deduces the conditions from the facts or by the 
defendants’ actions. In both case 1 and case 4, for example, the Federal Supreme Court 
assumed that the professionals knew that the information they provided would be shown to 
third parties and that such information would be crucial for the decisions the third parties 
would make by interpreting the style and the content of the bank’s notice in the first case 
and of the auditors’ letter in the second case as directed to appeal third parties. 
In case 2, the Federal Supreme Court opened the ‘contractual umbrella’ even wider. 
The fact that the defendant professional knew that the plaintiff was considering to rely on 
                                                 
538 See Subsection 2.2; see also Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 62-64; Beyer, O. (1996), p. 473; 
Sonnenschein, J. (1989), p. 225; see also BGH NJW 1984, pp. 355-356. 
539 See cases two and three. 
540 See cases 1 and 3. 
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his information was not necessary to allow the plaintiff’s action in the case.541 The Federal 
Supreme Court stressed that duties of care can also be created in favour of those persons 
who are not mentioned by name to the other contracting party. However, the damages can 
be claimed by the plaintiff under the condition that the defendant’s misstatement 
determined the plaintiff’s decision. 
 
The indeterminate liability issue 
Such permissive approach by the Federal Supreme Court to third-party liability for 
negligent misstatement brings up the issue of possible indeterminate liability. The Court 
stated on this point that it is not crucial that the professional was unaware that the 
information provided was to be submitted to that particular third-party plaintiff. In fact, it is 
also not necessary that the contracting party knew the correct number of persons to which 
his information would be relevant for. The only limit to the extension of professional third-
party liability for negligent misstatements set by the Federal Supreme Court consists of the 
fact that the group of persons who may potentially rely on the information must be capable 
of being objectively determined.542 
 
Third-party contributory negligence 
Another interesting issue emerges from the analysis of the cases. It concerns the 
possible role played by third-party contributory negligence in such cases. In case 2, the 
Federal Supreme Court excluded any third-party contributory negligence on the grounds 
that a contract for the supply of information or advice is based on the assumption that the 
information provider possesses more knowledge and insight on the matter than the party 
who receives the information. Consequently, if the latter does not detect mistakes made by 
the former, this will not normally be regarded as contributory negligence. The ratio of this 
type of contracts is that the subject’s lack of the necessary technical knowledge on a given 
matter brings him to outsource it.543 Therefore, if the recipients do not recognise that the 
information provided by the professional is wrong, this will usually not lead to contributory 
                                                 
541 See case 2. 
542 See cases 1, 2, and 3. 
543 Especially on complicated matters, there are no big chances for the subject to spot errors and, furthermore, 
he should not even be requested to check. 
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negligence; and in no instance would contributory negligence of this kind exclude third-
party professional liability altogether.544 
 
Third-party liability also in case of false information received by the professional  
Third-party liability for negligent misstatement was also found when a professional 
received false information from the party who commissioned the service (i.e., his 
contractual counterpart). More precisely, in case 3, a surveyor overvalued a house because 
he relied on the false information given to him by the real estate owner (i.e., the person 
who commissioned the survey). The third-party purchaser relied on the surveyor’s report, 
which was drafted on the basis of wrong information maliciously provided to the surveyor 
by the real estate owner, and bought the house at a price much higher than its real value. 
The Federal Supreme Court stated on this point that the fact that the vendor acted against 
good faith by providing the surveyor with misleading information on the real estate to 
value had no bearing on the inclusion of the potential buyer in the protective effects of the 
contract and the related surveyor’s duty to provide the potential buyer with reasonably 
correct information. 
 
The relevance of professional–third party trust relationship 
Moreover, the importance that the Federal Supreme Court gave in the cases dealt 
with to the trust relationship between the professional and the third-party has to be 
stressed.545 Usually, the Court looks at the professional as the key subject who fills the 
information gap of the third party.546 In other words, the professional should act as a 
guarantor who – in case 3, for example – has to protect the third party from the dishonesty 
of the seller who tries to conceal the true condition of the object for sale. According to the 
Federal Supreme Court, the trust that third parties – within the protective area of a contract 
- place in the truth and accuracy of the information provided by a professional must be 
legally protected even when the incorrectness of the information was caused by the 
professional’s contractual party.547  
                                                 
544 See case 2. 
545 See cases 3 and 4. 
546 See the concept of ‘information asymmetry’ Chapter 2, Section 4. 
547 See cases 3 and 4. 
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In case 4, the trust argument was also used by the Federal Supreme Court to 
overcome the obstacles posed by a conflict of interests between the client and the third 
party in order to include the latter in the protective area of the contract by which the client 
commissioned a compulsory audit to a professional auditor. In fact, the Federal Supreme 
Court maintained that, as the purpose of the report is to induce trust in third parties and 
possesses evidentiary value for them, the protective duty arises upon the auditor also in the 
case in which he provides the compulsory audit of a company, provided that it appears 
sufficiently clear to him that the audit is to be used with a third party who trusts in his 
expert knowledge. 
 
5. Possible influence of the decisions on TMO third-
party liability 
 
The fact that it is not possible to assume the existence of a VzD or an sgA between 
TMOs and e-consumers does not exclude the possibility for the latter to claim damages 
from the former.548 It will then be necessary to check whether the plaintiff can be included 
in the area protected by the contract between TMOs and e-merchants (in other words, 
whether a VmSzD may exist). In this respect, according to the decisions of the Federal 
Supreme Court, if TMOs knew both that e-consumers were contemplating to rely on the 
trustmarks and that the information provided through the trustmarks would have been of 
great significance to e-consumers for making important decisions, a contract with 
protective effect for third persons (e.g., e-consumers) may exist.549 The two requirements 
mentioned above were inferred by the Federal Supreme Court from the style and the 
content of a notice issued by a bank550 and, in another case, of the audit issued by 
auditors.551 In fact, the Court interpreted them as directed to appeal to third parties. It is 
also evident that a trustmark, which is by definition directed to appeal e-consumers, can be 
                                                 
548 See Subsection 2.2 Contract with protective effects towards third-parties (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung 
zugunsten Dritter – VmSzD); Subsection 4.5 The contract with protective effect towards third persons – 
VmSzD – as the residual means to establish third-party cause of action; see also case two. See extensively 
on the difference between the VzD and the VmSzD, Larenz, K (1956), p. 16. See on the condition required 
by courts for a VmSzD to exist, Beyer, O. (1996), p. 473; Sonnenschein, J. (1989), p. 225. 
549 See cases one and three; Subsection 2.2 Contract with protective effects towards third-parties (Vertrag mit 
Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter – VmSzD); See also Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), p. 63. 
550 See case 1. 
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enough to include e-consumers in the area protected by the contract between TMOs and e-
merchants. The Federal Supreme Court went even further by stating that the defendant’s 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s possible reliance on the information issued by the defendant is 
not decisive for a plaintiff’s cause of action to exist.552 The damages can be claimed by the 
plaintiff under the condition that the defendant’s misstatement determined the plaintiff’s 
decision. Consequently, if an e-consumer manages to prove that the presence of the 
trustmark on an e-merchant website determined his decision to transact with the latter, he 
may have a cause of action against the TMO that issued the trustmark.553 
Third-party contributory negligence has been excluded by the Federal Supreme 
Court.554 It is obvious that TMOs possess more knowledge and insight than e-consumers on 
e-merchant security, privacy, or business practice. Consequently, if e-consumers do not 
detect mistakes in the information provided (i.e., the inaccuracy of trustmarks), this will not 
normally be regarded as the e-consumers’ contributory negligence. Moreover, the Court 
concluded that if contributory negligence is found, in no circumstances it will be regarded 
as so serious as to exclude liability of the professional altogether.555 
It is interesting to observe that the Federal Supreme Court found third-party 
professional liability for negligent misstatements also when the professional received false 
information from the person that asked for his professional performance and is related to 
him by a contractual relationship. The court stated that in this situation, a contract with 
protective effects towards third parties – VmSzD – can exist anyway.556 This decision of the 
Federal Supreme Court can have a very relevant impact on the liability of TMOs. Very 
often, the auditing procedure carried out by TMOs on e-merchant security, privacy, or 
business practice is based on internal audit, as opposed to external audit.557 This means that 
e-merchants who apply for trustmarks are usually requested to self-assess their policies or 
practices against the TMOs’ standards. Therefore, the accuracy of trustmarks is based upon 
the good faith of e-merchants. Chances are high that e-merchants declare their security, 
privacy, or business practices to be up to the standards set by TMOs, even if they are not, in 
                                                                                                                                                    
551 See case 4. 
552 See case 2. 
553 Confront on the conditions required by courts for a VmSzD to exist, Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. 
(2002), pp. 59-64; Beyer, O. (1996), p. 473; Sonnenschein, J. (1989), p. 225. 
554 See case 2. 
555 See case 2. 
556 See case 3. 
557 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.2. 
 161
order to receive the trustmarks. Actually, this has already happened.558 However, even if e-
merchants provide false information which leads to the issuance of inaccurate trustmarks 
which e-consumers rely on and suffer loss as a consequence, the latter will have a cause of 
action for damage against TMOs based on the rights of e-consumers deriving from the 
contract with protective effects for third persons which anyway exists between TMOs and 
malicious e-merchants. A way for TMOs to possibly avoid liability in this situation is to 
make clear that the information provided on trustmarks is not verified and that they, the 
TMOs, exclude their liability for the accuracy of the statements.  
It is also interesting to observe the way the Federal Supreme Court perceives 
professional information providers. They are seen as subjects who fill the information gap 
of third parties. They assume the role of guarantors who, for instance, protect third parties 
from the dishonesty of sellers who try to conceal the true condition of the object for sale.559 
In this light, TMOs can be seen as professionals providing the necessary information (i.e., 
trustmarks) to reduce the information asymmetry between e-consumers and e-merchants.560 
They can also be seen as a sort of guarantors who protect e-consumers from the dishonesty 
of e-merchants who try to conceal the true condition of their services. The Federal Supreme 
Court stressed that the trust that third parties, who have been included in the protective area 
of the contracts between TMOs and e-merchants, place in the veracity of the information 
provided by such professionals must be legally protected – even when the incorrectness of 
the information was caused by the professionals’ contractual parties.561 
In conclusion, in order to prevent indeterminate professional liability towards third 
parties, the Federal Supreme Court set some requirements. In absence of these 
requirements there cannot be liability.562 Accordingly, it is not necessary that TMOs know 
the exact number of e-consumers to whom the trustmarks will be relevant. However, the 
group of e-consumers must be capable of being objectively determined for liability to exist. 
 
                                                 
558 See Chapter 2, Subsection 6.1. 
559 See case 3 and 4. 
560 On information asymmetry, see Chapter 2, Subsection 4. 
561 See cases 3 and 4. 
562 See cases 1, 2, and 3. 
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6. Parallel TMOs-CSPs: Applicability by analogy of 
CSPs’ third party liability rules to TMOs 
  
A law which sets forth third-party liability for online professionals comparable to 
TMOs actually exists. In fact, courts could compare, by analogy, TMOs to CSPs.563 The 
third-party liability of CSPs has been set out in Article 6564 of the Electronic Signatures 
Directive.565 Germany implemented Article 6 of the Electronic Signatures Directive in 
Section 11 of the Law Governing Framework Conditions for Electronic Signatures 
(Signatures Law, henceforth: Sag)566 as follows: 
 
Liability 
(1) If a certification-service provider infringes the requirements under this Law 
and the statutory ordinance under Section 24, or if his products for qualified 
electronic signatures or other technical security facilities fail, he shall reimburse 
a third party for any damage suffered from relying on the data in a qualified 
certificate or a qualified time stamp or on information given in accordance with 
                                                 
563 For an explanation of the comparison, see Chapter 1, Subsection 3.1. 
564 Article 6. Liability. 1. As a minimum, Member States shall ensure that by issuing a certificate as a 
qualified certificate to the public or by guaranteeing such a certificate to the public a certification service 
provider is liable for damage caused to any entity or legal or natural person who reasonably relies on that 
certificate: (a) as regards the accuracy at the time of issuance of all information contained in the qualified 
certificate and as regards the fact that the certificate contains all the details prescribed for a qualified 
certificate; (b) for assurance that at the time of the issuance of the certificate, the signatory identified in the 
qualified certificate held the signature-creation data corresponding to the signature-verification data given or 
identified in the certificate; (c) for assurance that the signature-creation data and the signature verification 
data can be used in a complementary manner in cases where the certification service provider generates 
them both; unless the certification service provider proves that he has not acted negligently. 2. As a 
minimum Member States shall ensure that a certification service provider who has issued a certificate as a 
qualified certificate to the public is liable for damage caused to any entity or legal or natural person who 
reasonably relies on the certificate for failure to register revocation of the certificate unless the certification 
service provider proves that he has not acted negligently. 3. Member States shall ensure that a certification 
service provider may indicate in a qualified certificate limitations on the use of that certificate, provided that 
the limitations are recognisable to third parties. The certification service provider shall not be liable for 
damage arising from use of a qualified certificate which exceeds the limitations placed on it. 4. Member 
States shall ensure that a certification service provider may indicate in the qualified certificate a limit on the 
value of transactions for which the certificate can be used, provided that the limit is recognisable to third 
parties. The certification service provider shall not be liable for damage resulting from this maximum limit 
being exceeded. 5. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall be without prejudice to Council Directive 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.  
565 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community 
Framework for Electronic Signatures (99/93/EC) (OJ L 13, 19 January 2000, p. 12). For an in-depth analysis 
of CSP liability as set forth in Article 6 of the Electronic Signatures Directive, see Balboni, P. (2004), pp. 
211-242. 
 163
Section 5 (1) Sentence 2. Damages shall not be payable if the third party knew, 
or must have known, that the data was faulty.  
(2) Damages need not be reimbursed if the certification-service provider has 
incurred no culpability.  
(3) If a qualified certificate restricts the use of the signature code to certain 
applications by type or extent, damages shall be payable only within the limits 
of these restrictions. 
(4) The certification-service provider shall be liable for third parties 
commissioned under Section 4 (5) and when guaranteeing foreign certificates 
under Section 23 (1) No. 2 as for his own actions. Section 831 (1) Sentence 2 of 
the German Civil Code shall not apply. 
 
According to Section 11 (1) of the Sag, if a product or a service provided by CSPs fails, 
CSPs will have to reimburse third parties for any damage suffered from relying on the data 
in a certificate, unless the third parties knew, or must have known, that the data were faulty. 
However, CSPs can avoid reimbursing the damage if they prove that their conduct was not 
culpable. Moreover, CSPs can limit the use of the certificates. Thus, damages shall be 
payable only within these limits.567 This law could be applied by analogy to TMOs. 
Accordingly, TMOs will have to compensate e-consumers for any damage suffered from 
relying on the information in the trustmarks, unless e-consumers knew or must have known 
that the information was wrong. As it has already been pointed out, however, e-consumers 
usually lack the necessary technical knowledge to spot information errors.568 TMOs can 
avoid liability by proving that they act without culpa. In conclusion, damages suffered by 
e-consumers will only be reimbursed if they occurred within the limits of use of the 
trustmarks (e.g., the e-consumers suffer damage by relying on the trustmark to make  




                                                                                                                                                    
566 Bundesgesetzblatt – BGBl. Teil I S. 876 vom 21. Mai 2001. 
567 For an analysis of such provision, see Heydn, T. J. (2005) Germany. In Campbell, D. (ed.) E-Commerce 
and the law of Digital Signatures (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc.), pp. 253 et seq. 
 164
The analysis of the German legal system shows that there are neither specific laws 
nor case law on TMO third-party liability for the provision of inaccurate trustmarks. 
However, general tort and contract law provisions may apply to the matter. More precisely, 
it can be concluded that TMO third-party liability lies on the borderline between tort and 
contract law.569  
Section 823 (1) BGB is in general not applicable to losses caused by inaccurate 
information provided in trustmarks issued by TMOs, but there may be an exception in the 
instance that e-consumers suffer damage for breach of their privacy right. In fact, privacy 
right can fall under the protection accorded by Section 823 (1) BGB to ‘other rights’.570 
Section 823 (2) BGB may only apply if the losses suffered by e-consumers who relied on 
inaccurate trustmarks are specifically protected by the law. Moreover, it is very improbable 
that TMOs issue inaccurate trustmarks with the purpose of harming e-consumers relying on 
them. Therefore, Section 826 BGB is not very likely to apply. However, if the ‘intent’ 
requirement will be interpreted to include also reckless and thoughtless acts,571 TMOs’ 
negligence in issuing trustmarks may fulfil such requirement. Nevertheless, it has to be 
borne in mind that the ‘intent’ requirement is necessary but not sufficient for the 
application of Section 826 BGB. In addition, the conduct of TMOs must also be considered 
contra bonos mores. On this point it has to be stressed that recently it has been widely 
accepted that “acting contra bonos mores implies conduct contrary to the existing 
economic and legal order or the ordre public.”572 In this respect, providing someone with 
incorrect information is a type of conduct which falls within the scope of Section 826 
BGB.573 Hence, the conduct of TMOs to negligently provide inaccurate information on e-
merchant security, privacy or business practice through the issuance of trustmarks may be 
regarded as an action contra bonos mores. 
The present analysis also shows that in German law, third-party professional 
liability seems to be developing more along contractual or quasi-contractual lines than in 
                                                                                                                                                    
568 See Subsection 4.5 Contributory negligence. 
569 See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 75-76; Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1996), p. 617; BGH 23.1.1985 in JZ 1985, 
pp. 951 et seq., noted by Honsell, Zur Ausckunftsvertrag mit Schutzwirkung für Dritte; Canaris, C. (1983), 
pp. 567 et seq.; Kreuzer, K.F. (1976), p. 778; Lorenz, W. (1973) pp. 575 et seq. 
570 See Bassenge P. et al. (2006), p. 1248. Van Gerven, W. et al. (2000), p. 142. See also Sections 2, 3 and 5. 
571 See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 71 and 172; Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 292 and 889; 
Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), p. 603; Larenz, K. & Canaris, C. W. (1994), pp. 452-453. 
572 Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 401-402; see also Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 889-890; Larenz, 
K. & Canaris, C. W. (1994), p. 448. 
573 See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 402. 
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tort. More precisely, the Federal Supreme Court often uses the contract with protective 
effect for third parties – VmSzD,574 which is a judicially created variant of the well-known 
contract for the benefit of third parties – VzD.575  
According to the decisions of the Court, if TMOs know both that e-consumers are 
contemplating to rely on the trustmarks and that the information provided through the 
trustmarks will be of great significance to e-consumers for taking important decisions, a 
contract with protective effect for third persons (e.g., e-consumers) may exist.576 Moreover, 
it seems that no contributory negligence, so serious as to exclude TMO liability, can derive 
from the fact that e-consumers did not detect the inaccurateness of the trustmarks. 
However, in order not to open the liability floodgates, although it is not necessary that the 
TMO knows the correct number of persons for whom the trustmark will be relevant, the 
group of e-consumer that can potentially rely on the trustmark must be capable of being 
objectively determined by the TMO for its third-party liability to exist.577 
In conclusion, it has emerged from the analysis that the Federal Supreme Court is at 
least open to the possible extension of protection in order to compensate for pure economic 
loss,578 turning to ‘audacious’ contractual or quasi-contractual constructions, in the absence 
of legal ground for a cause of action in tort.579  
Such attitude could also stimulate courts to apply by analogy Section 11 of the Sag 
according to which TMOs would have to compensate e-consumers for any damage suffered 
from relying on the information in the trustmarks, unless either the trustmarks have been 
relied upon for purposes that exceed their scopes or e-consumers knew or must have known 
that the information was wrong.580 
 
                                                 
574 See more generally on the important role played by VmSzD in third-party professional liability, Hirte, H. 
(1996), p. 388.  
575 See, e.g., case two. See extensively on the difference between the VzD and the VmSzD, Larenz, K. (1956), 
p. 16. See on the condition required by courts for a VmSzD to exist, Beyer, O. (1996), p. 473; Sonnenschein, 
J. (1989), p. 225. 
576 See cases 1 and 3. 
577 See cases 1, 2, and 3. 
578 Fleming, J. (1989), p. 508; Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 172-173. 
579 See, e.g., case 3. 












In the French legal system, there are no specific provisions on TMOs. Furthermore, 
no specific cases on TMO third-party liability have been reported. Moreover, literature on 
TMO third-party liability has not been found either. In this respect France does not differ 
from England and Germany. Given this scenario, the present chapter aims to investigate 
whether TMOs’ third-party liability for the provision of inaccurate trustmarks exists in 
France. Approached from another angle, the same question may also be formulated as 
whether an e-consumer who relies on a trustmark and suffers loss from such reliance can 
ask the TMO for damages and on which legal ground. 
An excursus on the general principles of third-party liability of professionals who 
provide information will be offered in Section 2. In Section 3, Articles 1382 and 1383 Code 
civil, the two pillars of French tort law, will be analysed. An in-depth analysis, based on 
literature and case law, on the issues related to ‘causation’ (one of the three necessary 
elements of a claim in tort) will be carried out in Section 4. In order to better define the 
content of information provider obligations, other relevant cases will be dealt with in 
Section 5. In Section 6, CSP third-party liability rules will be presented. Possible TMO 




2. On third-party liability for the provision of 
information 
 
Generally speaking, under French law, professionals who provide inaccurate 
information may be liable towards both the parties to whom they are contractually bound 
and parties outside any contractual relationship, i.e., third parties.581 Such third-party 
liability can only be based in tort law. In fact, contrary to what has been shown in the 
analysis of the German legal system,582 contractual liability under French law does not 
expand beyond the parties of the agreement.583 Furthermore, it is interesting to observe that 
the breach of contractual duties or obligations is often automatically considered to be a 
fault in tort. In a leading case, the Court de cassation recently maintained that if the non-
performance of a contractual obligation caused damage to third parties, they can claim 
compensation in tort. The only thing they have to prove is the causal link between the 
contractual non-performance and the damage suffered.584 Moreover, contractually 
established liability disclaimers do not have effects towards third parties.585 In other words, 
every breach of contract may be claimed in tort by aggrieved third parties, regardless of 
limitations or exclusions of third-party liability set forth by contracting parties. 
                                                 
581 See, e.g., Lemaignan, A. & Nechelis, D. (2005) Expert-comptable, JurisClasseur Responsabilité civile et 
Assurances, fasc. 376, § 40; Pinna, A. (2003) The Obligations to Inform and to Advise (The Hague: Boom 
Juridische uitgevers), p. 23. 
582 See Chapter 6, Section 2. 
583 See, e.g., Terré, F. et al. (2002) Droit Civil: Les Obligations (Paris: Dalloz), p. 32; Viney, G. (1995) Traité 
de Droit Civil: Introduction à la Responsabilité (Paris: Librarie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence), pp. 
321 et seq. and 349 et seq.; see also Viney, G. & Jourdain, P. (2001) Traité de Droit Civil: Les Effects de la 
Responsabilité (Paris: Librarie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence), pp. 447-448. See also Pinna, A. 
(2003), p. 55. 
584 Principle established in France by Civ. I, 13 February 2001, Bull. Civ. I, no. 35; J.C.P. 2001.I.338 with 
obs. Viney, G. (2001) Droit & Patrimoine, no. 2844 with obs. Chauvel, P.: “les tiers a un contract sont 
fondés a invoquer tout manquement du débiteur contractual lorsque ce manquement leur a cause un 
dommage, sans avoir a rapporter d’autre prevue.” This principle was confirmed in Cass. Ass. plén., 6 
October 2006, no. 05-13.255, P+B+R+I, Loubeyre et a. c/ SARL Myr’Ho et a. : Juris-Data no. 2006-
035298; See also Billiau, M. (2006) Le tiers à un contrat peut invoquer, sur le fondement de la 
responsabilité délictuelle, un manquement contractual dès lors qu’il lui a cause un dommage, La Semaine 
Juridique Edition Générale no. 46, 15 November 2006, II 10181; Viney, G. (2006) La responabilité du 
débiteur à l’égard du tiers auquel il a cause un dommage en manquant à son obligation contractuelle, 
Recueil Dalloz 2006 Jurisprudence, p. 2825. 
585 See Lemaignan, A. & Nechelis, D. (2005), § 48. 
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Tort liability is based on three legal concepts set out in Articles 1382586 and 1383587 
Code civil: ‘fault’ (fait fautif),588 ‘damage’ (dommage),589 and the ‘causal link’ between 
fault and damage (lien de causalité entre le faute et le dommage)590.591 In practice, if the 
defendant acts in a faulty way, the plaintiff suffers damage, and if a sufficient causal link 
between these two events exists, the plaintiff will have a cause of action against the 
defendant. Third-party liability for negligent misstatements does not entail any additional 
requirement. Therefore, fault, harm, and causation must be proven in order for such claim 
to be accepted by the court.592 However, not every act of the defendant will constitute a 
fault, and not every loss claimed by the plaintiff will be worth compensation. As it will be 
explained in more detail in Section 4, French courts use the ‘causation’ requirement as a 
sort of ‘control valve’ to allow or stop third-party claims for professional negligent 
misstatements.593  
 
2.1 Obligation of means or obligation of result? 
 
As it has already been pointed out, third parties can claim damages in tort if the 
non-performance of a contractual obligation is the cause of the damage they suffered.594 To 
                                                 
586 Article 1382: Any human deed whatsoever which causes harm to another creates an obligation in the 
person by whose fault it was caused to compensate it. Article translated in Bell, J. et al. (1998) Principles of 
French Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 355. 
587 Article 1383: Everyone is liable for the harm which he has caused not only by his deed, but also by his 
failure to act or his lack of care. Article translated in Bell J. et al. (1998), p. 355. 
588 See extensively Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 693 et seq.; Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002) Droit de la 
Responsabilité et des Contracts (Paris: Dalloz), pp. 348 et seq.; Viney, G. (1998) Traité de Droit Civil: Les 
Conditions de la Responsabilité (Paris: Librarie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence), pp. 313 et seq. 
589 See extensively Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 677 et seq.; Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 1197 et 
seq.; Viney, G. (1998), pp. 151 et seq. 
590 See extensively Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 815 et seq.; Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 441 et 
seq.; Viney, G. (1998), pp. 151 et seq. 
591 See more generally Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 46 et seq.; Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), pp. 615 et seq.; 
Van Gerven et al. (2000), pp. 57 et seq.  
592 See Lyon, 27 January 1994, Bull. C.N.C.C. 1994.271 (Annot. P. Merle); Paris, 23 February 1978 Rev. 
Soc. 79.92; Com., 27 October 1992, Rev. Soc. 79.92; Castell, R. & Pasqualini, F. (1995) Le commissaire aux 
comptes (Paris: Economica), p. 87; Guyon, Y. (1994) Droit des affaires (Paris: Economica), p. 274; 
Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes (1995) La responsabilité civile du commissaire aux 
comptes (Paris: Encuclopédie d’études juridiques), p. 2; Rennes, 22 February 1999, Bull. C.N.C.C. 1999.463 
(Annot. P. Merle). On the requirement of causation, see Com., 12 November 1992, Bull. C.N.C.C. 
1993.89.110 (Annot. M. Jeantin, E. du Pontavice); Com., 15 June 1993, Bull. C.N.C.C.1994.93; Amiens, 20 
June 1988, Bull. C.N.C.C. 71.316 (Annot. E. du Pontavice); Trib. gr. inst. Cherbourg, 6 April 1976, B.C.C. 
1976.23.318. 
593 Khoury, L. (2001) The Liability of Auditors beyond Their Clients: A Comparative Study, McGill Law 
Journal 46, pp. 457-460. 
594 See above Section 2. 
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focus the analysis on tort law, it is relevant to identify the nature of professional contractual 
obligations in providing information, breach of which can constitute third-party cause of 
action against the professional.  
According to what Clarisse Girot neatly described in her book User Protection in IT 
Contracts, “[c]ontracts of electronic information services are mainly considered contracts 
of provision of services (contract d’entreprise or de louage d’ouvrage) in the sense of 
Article 1710 Code civil.595”596 She explained further that: “whereas the information 
provider, economically speaking, ‘sells’ information, he is, legally speaking, committed to 
perform a service.”597 The parallel is easy to draw with auditors (expert contable), 
accountants (commissaire aux comptes), surveyors (agent immobilier), commercial 
information offices, financial consultants, etc.598  
The standard of care that such professionals have to comply with in providing 
information to their clients is usually decided by courts on a case-by-case basis. In fact, 
depending on the degree of liability which the courts find appropriate to impose on these 
professionals, and on the protection that they will grant to their clients, the obligation of 
professionals may range from an obligation of result to an obligation of means. In the first 
case, the professional is called to achieve the result expected by his contractual party. In the 
second instance, the information provider is under the duty to act according to professional 
diligence and care in providing his services; in other words, he is under an obligation of 
best effort. Accordingly, if the professional does not achieve the result he will be liable 
only in the case where he did not act with reasonable care and skill, i.e., if he has been at 
fault.599  
The prevalent doctrine and case law tend to see information providers under an 
obligation of means. The main argument used to support such thesis consists of the fact that 
                                                 
595 See Lucas A. (1987) Le droit de l’informatique, (Paris: PUF), p. 488; Groupements Français des 
Fournisseurs d’Information en Ligne (1986) Les relations contractuelles des producteurs des bases et 
banques de données – Problèmes juridiques (Paris: Dalloz), p. 34; Linant de Bellefonds, X. & Hollande, A. 
(1992) Contrats informatiques et télématiques (Paris: Delmas) p. 178. 
596 Girot, C. (2000), p. 197. 
597 Id. 
598 See Chapter 1, Subsection 3. 
599 See, especially, Tunc, A (1945) La distinction des obligations de résultat et des obligations de diligence, 
J.C.P., p. 449; Pinna, A. (2003), p. 61; and generally Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 557-558; Zweigert K. & 
Kötz, H. (1998), pp. 501-502; Demogue, R. (1928) Traité des onbligations in general (Paris) vol. 5, pp. 
1237 et seq., using already the expression: obligation de moyens et de résultat. 
 171
the person who ask the professionals for information is always free not to follow it.600 For 
example, in the liability of auditors and accountants, the plaintiff has to prove the 
professionals’ negligent action to establish their liability for the provision of inaccurate 
information.601 In a landmark case, the Cour de cassation stated, as a general principle, that 
a bank is under the mere obligation of means in providing information.602 As to the facts, 
the bank provided inaccurate information on the solvency and creditworthiness of a 
company to a potential investor (who also was a client of such bank). The company went 
bankrupt a few months after the investor bought its shares, relying on the information 
received from the bank. As the bank’s fault could not be proved, the investor did not 
manage to receive compensation for the loss suffered. In fact, the company looked solvent 
at the time the information was provided and there were no elements that could lead to 
foreseeing its future insolvency. 
Nevertheless, a minority case law in which wrong information was sufficient for the 
Court de cassation to establish the fault of the provider, has to be given account. For 
example, in cases concerning the information exchanged between two banks, the Court de 
cassation ruled that providing wrong information was sufficient to lead to liability.603 
 
2.2 ‘Reliance’ may function as the tongue of the scale 
between obligation of means and obligation of result 
 
From the analysis carried out so far, it can be argued that information providers are 
under an obligation of means. Nevertheless, the actual or even potential reliance of their 
contractual parties on the information in order to take further actions can push the 
obligation of the information service provider towards an obligation of result. Courts may 
even assume the reliance of a party who does not possess any knowledge regarding the 
matter on which the information has been provided. In such cases, the standard of care of 
                                                 
600 See E.g., Viney, G. (1975) La responsabilité des prestataires de conseil, J.C.P., p. 2750; Cass com. 2 June 
1987, D. 1987, p. 500; CA Paris, 25 January 1990, D. 1990, I.R., p. 65; Cass. Com. 27 December 1992, 
J.C.P. 1993 I 22026; Com. 30 January 1974, D. 1974, 428 with note Tendler. CA Lyon 27 October 1971, 
J:C.P. 1972.II.17012, with note R. Savatier. CA Rennes, 21 May 1974, Rev. Banque 1974, 848; RTD com. 
1974, 566 obs. Cabrillac, Rives-Lange. 
601 Lemaignan, A. & Nechelis, D. (2005), § 46. 
602 Com. 10 October 1988, Bull. Joly, 1988, 931, no. 303; RD bancaire et bourse 1989, no. 12, 66, obs. 
Crédot, Gerard. 
603 See Com. 9 January 1978, D. 1978 IR 308, obs. Vasseur; Com. 9 June 1980, D. 1981 IR 192 obs. Vasseur; 
Com. 24 November 1983, Bull civ. IV, no. 322; D. 1984 IR 707 obs. Vasseur; RTD civ. 1984, 518 note J. 
Huet. 
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professionals will be raised, bringing the professional almost under an obligation of 
result.604 The concept of reliance is of course relevant to establish the causal link between 
the professional’s fault in providing inaccurate information and the loss suffered by the 
plaintiff who based his decision on such information. However, it is not that French courts 
always ask for concrete reliance on statements (e.g., financial), the mere disclosure of 
documents being sufficient to satisfy the ‘causation’ requirement.605 In quite a few third-
party claims concerning loss suffered from the provision of inaccurate information, 
‘causation’ was established even when the third parties did not even read the information 
provided by a professional. In  a landmark case, for example, the claim of the creditors of a 
company against an auditor, who inaccurately audited such company, was allowed by the 
court even if the creditors did not check the relevant auditor’s statement. The rational used 
by the court to hold the auditor liable towards the creditors was that the auditor’s negligent 
performance, which resulted in an inaccurate statement, allowed the company to stay in 
business, thus misleading creditors’ perception of the company’s credit standing.606 
Contrariwise, it must be noted that there have also been cases in which the court, in 
its decision, took into consideration whether or not the plaintiff relied on the defendant’s 
statement.607 Moreover, in other cases, courts have refused to allow compensation because 
the third-party plaintiff did not exercise reasonable care in relying on a statement or 
certification.608 
 
2.3 Seemingly no worries for indeterminate liability for 
negligent misstatements 
 
The issue of professional liability to an unlimited group of people for an 
undetermined amount of money which concerns so much courts and authors in England, 
                                                 
604 See Girot, C. (2000), pp. 197-198. See also the concept of information asymmetry dealt with in Chapter 2, 
Section 4. 
605 See Com., 21 January 1997, Bull. C.N.C.C.1997.406 (Annot. P. Merle). 
606 Tribunal de Grande Instance de Le Havre stated on 15 November 1979 BCC.1980.44, aff’d, Rouen, 27 
April 1982, Bull. C.N.C.C.47.288. See also Khoury, L. (2001), pp. 460-461. 
607 See Trib. gr. inst. Bordeaux, 31 December 1974, Bull. C.N.C.C. 1975.180, aff’d, Bordeaux, 9 February 
1976, Bull. C.N.C.C. 1976.169; Trib. gr. inst. Montauban, 21 March 1985, B.C.C. 1985.234; Trib. gr. inst. 
Rouen, 9 March 1998, Bull. C.N.C.C. 1998.401 (Annot. P. Merle); Paris, 14 November 1997, Bull. 
C.N.C.C. 1998.209 (Annot. P. Merle); Com., 21 January 1997, Bull. C.N.C.C. 1997.406 (Annot. P. Merle); 
Paris, 8 September 1999, Joly. 1999.1162 (Annot. J.F. Barbiéri). 
608 See Khoury, L. (2001), p. 461. 
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Germany, and also in the US seems not to be a major issue in the French legal system.609 
In general, considerations on the foreseeability of damage and the defendants’ knowledge 
of the plaintiff or class of plaintiffs to whom the information will be supplied do not seem 
to play a crucial role in courts’ decisions concerning professional third-party liability for 
negligent misstatements. Furthermore, no big concern for limiting compensation on the 
basis of fear of indeterminate liability for information providers is reported by the relevant 
doctrine.610 Moreover, as already mentioned, whereas limitation and exclusion liability 
clauses are in principle valid in contractual liability, they are void if their object is to limit 
or exclude tortuous liability.611 However, as it will be shown in Section 4, courts very 
often use ‘causation’ as a tool to close the floodgates of professional liability and, thus, to 
prevent indeterminate liability for professionals.612 
 
3. Brief analysis of the relevant rules: Articles 1382 
and 1383 Code civil 
 
Article 1382 
Any act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by 
whose fault it occurred, to compensate it.613 
 
Article 1383 
Everyone is liable for the damage he causes not only by his intentional act, but 
also by his negligent conduct or by his imprudence.614 
 
Articles 1382 and 1383 Code civil are the two pillars of French tort law.615 The 
combination of the two provisions sets forth the principle that the damage caused to a 
                                                 
609 See, e.g., Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 171-172; Van Gerven et al. (2000), pp. 236-236; Zweigert K. & Kötz, 
H. (1998), p. 617; Tancelin, M. (1993) Des obligations: L’acte illégitime et les modes d’exécution (Montreal: 
Wilson & Lafleur), pp. 108 and 126-127. See also floodgates arguments in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
610 See, e.g., Khoury, L. (2001), pp. 460-461; Pinna, A. (2003), pp. 55-56.  
611 See the leading case, Civ. II 17 February 1955, D. 1956, 17 with note P. Esmein; J.C.P. 1955.II.8951 with 
note R. Rodière. 
612 See also Subsection 3.1. 




person by an intentional or negligent conduct (i.e., action or omission) must be 
compensated. This is a very general clause. Unlike in German law, rights and interests 
protected by this clause are not limited, or even mentioned. In fact, all the rights or 
interests, provided that they are legitimate (intérêt légitime juridiquement protégé), fall 
within the scope of Articles 1382 and 1383 Code civil.616 For example, the right to life, 
physical and moral integrity, specific and general rights of personal privacy (droit à la vie 
privée), as well as property rights, are all fully protected against interference and damage of 
any kind, including pure economic loss. More precisely, as far as the right to personal 





The idea of protected rights or interests618 relates under French law to the notion of 
damage, which is the first requirement for a successful claim in tort.619 In order to be 
compensated under Articles 1382 and 1383 Code civil, the damage must exist, be certain, 
and be personal to the plaintiff.620 The nature of the damage (e.g., physical harm or 
property damage) is not relevant, unlike in the English and the German legal systems.621 
More precisely, pure economic loss has never been excluded from the outset or treated 
separately.622 It is compensated under the general principle of liability,623 as long as it 
exists, it is certain, and it is personal to the plaintiff. Recalling what was analysed in the 
previous chapters, the French legal system seems to be definitely more open to claims for 
pure economic loss than the English and the German systems. However, “[t]his does not 
                                                                                                                                                    
615 See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 46 et seq.; Terré, F. et al. (2002), p. 683; Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), p. 
615 et seq.; Van Gerven et al. (2000), p. 57 et seq.; Viney, G. (1995), pp. 16 et seq. 
616 See Van Gerven et al. (2000), p. 57. 
617 “Everyone has the right to respect for his private life. Without prejudice to compensation for injury 
suffered, the court may prescribe any measures, such as sequestration, seizure and others, appropriate to 
prevent or put an end to an invasion of personal privacy; in case of emergency those measures may be 
provided for by interim order.” Added to the Code civil by the Loi 70-643 tendant à renforcer la garantie 
des droits individuals des citoyens of 17 July 1970, JO, 19 July 1970, 6751, D 1970.lég.199. 
618 See, above, Section 3. 
619 See extensively Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 677 et seq.; Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 1197 et 
seq.; Viney, G. (1998), pp. 151 et seq. 
620 See Van Gerven et al. (2000), Chapter IV, Subsection 4.1.3 and Chapter VIII. 
621 See Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), p. 617. 
622 See Tancelin, M. (1993), pp. 126-127. 
623 See Id., p. 108. 
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mean that ‘anything goes’ in French law.”624 In fact, French law also has limits to 
compensation of pure economic loss. As already pointed out, the general rule is that only 
the breach of legitimate interests enjoy the protection stated by Articles 1382 and 1383 
Code civil and only insofar as the damage occurred is the direct and certain consequence of 
the negligent act. Furthermore, courts have significant room for discretion to reject or allow 
claims. Their decisions are usually centred on the question of whether enough causal link 
can be established between the act of the defendant and the loss suffered by the plaintiff.625 
Many claims are feasible in theory; nevertheless, a significant part of them are in fact 
rejected for absence of sufficient direct causation or for lack of certainty of the damage. As 
already mentioned, the ‘causation’ requirement is often used by courts to close the 
floodgates of professional liability in order to prevent indeterminate duties and obligations. 
Thus, whenever a claim is dismissed in court on the grounds of insufficient causation, the 
genuine reason might well be the policy considerations, i.e., the defendant should not be 




‘Fault’: a defendant’s wrongful act is the second necessary requirement to establish 
liability in tort. Although there is no official definition of ‘fault’ provided in the Code 
civil,626 the literature generally describes it as a behaviour (an action or an omission) which 
does not conform to relevant rules or standards.627 More precisely, French scholars 
conventionally distinguish between faute délictuelle and faute quasi-délictuelle. The first 
type of ‘fault’ is the result of an action or omission deliberately put in place by the 
wrongdoer in order to cause damage. The faute quasi-délictuelle consists in a behaviour 
                                                 
624 Van Boom et al. (2004) Pure Economic Loss (Vienna: SpringerWienNewYork) p. 9. 
625 See Trib. gr. inst. Nanterre, 22 Oct 1975, Gaz. Pal. 1976.1re sem. Jur. 392 (Annot. A. Plancqueel); Cass. 
Civ., 11 July 1963, Gaz. Pal. 1963. 2e sem. Jur. 389; Cass. Civ. 2e, 19 March 1980, J.C.P. 1980.IV.216, D. 
1980.IR.414 (Annot. Laroumet). 
626 See Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), p. 348; Terré, F. et al. (2002), p. 693; Viney, G. (1998), pp. 315-
316. 
627 See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 192-193; Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), pp. 619 et seq. See also extensively 
Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 693 et seq.; Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 348 et seq.; Viney, G. 
(1998), pp. 313 et seq. 
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which produces damage because the wrongdoer did not act with the care expected from a 
reasonable person in comparable circumstances.628  
 
 Causal link between fault and damage 
 
The third necessary element to establish tortious liability under French law is 
‘causation’. In a nutshell, a link must be found between the defendant’s faulty act or 
omission and the damage suffered by the plaintiff.629 Given its relevance, an in-depth 
analysis of the ‘causal link’ requirement will be separately carried out in Section 4. What is 
relevant to point out from the very outset is that according to French law, the damage 
suffered by the plaintiff must be a direct consequence (un suite immediate et directe) of the 
defendant’s conduct. No external factors should interfere with such cause-effect chain 
(causalité étrangère).630 
 
 Burden of proof 
 
Fault, harm, and causation must thus generally be proven in order to substantiate a 
claim in tort. Moreover, Articles 1382 and 1383 do not impose any a priori limitations as 
to the specific rights, interests, or group of persons that enjoy protection.631 Therefore, any 
plaintiff who is able to prove to have suffered damage, the faulty conduct of the defendant, 
and the causation link between them can claim compensation under Articles 1382 and 
1383.  
 
4. Focus on ‘causation’: the major obstacle to claims 
in tort 
 
                                                 
628 For more on the distinction between faute délictuelle and faute quasi-délictuelle see Mazeau, H. et al. 
(1965) Traité théorique et practique de la responsabilité civile délictuelle et contratuelle, numbers. 380 et 
seq. 
629 See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 278-279 and 283-284. See also extensively Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 815 et 
seq.; Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 441 et seq.; Viney, G. (1998), pp. 151 et seq. 
630 See Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), p. 621. 
631 In this respect French tort law is quite different from English and German law. See Van Gerven et al. 
(2000), p.58; see also for comparison Chapter 5, Section 4 and Chapter 6, Section 2. 
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Causation as the direct link between the defendant’s fault and the damage suffered 
by the plaintiff can be quite difficult to demonstrate in case of loss suffered relying on 
inaccurate information. In fact, in this specific instance there are usually a number of 
external factors that might as well have led to the damage.  
Several theories on causations have been developed in the French legal system, two 
of which are relevant to the present analysis: the theory of adequate causation (causalité 
adéquate)632 and the equivalence theory (équivalence des conditions)633.634 The first one 
tries to isolate the direct cause of the damage from the so-called mere circumstances. 
Indeed, under the adequate causation theory, only the event “which in the normal state of 
affairs (dans le cours habituel des choses) is of a nature to cause the damage”635 is relevant 
in order to establish the causation link in a tortious liability claim. Such theory has been 
widely accepted by the courts. However, it presents the shortcoming of taking into 
consideration only one cause even in cases in which several factors contributed to the 
damage. This issue is overcome by the equivalence theory, which considers all the factors 
that contributed to the damage. The equivalence theory often plays a significant role in 
third-party liability cases of auditors.636 The reason is that the fault of auditors is seldom 
the only cause of the loss. For instance, it is not unusual that the administrators of 
companies provide wrong information on which auditors base their accounts. Hence, it can 
be argued that the damage caused by the auditors’ inaccurate statements may originate not 
only by the auditors’ negligence but also by the administrators’ lack of care, if not fraud. 
Finally, above any theory stands the judges’ discretionary decisional power. Judges’ 
subjective appreciation of the facts at hand may often prevail on the strict application of 
legal theories. On the one hand, this enables the decision process to adapt to different 
circumstances and needs, thus providing it a certain degree of flexibility; on the other hand, 
such discretionary power of the judiciary creates some ambiguity as to the necessary 
causation requirements to be met for a successful claim in tort.  
 
                                                 
632 See, e.g., Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 447-448; Viney, G. (1998), p. 161. 
633 See Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 446-447; Viney, G. (1998), p. 160. 
634 For analysis and criticism of these theories, see Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 816 et seq.; Flour, J. & Aubert 
J.L. (1997), §§ 155-62; Malaurie, P. & Aynès, L. (1992) Cours de droit civil. Les obligations (Paris: Cujas), 
p. 50; Starck, B. et al. (1996) Obligations. 1) La responsabilité délictuelle (Paris: Litec), pp. 444-449;  
635 See Khoury, L. (2001), p. 451. 
636 See id. p. 452. 
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4.1 Looking for a causation test 
 
From the study carried out so far, it clearly comes out that the existence of the 
causal link between defendant fault and plaintiff damage shall be dealt with case by case. 
Nevertheless, before carrying out an analysis of relevant cases in order to explain the 
courts’ rationale in determining causation, a very basic causation test will be presented. In 
fact, given the defendant’s fault, the court will usually proceed with the question of 
whether the loss could have been avoided if the information provider (e.g., an auditor) had 
acted with the diligence expected of a professional in his position. In case of a negative 
answer, i.e., that the loss would have occurred anyway, no causal link will be established 
and the plaintiff claim barred. This is the so-called conditio sine qua non test.637 However, 
if the answer to the said question is positive, i.e., that the loss would possibly not have 
occurred, the court will proceed in the causation assessment with a further question: “Did 
the inaccurate information provided by the defendant really influence the plaintiff’s 
decision/action that led to the damage in the specific case?” Causation will generally be 
found only if the answer to such question is positive. 
 
4.2 Limiting professional liability through causation 
 
The French relevant case law shows that claims against auditors for damage 
suffered by relying on their statements were quite often rejected when evidence was found 
that – despite the inaccurate information provided by auditors – the plaintiffs knew, or 
should have known, about the actual financial situation of the audited companies. 
Moreover, claims were also not allowed in cases where, even if the auditors’ statements 
presented some mistakes, such mistakes did not impede an understanding of the actual 
financial situation of the companies.638 In this respect, the plaintiff’s knowledge of the 
matter at stake is found to be a crucial element in the court’s decision. The plaintiff’s 
expertise will be considered by the court in establishing the standard of care against which 
his conduct should be evaluated. In fact, the court would evaluate not only if the defendant 
acted with reasonable care to provide his service but also if the plaintiff exercised 
reasonable care in relying on the statement. The court can actually reject the plaintiff’s 
                                                 
637 See, e.g., Viney, G. (1998), p. 169. 
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action for damage if his fault can be established or the court may not allow full 
compensation.639 For example, compensation was refused to experts in risk investment who 
proposed an action for damage against the auditors who failed to capture in their statements 
the weak financial situation of a company. The court maintained that, given the plaintiffs’ 
expertise on the matter, they should have verified further before making the investment in 
the company that not much later went bankrupt.640 Similarly, in another case, a plaintiff-
investor sued the accountant and the auditor that certified the accounts of the company 
which he decided to rescue by making a significant financial investment. A few months 
after the investment, the plaintiff discovered significant irregularities in the company’s 
accounts. The court maintained that both the defendants and the plaintiff acted negligently. 
The defendants did not take enough care in analysing the company’s accounts to be 
certified. The plaintiff acted recklessly because he did not verify the accounts. Furthermore, 
the plaintiff based his decision on accounts that were prepared six months before the time 
he made the investment. Eventually, the court decided that only half of the damages 
suffered by the plaintiff should be compensated by the plaintiffs.641 Courts often see the 
auditors’ negligent conduct as only one of the causes of a plaintiff’s damage. Indeed, it is 
not rare that courts maintained that the plaintiffs’ damage originated mainly, or even solely, 
from the company administrators’ negligent (or even fraudulent conduct), or simply from 
the fact that the company went bankrupt.642 This approach does not limit or exclude the 
auditors’ liability from the outset. However, it requires the plaintiff to clearly prove the 
causal link between auditors’ conduct and the loss. 
 
4.3 Presumption of causation 
 
A decision of the Court de cassation seems particularly relevant to show a possible 
approach to causation which is rather different from the one taken by the courts in the cases 
presented above.643 As to the facts, an accountant negligently certified a company’s 
                                                                                                                                                    
638 See e.g. Com., 15 June 1993, Bull. C.N.C.C.1994.93; Com., 12 November 1992, Bull. C.N.C.C. 
1993.89.110 (Annot. M. Jeantin, E. du Pontavice); Morin, J.M. (1996), p. 19. 
639 See Trib. gr. inst. Nanterrre, 12 May 1999, Bull. C.N.C.C. 1999.489 (the plaintiff was both an auditor and 
accountant). Contra Trib. gr. inst. Paris, 22 January 1997, Joly 1997.432 (Annot. J.F. Barbiéri). 
640 Trib. gr. inst. Paris, 6 April 1990, unreported. 
641 Court of Appeal of Paris, 1 February 1984. 
642 See Guyon, Y. (1994), p. 400. 
643 Cass. Comm.., 17 October 1984, JCP 1985.II.20458, annotated by Viandier. Translation by N. Sims. 
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account which turned out to be inaccurate. The company’s shareholders made a capital 
increase relying on the certified account and eventually suffered a loss. Consequently they 
brought an action against the accountant under Article 1382 Code civil. The Court de 
cassation quashed the decision of the Court of Appeal that had previously dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ action in tort. The Court of Appeal based its decision on the fact that the 
plaintiffs failed to prove the defendant’s fault and the causal link between the alleged fault 
and the loss they suffered. More precisely, according to the court, no evidence was given 
that the accountant had the chance to verify all the relevant transactions. According to the 
Court de cassation, the rationale used by the Court of Appeal in the analysis of the case 
was contradictory. As pointed out by Alain Viandier in his note to the case, the Court of 
Appeal “denied the existence of fault and causation in spite of having acknowledged earlier 
that the financial statements were ‘factually inaccurate’.”644 In fact, the Court de cassation 
considered that auditors were under an obligation of means. Therefore, it might well have 
been possible for the auditors to certify inaccurate accounts without being at fault under 
Article 1382 Code civil (e.g., acting with professional reasonable care, but nevertheless not 
spotting the mistakes in the accounts). However, in the present case, once the plaintiffs 
proved the factual inaccuracy of the accounts, the defendant was not able to provide 
evidence that he acted with reasonable care for a professional in a comparable situation. 
This was enough for the Court de cassation to overrule the Court of Appeal’s decision. It 
can be argued from a close look at the decision that once the defendant’s fault was 
established (because he did not prove the opposite), the Court de cassation operated a sort 
of ‘presumption of causation’ in order to make the auditor liable. 
 
5. Additional case law potentially applicable to TMOs 
 
In addition to the case law already quoted in the previous sections, a selection of 
other relevant cases dealing with liability for negligent misstatement of professionals that 
are comparable to TMOs will be presented hereunder in order to further specify the content 
of information service provider obligations under French law. 
                                                 
644 Id. 
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The following cases concern the contractual relationship between information 
providers and their clients. Nevertheless, they are very meaningful in determining 
information provider third-party liability. Interestingly, the Court de cassation recently 
held, in a couple of leading cases, that third parties can claim damages in tort if the 
incorrect performance of a contractual obligation of the defendant towards his contractual 
counterpart is the cause of the damage they suffered (le tiers à un contrat peut invoquer, 
sur le fondement de la responsabilité délictuelle, un manquement contractuel dès lors qu’il 
lui a cause un dommage), adding that this is the only thing they have to prove.645 
Furthermore, it has to be borne in mind that contractual limitation or exclusion of liability 
clauses do not have effects towards third parties.646 
 
 Duty to exercise reasonable care in the collection, processing, 
and provision of information 
 
Some decisions concerning the liability of commercial information offices that 
provide specialised information to their clients for a fee are particularly relevant in order to 
clarify the scope of information provider duties in providing their services. A commercial 
information office, for example, was found in breach of the duty of care, and thus liable, 
towards one of its customers for providing him inaccurate financial information on a third 
party. In fact, the customer asked the office whether it would be reasonable to allow an 
overdraft to a specific subject. The commercial information office gave a positive answer 
to its customer who acted accordingly and eventually suffered damage. The customer sued 
the commercial information office for damage caused by the negligent provision of 
inaccurate information. The court allowed the plaintiff’s action, stressing that the office 
acted carelessly because, according to the available information, it should have expressed 
some major doubts on the reasonableness of granting the overdraft.647 In another case, a 
commercial information office was found in breach of its duty of care towards a customer 
because the office provided him only the favourable information on the credit rating of a 
                                                 
645 Principle established in France by Civ. I, 13 February 2001, Bull. Civ. I, no. 35; J.C.P. 2001.I.338 with 
obs. Viney, G. (2001) Droit & Patrimoine, no. 2844 with obs. Chauvel, P.: “les tiers a un contract sont 
fondés a invoquer tout manquement du débiteur contractual lorsque ce manquement leur a cause un 
dommage, sans avoir a rapporter d’autre prevue.” This principle was confirmed in Cass. Ass. plén., 6 
October 2006, no. 05-13.255, P+B+R+I, Loubeyre et a. c/ SARL Myr’Ho et a. : Juris-Data no. 2006-
035298; See also Billiau, M. (2006), II 10181; Viney, G. (2006), p. 2825. 
646 See Section 2. See also Lemaignan, A. & Nechelis, D. (2005), § 48. 
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specific company. For this omission, the commercial information office was held liable of 
the loss occurred to his customer who relied on this partial information.648 It is relevant for 
the present analysis to point out that, as far as commercial information offices are 
concerned, it is well established in the French case law that they are under an obligation to 
provide clients with relevant information on which clients may draw their conclusions. In 
other words, they are under an obligation of means. Furthermore, the service offered by 
such offices has to be up to their professional standard of care, regardless of the price to 
which the service is offered. Nevertheless, the price paid by the clients for the information 
would be relevant in the determination of the amount of damages to be compensated by the 
commercial information office in case it is held liable for the loss one of its clients suffered 
relying on inaccurate information negligently provided by the office.649 
Moreover, as to the standard of care an information provider has to observe in 
offering its services, the following case is particularly relevant. A bank was found in breach 
of its obligation of means towards a client because it provided him wrong information. The 
key issue in this case was not that the information was wrong. But the court maintained 
that, first, the bank was aware of the critical relevance for the client of the financial 
information it was asked for. Second, the bank was held liable for gross negligence because 
it did not bother to verify the accuracy of the background information that the client passed 
on to the bank, which actually served as a basis of the relevant financial analysis. Such 
information turned out to be both wrong and outdated and so the financial analysis supplied 
by the bank to the client was inaccurate, causing the latter an economic loss.650 However, 
even if in the case just described the court took into great consideration the fact that the 
defendant knew about the relevance of the information to be provided, an auditor in a 
similar case was held liable under Article 1382 Code civil without even having been aware 
of the fact that his statement would be used by his clients (i.e., company shareholders and 
also third-party possible investors) as a basis to make decisions. In fact, the auditor failed to 
mention in his statement the significant passive of the company’s accounts.651 
                                                                                                                                                    
647 CA Lyon, 27 October 1971, D. 1972, Jur., p. 327, note Tendler. 
648 Cass. Com. 1 March 1982, Gaz. Pal. 1982, Som., p. 159; See also Cass. Com. 30 January 1974, D. 1974, 
p. 478, note Tendler; T. com. Nanterre, 7e ch., 10 September 2002: Juris-Data no. 2002-190271; CA Paris, 
5e ch. C, 28 March 1991: Juris-Data no. 1991-021436. 
649 T.co. Seine, 19 January 1953, Cimex v. Beuzon, Gaz. Pal. 1953, 1, p. 239. See also Girot. C. (2000), p. 
198. 
650 Cass. Com 24 November 1983, R.T.D. Civ. 1984, p. 518, obs. JH, D. 1984, I.r. 307, note Vasseur. 




 Client competence may influence the content of the 
information provider’s obligation; the nature of the information 
may not 
 
From the analysis carried out so far, it seems quite unchallenged that information 
service providers are under an obligation of means. In specific circumstances, however, 
courts may increase information providers’ standards of care to a level bringing their 
obligation close to one of result. This generally happens when information service 
providers are called to offer their services to persons who do not have much knowledge of 
the matter on which they asked the information. The reason for such approach by the courts 
has to be found in the fact that persons who do not possess enough expertise will most 
likely fully rely on the information provided by the professional.652 The opposite situation 
is well represented by the decision of the Court de cassation in which it was maintained 
that a bank, in principle, is not even under an obligation to support clients with stock 
exchange advice, provided that such clients are well informed on the matter. The rule of 
thumb could be that the information provider’s standard of care is inversely related to the 
expertise of the information recipient. Moreover, it is interesting to note that some 
doctrines maintained that the information providers shall offer a service which has to be up 
to the expectations that the providers have created in their clients by offering or describing 
their services. This means, for example, that if information providers guarantee, either 
directly or indirectly,653 to supply reliable information, they may be held liable for breach 
of contractual duties in case the information is inaccurate. In other words, information 
providers may be under an obligation to achieve the results they promised to their 
clients.654  
As far as the nature of the information is concerned, it is relevant to mention a quite 
recent case decided by the Court de cassation. An auditor was sued by shareholders who 
decided to increase the capital of the company on the basis of a wrongful estimate of future 
business performance issued by the auditor. The Court of Appeal maintained that there is 
                                                 
652 See Bertrand, A.R. (1992) La responsabilité du fait des bases de données en France, in Sieber, U. (ed.) 
Liability for On-line Data Bank Services in the European Community, Vol. 3 of the European Series on 
Information Law (Cologne, Berlin, Munich: Carl Heyman Verlag KG), p. 51. 
653 Advertising the information service provider as a trustworthy source of information may be enough. 
654 See extensively on this, e.g., Girot, C. (2000), pp. 197 et seq. In the specific instance, the author refers to 
providers of electronic information. 
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no liability attached to the wrongful provisions of information on companies’ future 
business performances due to the uncertain nature of this type of information. The court 
based its decision on the idea that the chances of issuing a wrong estimate are very high, 
hence the auditor’s related liability risk became unbearable. However, the Court de 
cassation quashed the decision of the Court of Appeal, stating that, in making its decision, 
the lower court missed the central issue of the case. In fact, the Court of Appeal focused on 
the type of information provided by the defendant, whereas the crucial question was 
whether the content of the auditor’s estimate influenced the shareholders’ decision.655 From 
this case, it could be indirectly inferred that the type of information provided by the 
professional may not have a very relevant impact on his obligations and related liability. 
 
  Occasional qualification of information provider obligation as  
one of result 
 
A couple of decisions seem quite significant to underlying that, as all the rules 
occasionally have some exceptions, so does the fact that information provider are generally 
under an obligation of means. The first case concerns the National Institute of Intellectual 
Property (INPI), which published wrong information about a politician on its server. Such 
information originated a scandal that obviously damaged the politician who sued the INPI. 
The court held the INPI liable under Article 1382 Code civil. The fault was not specifically 
qualified by the court; however, it seemed to consist in the simple provision of wrong 
information.656 Similarly, in the second case, a digital server published inaccurate 
information on the financial situation of a company (i.e., that it was going bankrupt). The 
company brought a claim against the server, asking for the damages suffered because of the 
publication of such information. Once again, the court held the information provider liable 
for the provision of inaccurate information under Article 1382 Code civil, without even 
getting into an analysis of its obligations.657 Accordingly, it could be argued that, 
occasionally, the mere provision of inaccurate information is seen as a fault in tort law and 
thus it leads straight to the related liability.658 Such conclusion is also supported by some 
literature. Part of the doctrine holds that professionals that make available to the general 
                                                 
655 Cass. 2e civ., 11 December 2003: Juris-Data no. 2003-021584. 
656 TGI Bar-le-Duc, 16 January 1997, D.I.T. 1998, No. 4, p. 70 note Gavanon. 
657 T. corr. Romans, 14 February 1996, D.I.T. 1998, No. 4, p. 74, note Gavanon. 
658 See Girot, C. (2000), p. 201. 
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public information which is verifiable should guarantee its correctness. In other words, 
such professionals will thus be exposed to an obligation of result towards relying parties.659 
 
 Some remarks on the analysed cases 
 
 The analysis of this additional case law has shown that an information provider is 
generally under an obligation to collect and process information by adequate means. 
Furthermore, he has to provide complete (as opposed to partial) information no matter how 
much he charges and whether he ignores that the information will be used as basis for 
crucial decisions. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the very purpose of the information 
provider’s activity is to provide its clients with reasonably accurate indications on which 
they can draw certain conclusions. Moreover, it has been shown that the expectations of the 
recipients as to the objective quality of the information are likely to be protected under 
French law insofar they are dependent on such information (e.g., because they have no 
expertise on the matter), regardless of the nature of the information to be provided. Finally, 
the mere communication of wrong information has been occasionally considered as a fault 
in itself under tort law. 
 
6. Parallel TMOs-CSPs: applicability by analogy of 
CSPs’ third party liability rules to TMOs 
 
Courts could also compare TMOs to CSPs and thus apply by analogy the relative 
liability rules.660 The third-party liability of CSPs has been set out in Article 6661 of the 
                                                 
659 See, e.g., Pinna, A (2003), p. 66. 
660 See Chapter 1, Subsection 3.1.  
661 Article 6. Liability. 1. As a minimum, Member States shall ensure that by issuing a certificate as a 
qualified certificate to the public or by guaranteeing such a certificate to the public a certification service 
provider is liable for damage caused to any entity or legal or natural person who reasonably relies on that 
certificate: (a) as regards the accuracy at the time of issuance of all information contained in the qualified 
certificate and as regards the fact that the certificate contains all the details prescribed for a qualified 
certificate; (b) for assurance that at the time of the issuance of the certificate, the signatory identified in the 
qualified certificate held the signature-creation data corresponding to the signature-verification data given or 
identified in the certificate; (c) for assurance that the signature-creation data and the signature verification 
data can be used in a complementary manner in cases where the certification service provider generates 
them both; unless the certification service provider proves that he has not acted negligently. 2. As a 
minimum Member States shall ensure that a certification service provider who has issued a certificate as a 
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Electronic Signatures Directive.662 France implemented the Directive by Decree 30 March 
2001 No. 272. However, in Sections 6 to 9 of the Decree which implemented the 
provisions on CSPs set forth in the Directive, the extent of the liability of the CSP was not 
clearly stated. In fact, the liability of CSPs was codified only later in Article 33 of the Law 
of 21 June 2004 for Confidence in the Digital Economy.663 
 
Article 33 
Sauf à démontrer qu’ils n’ont commis aucune faute intentionnelle ou négligence, 
les prestataires de services de certification électronique sont responsables du 
préjudice causé aux personnes qui se sont fiées raisonnablement aux certificats 
présentés par eux comme qualifiés dans chacun des cas suivants: 
1. Les informations contenues dans le certificat, à la date de sa délivrance, étaient 
inexactes; 
2. Les données prescrites pour que le certificat puisse être regardé comme qualifié 
étaient incomplètes; 
3. La délivrance du certificat n’a pas donné lieu à la vérification que le signataire 
détient la convention privée correspondant à la convention publique de ce 
certificat; 
4. Les prestataires n’ont pas, le cas échéant, fait procéder à l’enregistrement de la 
révocation du certificat et tenu cette information à la disposition des tiers. 
Les prestataires ne sont pas responsables du préjudice causé par un usage du 
certificat dépassant les limites fixées à son utilisation ou à la valeur des 
                                                                                                                                                    
qualified certificate to the public is liable for damage caused to any entity or legal or natural person who 
reasonably relies on the certificate for failure to register revocation of the certificate unless the certification 
service provider proves that he has not acted negligently. 3. Member States shall ensure that a certification 
service provider may indicate in a qualified certificate limitations on the use of that certificate, provided that 
the limitations are recognisable to third parties. The certification service provider shall not be liable for 
damage arising from use of a qualified certificate which exceeds the limitations placed on it. 4. Member 
States shall ensure that a certification service provider may indicate in the qualified certificate a limit on the 
value of transactions for which the certificate can be used, provided that the limit is recognisable to third 
parties. The certification service provider shall not be liable for damage resulting from this maximum limit 
being exceeded. 5. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 4 shall be without prejudice to Council Directive 
93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.  
662 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community 
Framework for Electronic Signatures (99/93/EC) (OJ L 13, 19 January 2000, p. 12). For an in-depth analysis 
of CSP liability as set forth in Article 6 of the Electronic Signatures Directive, see Balboni, P. (2004), pp. 
211-242. 
663 LOI n° 2004-575 du 21 juin 2004 pour la confiance dans l'économie numérique . J.O n° 143 du 22 juin 
2004 page 11168 texte n° 2. 
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transactions pour lesquelles il peut être utilisé, à condition que ces limites figurent 
dans le certificat et soient accessibles aux utilisateurs. 
Ils doivent justifier d’une garantie financière suffisante, spécialement affectée au 
paiement des sommes qu’ils pourraient devoir aux personnes s’étant fiées 
raisonnablement aux certificats qualifiés qu'ils délivrent, ou d’une assurance 
garantissant les conséquences pécuniaires de leur responsabilité civile 
professionnelle. 
 
In a nutshell, this Article creates a presumption of CSP liability for the loss suffered by 
third parties who reasonably rely on inaccurate information provided in the electronic 
certificates (“les prestataires de services de certification électronique sont responsables du 
préjudice causé aux personnes qui se sont fiées raisonnablement aux certificats présentés 
par eux comme qualifiés dans chacun des cas suivants : 1. (…),2.,3.,4.”). However, CSPs 
can avoid this liability if they prove that they performed the certification service with 
reasonable care and that they did not voluntarily provide inaccurate information (“Sauf à 
démontrer qu'ils n'ont commis aucune faute intentionnelle ou négligence”). Moreover, 
CSPs can limit the scope of the certificate, e.g., by stating that the certificate can be used 
only for certain types of transactions. Accordingly, if third parties use the certificate in 
transactions that exceed the scope of the certificate, the presumption of CSP liability is not 
applicable (“Les prestataires ne sont pas responsables du préjudice causé par un usage du 
certificat dépassant les limites fixées à son utilisation ou à la valeur des transactions pour 
lesquelles il peut être utilisé, à condition que ces limites figurent dans le certificat et soient 
accessibles aux utilisateurs”). In conclusion, Article 33 requires CSPs to have either a 
dedicated financial fund for the compensation of the damage suffered by persons who 
reasonable rely on the certificates or to make an insurance for the same purposes (“Ils 
doivent justifier d'une garantie financière suffisante, spécialement affectée au paiement des 
sommes qu'ils pourraient devoir aux personnes s'étant fiées raisonnablement aux 
certificats qualifiés qu'ils délivrent, ou d'une assurance garantissant les conséquences 
pécuniaires de leur responsabilité civile professionnelle”). It is noticeable that the 
imposition of a compulsory third-party insurance for CSPs is a major difference between 
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the implementation of the Directive in France. Indeed, in England and Germany, CSPs are 
not under such obligation.664 
 
7. Possible third-party liability for TMOs 
 
On the basis of the analysis carried out, the tortious liability of TMOs towards e-
consumers falls under the rules set forth in Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Code civil.665 E-
consumers will thus benefit from the general right of action which comes into play 
whenever TMOs have committed a fault, e-consumers have suffered loss, and there is 
sufficient causal connection between these two events. Compensation both for pure 
economic loss and for damage related to the violation of privacy rights may be possible. In 
principle, there are no specific obstacles for the recovery of economic loss.666 Once e-
consumers manage to prove the TMO’s fault, the damage occurred to them, and the causal 
link between the two, the loss will be compensated. As far as damage related to the 
violation of privacy rights is concerned, the mere infringement of the right to privacy, 
protected by Article 9 Code civil, suffices to satisfy the conditions of ‘fault’ and ‘damage’ 
for the purposes of liability under Article 1382 Code civil. ‘Causation’ is the only element 
that remains to be proved.667 
 
7.1 Nature and object of TMO obligations 
 
As a general rule, TMOs may be under an obligation of means: they have to make 
the best efforts to provide accurate information on e-merchant security, privacy or business 
practices. Consequently, evidence of negligence is required to hold TMOs liable for the 
negligent provision of wrongful or deficient information. However, depending on the 
extent of responsibility which the courts wish to impose on these professionals and on the 
degree of protection which they will award to the recipients of the information, the 
                                                 
664 See for comparison Chapter 5, Section 8 and Chapter 6, Section 6. 
665 See Sections 2 and 3. 
666 See, e.g., Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 171-172; Van Gerven et al. (2000), pp. 236-236; Zweigert K. & Kötz, 
H. (1998), p. 617; Tancelin, M. (1993), pp. 108 and 126-127. See also Subsection 2.3. 
667 See Section 3. 
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classification of TMO obligations can actually vary from an obligation of means to an 
obligation of result.668 
Applying by analogy the outcome of the analysis carried out in Section 5 on 
information providers to TMOs, the latter have to provide their services with reasonable 
care. More precisely, TMOs are under the obligation to collect and process information by 
adequate means.669 Furthermore, they have to provide complete (as opposed to partial) 
information670 regardless of the nature of the information,671 of the fees they charge,672 and 
no matter whether they ignore that the information will be used by e-consumers as basis for 
crucial decisions.673 The ratio behind imposing such obligations consist of the fact that the 
very purpose of the commercial activity of TMOs is to provide e-consumers with relevant 
information from which e-consumers may draw certain conclusions.674 
As far as the quality of the information provided by TMOs is concerned, as a 
general rule, under French law, the provider must meet the user’s expectations that he has 
raised in the formulation of his commercial offer, the description of his service, etc.675 In 
cases of TMOs’ liability, this general rule unveils a paradox often present in the business 
practices of TMOs. In fact, as already stressed in Chapter 3, on the one hand, TMOs 
describe their services (which mainly consist of providing information on e-merchants’ 
practices) as very trustworthy; on the other hand, they tend to contractually disclaim any 
third-party liability related to the provision of wrongful information.676 In French law, 
however, exclusion of liability clauses does not have effects towards third parties.677 It may 
be assumed that the expectations raised by TMOs in e-consumers are very high as to the 
quality of the information provided on e-merchants’ practices. Furthermore, e-consumers’ 
expectations on the objective quality of the information are likely to be protected under 
                                                 
668 See Subsection 2.1. 
669 See CA Lyon, 27 October 1971, D. 1972, Jur., p. 327, note Tendler; Cass. Com 24 november 1983, R.T.D. 
Civ. 1984, p. 518, obs. JH, D. 1984, I.r. 307, note Vasseur. 
669 TGI Grasse, 9 January 1990: Juris-Data no. 1990-042186. See also Lemaignan, A. & Nechelis, D. (2005), 
§ 41. 
670 See Cass. Com. 1 March 1982, Gaz. Pal. 1982, Som., p. 159; See also Cass. Com. 30 January 1974, D. 
1974, p. 478, note Tendler; T. com. Nanterre, 7e ch., 10 September 2002: Juris-Data no. 2002-190271; CA 
Paris, 5e ch. C, 28 March 1991: Juris-Data no. 1991-021436. 
671 See Cass. 2e civ., 11 December 2003: Juris-Data no. 2003-021584. 
672 See T.co. Seine, 19 January 1953, Cimex v. Beuzon, Gaz. Pal. 1953, 1, p. 239. 
673 See TGI Grasse, 9 January 1990: Juris-Data no. 1990-042186. See also Lemaignan, A. & Nechelis, D. 
(2005), § 41. 
674 See T.co. Seine, 19 January 1953, Cimex v. Beuzon, Gaz. Pal. 1953, 1, p. 239. 
675 See Subsection 5.2. 
676 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.5. 
677 See Lemaignan, A. & Nechelis, D. (2005), § 48. 
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French law because e-consumers may be seen as very dependent on this information. The 
dependency of e-consumers is due to their ignorance on matters such as security, privacy, 
or business practices. Ideally, through trustmarks, e-consumers can receive a sort of 
guarantee from an independent third party (i.e., a TMO) on the quality of e-merchant 
security, privacy or business practices.678 Therefore, e-consumers can be expected to rely 
totally on the information provided by TMOs. As it was pointed out earlier, the 
appreciation of the chances that the recipient of the information will actually rely on this 
information to take further actions can push the obligation of the professional towards one 
of result.679 The principle seems to be that the more inexperienced the recipient of the 
information, the more likely it is that his reliance on the information will be taken for 
granted and thus the related obligations will be strict.680 Applying the principle to the 
typical TMO third-party liability case,681 e-consumers are usually very much inexperienced 
as far as e-merchant security, privacy or business practices are concerned. Therefore, 
TMOs may be more easily held liable.682 However, the necessity of the recipient’s reliance 
on the information for the good outcome of an action in damage for negligent 
misstatements against the information provider is debated in case law. Moreover, part of 
the doctrine holds that professionals that make available to the general public information 
which is verifiable should guarantee the correctness of such information. In other words, it 
seems that the obligation they have towards third parties is one of result.683 Accordingly, by 
issuing trustmarks, TMOs make available to all e-consumers information which is 
verifiable (i.e., e-merchant security, privacy or business practices). Hence, TMO third-party 
liability may depend on the fulfilment of the obligation to provide accurate trustmarks to e-
consumers.  
 
7.2 Causation issues in TMO liability 
 
As already pointed out in Section 4, the causal link between ‘fault’ and ‘damage’ is 
the most difficult requirement to meet in a claim for damage under Articles 1382 and 1383 
                                                 
678 See Subection 5.2. 
679 See Subsection 2.2. 
680 See Girot, C. (2000), pp. 197-198. 
681 For the definition of the typical TMO third-party liability case, see Charter 1, Section 2. 
682 See Bertrand, A.R. (1992), p. 51. See also, Cass. com. 18 April 1997, D. Aff. 1997, p. 369. 
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Code civil. The two main causation theories have been reported: the theory of adequate 
causation684 and the equivalence theory685.686 Courts enjoy a great deal of discretion on 
which theory to follow and how to apply it to a given case. If courts apply the adequate 
causation theory, it may be very difficult for the e-consumer to prove the causal link 
between the TMO’s fault (i.e., the provision of negligent information on e-merchant 
security, privacy or business practices) and the damage suffered. In these cases, in fact, the 
e-consumer’s damage usually flows from many factors (e.g., the TMO’s negligence in 
performing its services, the e-merchant’s lack of care or fraud, the e-consumer’s own fault, 
cunning third-party actions to capture and exploit e-consumer’s data). However, the 
adequate causation theory seeks to eliminate the mere circumstances of the damage to 
isolate only its immediate cause: the event which in normal state of affairs is of a nature to 
cause the damage. Hence, the TMO’s fault may eventually be considered only a ‘mere 
circumstance’ as opposed to an ‘immediate cause’.687  
There will definitely be more chances for e-consumers to succeed in meeting the 
‘causation’ requirement if the court adheres to the equivalence theory. Following this 
theory, all the facts contributing to the damage are to be retained as causal. Accordingly, 
the TMO’s fault should be taken into consideration as well as, for instance, the e-
merchant’s lack of care or fraud, the e-consumer’s own fault, and cunning third-party 
action to capture and exploit the e-consumer’s data. The equivalence theory is very much in 
use in the area of auditor liability.688 Therefore, courts may apply it by analogy to the 
typical TMO third-party liability case. 
However, even if the court applies the equivalence theory, the ‘causation’ 
requirement is, nevertheless, very difficult to meet. In fact, as for auditors, the TMOs’ fault 
is usually one of omission rather than of positive action. Therefore, to prove the causal link 
between TMOs’ faulty omission and the damage suffered may be quite challenging for 
                                                                                                                                                    
683 See, e.g., Pinna, A (2003), p. 66. 
684 See, e.g., Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 447-448; Viney, G. (1998), p. 161. 
685 See Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 446-447; Viney, G. (1998), p. 160. 
686 See Section 4; Moreover, for further analysis and criticism of these theories, see Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 
816 et seq.; Flour, J. & Aubert J.L. (1997), §§ 155-62; Malaurie, P. & Aynès, L. (1992), p. 50; Starck, B. et 
al. (1996), pp. 444-449;  
687 See generally Guyon, Y. (1994), p. 400. The courts have sometimes linked the plaintiff’s damage solely to 
the fault of the administrators or to the collapse of the company, which was said not to be primarily caused 
by the auditor. This fact, however, present in every case, does not usually in itself prevent the courts from 
finding a causal link. Yet, such a fact demonstrates the prima facie indirectness of the actions of the auditor 
as a cause of the failure of the business and the necessity of applying strictly the requirement of causation. 
688 See, e.g., Trib. gr. inst. Paris, 22 January 1997, Joly 1997.432 (Annot. J.F. Barbiéri). 
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aggrieved e-consumers. Moreover, in most cases, TMOs do not themselves assess e-
merchant security, privacy or business practice. Instead, internal audit prevails over 
external audit as the evaluation practice.689 In other words, e-merchants that apply for 
trustmarks are most of the time requested to self-assess their policies or practices against 
the standards of TMOs. Once again, the fault of TMOs can thus be very difficult to prove 
for the average e-consumer who usually ignores how the services of TMOs work and does 
not have any knowledge of security, privacy or business practices’ standards. Given this e-
consumers’ information gap (also defined as information asymmetry)690 it will then be 
almost impossible for e-consumers to prove the causal link between TMOs’ fault and the 
damage they suffered. 
Exceptionally, courts have considered it sufficient in order to meet the ‘causation’ 
requirement that the plaintiff had shown that the information provided by the defendant 
was factually inaccurate. In other words, this means that the courts, in those cases, created a 
presumption of the professionals’ liability for the loss suffered by persons who act upon the 
inaccurate information provided by such professionals.691 If such presumption is an 
exception in cases of auditor and information providers liability, conversely, it is a codified 
rule in CSP liability.692 In fact, Article 33 of the Law of 21 June 2004 for Confidence in 
Digital Economy creates a presumption of CSP liability for the loss suffered by third 
parties who reasonable rely on inaccurate information provided in electronic certificates in 
undertaking transactions within the scope of the certificates. However, CSPs can escape the 
liability by proving that they provided their services with reasonable care. Hence, courts 
may discretionally apply by analogy this presumption to TMO liability cases. It is a matter 
of fact that if they apply it, e-consumers will have by far greater chances to succeed in their 
actions for damages against TMOs. 
It has to be borne in mind, however, that in cases of professional liability for the 
provision of wrongful information, courts traditionally tend to deny recovery in favour of 
                                                 
689 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.2. 
690 See Charter 2, Section 4. 
691 See, e.g., Com., 18 October 1994, Joly. 1994.1302 (Annot. J.F. Barbiéri). 
691 See TGI Bar-le-Duc, 16 January 1997, D.I.T. 1998, No. 4, p. 70 note Gavanon; T. corr. Romans, 14 
February 1996, D.I.T. 1998, No. 4, p. 74, note Gavanon; Trib. gr. inst. Paris, 22 January 1997, Joly 
1997.432 (Annot. J.F. Barbiéri). 
692 See Section 6. 
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third parties on ground of causation even when the professionals were at fault – in order to 




The central question addressed in this chapter consists of whether TMOs’ third-
party liability for the provision of accurate trustmarks exists in France; or, in other words, 
whether an e-consumer who detrimentally relies on a trustmark issued by a TMO and 
suffers loss, may ask the TMO for damage and on which ground. It could be argued that, 
theoretically, TMOs can be held liable in tort under Articles 1382 and 1383 Code civil to 
third-party e-consumers who suffer damage related to the violation of their privacy rights 
or pure economic loss by relying on inaccurate trustmarks.694 As a general rule, TMOs may 
be under an obligation of means.695 On the one side, thus, TMOs have to make the best 
effort to provide accurate trustmarks on e-merchant security, privacy or business practices. 
On the other side, e-consumers have to prove TMOs’ negligence to hold them liable for the 
provision of inaccurate trustmarks. In practice, presenting the proof of the causal link 
between TMOs’ fault and e-consumers’ damage represents a major obstacle to the good 
outcome of e-consumers’ actions in tort for damages. E-consumers will have almost no 
chance of success if the court applies the ‘adequate causation’ theory. On the other hand, 
they may have few chances under the ‘equivalence’ theory.696 However, courts enjoy a 
great deal of discretion and may remove the ‘causation’ obstacle, thus enhancing e-
consumers’ chances to recover their loss.697 Courts could apply by analogy Article 33 of 
the Law of 21 June 2004 for Confidence in Digital Economy. In this way, there will be 
created a presumption of TMO liability for the loss suffered by third parties who 
                                                 
693 See Subsections 3.1 and 4.2. Moreover, the commentators recognise unanimously that the causation 
requirement is usually very difficult to meet. See Guyon, Y. (1994), p. 399; Compagnie Nationale des 
Commissaires aux Comptes (1995), p. 24; Lyon, 27 January 1994, Bull. C.N.C.C. 2994.271 (Annot P. 
Merle) 399; Com., 27 October 1992, JCP.14.G.22026, Bull. C.N.C.C. II 91.376, Rev. Soc.1993.86 (Annot. 
M. Jeantin). However, confront Cass. Comm., 17 October 1984, JCP 1985.II.20458, annotated by Viandier. 
Translation by N. Sims; see also Subsection 4.3. 
694 See Sections 2, 3, and 7. 
695 However, depending on the extent of responsibility which the courts wish to impose on these professionals 
and on the degree of protection which they will award to the recipients of the information, the classification 
of TMO obligations can actually vary from an obligation of means to an obligation of result. See Subsection 
7.1. 
696 See Section 4 and Subsection 7.2. 
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reasonably rely on inaccurate trustmarks in undertaking transactions within the scope of the 
trustmarks. Accordingly, e-consumers would only have to prove the inaccuracy of the 
trustmark. Conversely, TMOs may avoid their liability by proving that they issued the 
trustmark with reasonable care. 
Such approach to TMO liability, though desirable by e-consumers, will have to face 
the more traditional approach that courts have taken in cases involving professional 
liability for the provision of wrongful information: to deny recovery in favour of third 
parties on ground of causation.698 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
697 See Subsections 4.3 and 7.2. 
698 See Subsections 3.1, 4.2, and 7.2. Moreover, the commentators recognise unanimously that the causation 
requirement is usually very difficult to meet. See Guyon, Y. (1994), p. 399; Compagnie Nationale des 
Commissaires aux Comptes (1995), p. 24; Lyon, 27 January 1994, Bull. C.N.C.C. 2994.271 (Annot P. 
Merle) 399; Com., 27 October 1992, JCP.14.G.22026, Bull. C.N.C.C. II 91.376, Rev. Soc.1993.86 (Annot. 
M. Jeantin). However, confront Cass. Comm., 17 October 1984, JCP 1985.II.20458, annotated by Viandier. 












 In this chapter the conclusions of the comparative study will be drawn and the first 
two fundamental questions of the present study will be answered: 
 a) “What is TMO third-party liability in Europe?”  
More precisely: “Are TMOs liable towards e-consumers who detrimentally rely on 
inaccurate trustmarks and suffer loss?” From a different perspective: “Do e-consumers 
have a cause of action to recover the damages they incurred by relying on inaccurate 
trustmarks directly from TMOs? If they do, what will be the legal basis?” 
 b) “Is the present TMO third-party liability system in Europe adequate?” 
 As to the structure, an answer to the first question will be provided in Section 2 after 
reviewing the findings of the comparative analysis that has been carried out so far. The 
adequacy of the present TMO third-party liability system in Europe will be challenged in 
Section 3, concluding in Section 4 by answering the second fundamental question in the 
sense that the actual system is manifestly inadequate.  
 
2. De facto absence of third-party liability for TMOs 
 
A first unchallengeable conclusion is that neither statutory provisions nor case law on 
TMO third-party liability have been found in the legal systems dealt with. Furthermore, the 
literature on the matter is scarce if not absent. Therefore, the considerations that follow are 
logical forecasts based both on decisions that courts took in comparable situations and 
statutory regulations potentially applicable by analogy.  
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In none of the legal systems dealt with will it be easy for an e-consumer to recover 
directly from the TMO damages suffered by relying on an inaccurate trustmark displayed 
on the website of an e-merchant. E-consumers will have to bring charges against TMOs 
based either on the general principles of tort or contract law or on statutory provisions and 
case law that may apply by analogy to TMOs. In most of the cases, e-consumers will have 
to prove: 
 
a. the damage occurred to them; 
b. TMO fault in the issuance of the trustmark; and 
c. the causal link between TMO fault and the damage occurred. 
 
However, even if e-consumers manage to prove all these, they could still see their 
claims rejected by means of adverse policy arguments. Indeed, in the analysed legal 
systems, the courts enjoy a great deal of discretion. As it will be explained below, in the 
absence of specific provisions, third-party TMO liability will eventually depend most of all 
on policy arguments. 
As a matter of completeness, before focusing on the European legal systems that have 
been dealt with, the findings derived by the analysis of the American legal system will be 
briefly reviewed.699  
 
2.1 United States 
 
Under US law, according to Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts – 
which is the standard that courts use the most in cases concerning third-party liability for 
negligent misstatements – the recipient of the information (the e-consumer) has to prove 
that he suffered relevant pecuniary loss.700  
Furthermore, it has to be proven that the information is false and that the provider (the 
TMO) failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating it. In order then to 
establish the causal link between the breach of duty and the damage, courts in the US 
                                                 
699 As already explained in Chapter 1, Section 3 and in Chapter 1, Subsection 3.1, since the trustmark 
phenomenon started in the US and it has expanded there way more than in Europe, the American legal 
system has been also investigated in order to better understand the relevant legal issues. 
700 See Chapter 4, Subsection 4.3. See Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 43. 
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require plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s statement both in the misrepresentation action 
and in the negligent action.701  
Moreover, according to Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the e-
consumer will have to prove that he belongs to the group for whom the TMO intended to 
supply the information or knew that the recipient of the information intended to supply 
it.702  
Finally, it has to be pointed out that in the Jaillet line of cases, the courts applied 
consistently the contractarian approach (or limited liability theory) as to public policy.703 
All the standards were interpreted in a restrictive way so that no third-party actions in 
negligence against who disseminates false information were allowed. More precisely, a 
professional’s potential unlimited liability to an indeterminate class and the related chilling 
effect – originated by the imposition of a high duty of care to a large class of people – 
which may paralyse their business, are the two main policy concerns.704  
Very slight seem the chances that the courts will regard the trustmark as an ‘expert 
stamp of approval’ (a sort of implied warranty on the accuracy of information). In this case, 
the applicability of the Jaillet rule will be put under discussion and there may be room for 
third-party action in negligence against TMOs.705 
2.2 Europe 
 
                                                 
701 See Chapter 4, Section 3; Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 33. See also H. Rosemblum Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 
138, 146 (N.J. 1983); Greycas, Inc. v. Proud., 826 F2d 1560 (7th Circ. 1987)); Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, 
Inc., 625 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1993); Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 762 A.2d 582 (Md. 2000). 
Contrariwise, see Tri-Professional Realty, Inc. v. Hillenburg, 669 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). In 
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988); Bily v. Arthur Young & 
Co, 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992). 
702 See Chapter 4, Subsections 4.3, 6.1 Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co. and Gutter v. Dow Jones; See also 
Feinman, J.M. (2003), p. 43. 
703 See Chapter 4, Subsection 6.2. On the contractarian approach, see Chapter 4, Subsection 5.1 and more 
specifically, e.g., Epstein, R.A. (1995), pp. 71-90; Huber, P.W. (1988), p. 5; see also Deakin, S. et al. 
(2003), pp. 224 et seq. 
704 See Subsection 6.1 Jailet v. Cashman; Daniel v. Down Jones & Co.; First Equity Corp. v. Standard & 
Poor’s Corp; Gale v. Value Line; Subsections 6.2 and 6.3. Moreover, see Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), 
pp. 495-496; the emblematic Cardozo’s statement in Ultramares v. Touche, where he maintained that 
liability for negligence “may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.” 174 N.E. 441 at 444 (N.Y. 1931). See also Siliciano, J.A. 
(1988), p. 1943. See more generally on the issue, Dobbs, D.B. (2000), p. 1282; Atiyah, P.S. (1985), p. 488; 
Perlman, H.S. (1982), pp. 71-72. 
705 See Chapter 4, Subsection 6.6. See also the relational approach Chapter 4, Subsection 5.2. More on the 
relational approach, see, e.g., Feinman J.M., (1995), § 7.3; Macneil, I.R. (1980), pp. 71-117. Feinman, J.M. 
(2000), p. 737-748; Feinman, J.M. (1990), pp. 1299-1304; Gottlieb, G. (1983), pp. 567-612; Macneil, I.R. 
(1983), pp. 340-418. 
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Turning our attention to Europe now, the study has highlighted the absence of 
statutory laws and case law on third-party liability of TMOs. Therefore, the general 
principles and clauses of tort and contract law apply to the matter. In this respect, it has 
emerged from the analysis of the three selected European legal systems that the strong 
arguments used to limit auditor, accountant, and surveyor third-party liability in those 
jurisdictions706 may heavily impact TMO third-party liability by limiting it very much if 
not excluding it at all. However, this trend could be counterbalanced by the possible 
applicability by analogy to TMOs of the rules set forth in each Member State to implement 
Article 6 of the Electronic Signatures Directive which prescribe not only a fault-based 
third-party liability for Certification Service Providers (CSPs) but also set out a 
presumption of CSP liability towards third parties who suffer loss as a result of their 
reasonable reliance on CSP certificates. Yet CSPs can rebut the liability presumption by 




Under English law, the e-consumer will have first to prove that he suffered damage. 
Second, the e-consumer will have to prove that the TMO owes a duty of care towards him 
and then that the TMO acted or spoke in such a way as to breach that duty of care.708 Third, 
the e-consumer will have to prove that he suffered damage as a consequence of the TMO’s 
breach of duty of care and that the loss suffered falls within the scope of the TMO’s duty of 
care.  
Professional duty of care towards the plaintiff and the causal link between 
professional fault and plaintiff damage are two elements very much interrelated. It could be 
argued that the two requisites will be met if it is shown by the plaintiff that it was 
foreseeable for a person in the defendant’s position to foresee that his carelessness might 
                                                 
706 See, e.g., the so-called floodgates arguments widely used in Europe to limit third-party professional 
liability for pure economic loss towards an unlimited amount of people for an indeterminate amount. 
707 The parallel between TMOs and CSPs has been drawn in Chapter 1, Subsection 3.1. 
708 See Chapter 5, Section 2. See also Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), p. 13; See also, Walton, C. et al. 
(2006), p. 11; Rogers, W.V. H. (2006), pp. 74-75; Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), p. 383; Lunney, 
M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 120-124; Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 94-95; Giliker, P. & Beckwith, S. (2004) 
p. 22; Hodgson, J. (2004), pp. 73-74; Deakin, S. et al. (2003), pp. 74-83; Van Gerven, W. et al. (2000), pp. 
44-45; Zweigert, K. & Kötz, H. (1998), p. 609. 
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cause a loss to the plaintiff, or to the class of persons he belongs.709 However, 
‘foreseeability’ is necessary to establish the causal link, but it is not sufficient. The 
proximity requirement has also to be proven. ‘Proximity’ is about the relationship between 
the parties: being sufficiently proximate, the defendant would know that his failures might 
directly affect the plaintiff. It plays a significant role in establishing the necessary causal 
link between the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s loss.710  
There is no simple test to prove proximity,711 but there are several factors that, if 
proven, may help to establish proximity. The most relevant are: (a) facts pointing to the 
recognition of the defendant’s responsibility;712 (b) the defendant’s knowledge of the 
recipient or class;713 (c) the defendant’s skills or special knowledge of the matter;714 (d) the 
defendant’s scope of information being sufficiently congruent with the one of plaintiff 
reliance;715 and last but not least (e) the plaintiff’s reasonable reliance.716 It will be deemed 
reasonable if, in the case at hand, other proximity factors will coexist.717  
The proximity test, however, may be ‘lessened’ in case the court decides to apply the 
‘extended Hedley Byrne liability’ test.718 Accordingly, the plaintiff e-consumer will have to 
first prove that the facts clearly demonstrate that the defendant TMO had actual knowledge 
of the likelihood of harm to e-consumers if the trustmark service was inadequately 
performed and thus the information relating to the e-merchant was inaccurate. Second, it 
                                                 
709 See on foreseeability Chapter 5, Subsection 4.1. See also extensively, e.g., Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. 
(2006), pp. 391-392; Walton, C. et al. (2006), pp. 30-32; Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 129-138; 
Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. (2000), pp. 159-160. 
710 See on proximity Chapter 5, Subsection 4.2. See also Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 142-143; 
Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), pp. 391-392; Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. (2000), pp. 159-160; Hodgin, 
R. (1999), pp. 57-58. 
711 In Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, the House of Lords maintained that “there is no simple formula or 
touch-stone to which recourse can be had in order to provide in every case a ready answer.” ([1990] 2 AC 
628, HL). 
712 See White v. Jones [1995] 2AC 283-284, HL. 
713 See Chapter 5, Subsection 4.2. It is considered a proximity factor because of its function of linking the 
defendant and the plaintiff. In fact, defendant knowledge of plaintiff reliance brings the latter within the 
group class of persons directly affected by the act or omission of the former. 
714 See, e.g., Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 502-503, 505, 510, and 538-539 
HL; Henderson v. Merret Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 180 HL. 
715 See, e.g., Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v. Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 503 HL; Western Trust & Savings 
Ltd v. Strutt & Parker [1999] PNLR 154, CA. Contrariwise, see Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 2 
AC 605, HL where the House of Lords maintained that the identification of the specific purposes for which 
a statement is issued would not only help in establishing plaintiff’s probability of reliance but, more 
importantly, his entitlement to rely on it. 
716 See Witting, C. (2004), pp. 321-322. 
717 See Id., pp. 197. 
718 See Chapter 5, Subsection 5.2 Proximity; Witting, C. (2004), pp. 222-225. See more generally on the 
‘Extended Hedley Byrne liability’ line of cases’, Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), pp. 413 et seq.; 
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should be proved – or it should clearly result from the facts – that TMOs, in light of the 
aforementioned knowledge, made a conscious decision to provide information on e-
merchant security, privacy, or business practices by supplying trustmarks. Third, e-
consumers will have to provide evidence of the tightness of the causal link between TMO 
inadequate performance of the service and the damage suffered by the e-consumer. In order 
to demonstrate this, e-consumers will have to prove that few (if any) decisions or acts 
intervened in the sequence of events leading to the damage. Furthermore, the additional 
evidence that e-consumers were unable to protect themselves from loss and thus the 
damage was inevitable will be of help.  
It will be radically different if the court decides to apply Section 4 of the Electronic 
Signatures Regulation on third-party liability of CSPs. CSPs,719 as already explained, 
provide services which are comparable to the ones offered by TMOs.720 If this would be the 
case, TMOs would be liable to e-consumers who reasonably rely on TMOs’ trustmarks – 
and suffer loss as a result of such reliance – for the accuracy of the information contained 
in the trustmark at the time of issue, notwithstanding that evidence of TMOs’ negligence 
was not provided, unless TMOs prove that they were not negligent. The standard of care of 
TMOs would thus consist of providing accurate information on e-merchants on their 
trustmarks. Aggrieved e-consumers who reasonably rely on a TMO’s trustmarks would be 
entitled to ask the TMO for compensation for the TMO’s negligent performance, without 
having to prove the TMO’s negligence. TMOs would be held liable unless they prove that 
they were not negligent. It will then be crucial at this point to establish whether e-
consumers’ reliance would have been reasonable. This comes down to proximity. In this 
respect, it could be argued that e-consumers’ reliance is then reasonable, as in a typical 
TMO third-party liability case the proximity factors are all satisfied.721 Therefore, TMOs 
could be held liable. 
Eventually, policy arguments will play a crucial role in the courts’ decisions on 
whether or not it will be reasonable to impose a duty of care towards e-consumers on 
TMOs and thus in allowing a cause of action for aggrieved e-consumers against TMOs that 
negligently provide wrongful information on e-merchants. More precisely, it will most 
                                                                                                                                                    
Witting, C. (2004), pp. 213 et seq.; Deakin, S. et al. (2003), pp. 124 et seq.; Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. (2000), 
pp. 199-203. 
719 See Chapter 5, Section 7. 
720 See Chapter 1, Subsection 3.1. 
721 See Chapter 5, Subsection 6.1. 
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likely depend on the approach that courts will have to floodgates arguments (i.e., 
arguments to limit third-party professional liability for pure economic loss towards an 
unlimited amount of people for an indeterminate amount). So far, courts have tended to 
‘close the floodgates’. In a typical TMO case, courts may thus maintain that TMOs should 
be in a position where they are able to weigh the costs of taking precautions against the 
possible size of claims that could be made against them, and TMOs should be able to 
predict the number of persons that their negligence might affect. As TMOs are neither able 
to estimate the cost of claims that they could face nor to predict the number of persons that 
their negligence might effect, courts could conclude that it would not fair, just, and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care towards e-consumers and deny them a cause of 
action.722  
However, it cannot be excluded that courts will hold TMOs liable by applying by 





In Germany, first, e-consumers will have to prove that they suffered damage relying 
on the incorrect information provided through the trustmark by the TMO.  
Second, consumers will have to provide evidence that the TMO knew that both that e-
consumers were contemplating to rely on the trustmark and that the information provided 
through the trustmark could be of great significance to e-consumers in making important 
decisions. In this way, e-consumers may in fact be included in the area protected by the 
contract between the TMO and the e-merchant. A contract with protective effect towards 
third persons (VmSzD) may thus be found between the TMO and the e-merchant. Thus e-
consumers may have an action against the TMO accordingly.723  
                                                 
722 See Chapter 5, Subsections 4.3 and 6.3 Floodgates arguments. See also Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. 
(2007), pp. 143-144; Powell, J.L. & Stewart, R. (2007), pp. 69; Dugdale, A. M. & Jones, M. A. (2006), pp. 
392-398 and 571; Witting, C. (2004), pp. 165 et seq.; Giliker, P. & Beckwith, S. (2004), pp. 94-95; Deakin, 
S. et al. (2003), p. 115; Cooke, J. & Oughton, D. (2000), pp. 160-161. See on the floodgates arguments, 
Lunney, M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), p. 458; Hodgin, R. (1999), pp. 61-62; Van Dam, C. (2006), p. 170. 
723 See Chapter 6, Subsection 2.2 Contract with protective effects towards third parties (Vertrag mit 
Schutzwirkung zugunsten Dritter – VmSzD); Subsections 4.2 and Subsection 4.5 The contract with 
protective effect towards third persons – VmSzD – as the residual means to establish third-party cause of 
action. See on the condition required by courts for a VmSzD to exist, Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. 
(2002), pp. 59-64; Beyer, O. (1996), p. 473; Sonnenschein, J. (1989), p. 225. 
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Third, e-consumers will have to prove the existence of a causal link between TMO 
failure to provide accurate trustmarks and the damage they suffered. On this point, e-
consumers will have to prove that the presence of the trustmark on the e-merchant’s 
website determined their decision to transact with the latter and that they suffered damage 
from that transaction.  
E-consumers may also invoke the application by analogy of the rules on third-party 
liability of CSPs, which are set forth in Section 11 Sag.724 In this case, e-consumer will 
only have to prove that they suffered damage because they had relied on the trustmark and 
that they did not know that the information provided on the trustmarks were wrong. 
A further option for e-consumers could be to try asking the TMO for compensation 
based on an extensive interpretation of Section 826 BGB. They would then have to prove 
that the TMO acted recklessly725 in providing the inaccurate trustmark and that such act of 
providing inaccurate information is contrary to the existing economic and legal order and 
thus the TMO acted contra bonos mores.726 
However, it has to be kept in mind that, in order to prevent indeterminate liability 
towards third parties, German courts do not require that the professional knows the exact 
number of people to whom the information issued will be relevant. Nevertheless, they tend 





Under French law, the first requirement for a successful claim in tort (pursuant to 
Articles 1382 and 1383 Code civil) is to prove the damage.728 More precisely, the plaintiff 
e-consumer will have to prove that the damage exist, is certain, and is personal to him.729  
                                                 
724 See Chapter 6, Section 6. For an explanation of the possible comparison between TMOs and CSPs see 
Chapter 1, Subsection 3.1. 
725 See Chapter 6, Subsection 2.1 Section 826; and Section 7. See also Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 71 and 172; 
Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 292 and 889; Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), p. 603; Larenz, K. 
& Canaris, C. W. (1994), pp. 452-453. 
726 See Chapter 6, Subsection 2.1 Section 826; and Section 7. See also Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 401-402; see 
also Markesinis, B. S. & Uberath, H. (2002), pp. 889-890; Larenz, K. & Canaris, C. W. (1994), p. 448. 
727 See Chapter 6, Subsections 4.2, 4.3, and Section 5. 
728 See Chapter 7, Subsection 3.1. See extensively Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 677 et seq.; Le Tourneau, P. & 
Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 1197 et seq.; Viney, G. (1998), pp. 151 et seq. 
729 See Chapter 7, Subsection 3.1. See also Van Gerven et al. (2000), Chapter IV, Subsection 4.1.3 and 
Chapter VIII. 
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The second necessary requirement will consist of proving the TMOs’ fault, i.e., the 
fact that the TMOs’ performance did not conform to the relevant rules and standards.730 
The third element that e-consumers will have to prove in order to establish tortious 
liability is the link between the TMOs’ faulty act and the damage suffered.731 More 
precisely, e-consumers will have to prove that if the TMOs had acted with due diligence 
the damage would not have happened.732 Furthermore, evidence will also have to be 
provided that the inaccurate trustmark had in fact influenced the e-consumers decision that 
led to the damage. The causation requirement is the most difficult to meet.733  
E-consumers may also try to argue for the application by analogy of the CSPs’ third-
party liability rules set forth in Article 33 of the Law of 21 June 2004 for Confidence in 
Digital Economy. Accordingly, e-consumers will only have to prove the inaccuracy of the 
trustmark. Conversely, TMOs may avoid their liability by proving that they issued the 
trustmark with reasonable care.  
However, it has to be stressed that in cases of professional liability for the provision 
of wrongful information, courts traditionally tend to deny recovery in favour of third 
parties.734 Many claims are feasible in theory; nevertheless, a significant part of them are 
rejected for absence of sufficient direct causation. As already mentioned, the ‘causation’ 
requirement is often used by courts to close the floodgates of professional liability in order 
to prevent indeterminate duties and obligations. Thus, whenever a claim is dismissed in 
court on the grounds of insufficient causation, the genuine reason might well be the policy 




                                                 
730 See Chapter 7, Section 3.3. See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 192-193; Zweigert K. & Kötz, H. (1998), pp. 619 
et seq. See also extensively Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 693 et seq.; Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 
348 et seq.; Viney, G. (1998), pp. 313 et seq. 
731 See Chapter 7, Subsection 3.4. See Van Dam, C. (2006), pp. 278-279 and 283-284. See also extensively 
Terré, F. et al. (2002), pp. 815 et seq.; Le Tourneau, P. & Cadiet, L. (2002), pp. 441 et seq.; Viney, G. 
(1998), pp. 151 et seq. 
732 See Chapter 7, Subsection 4.1. See on the conditio sine qua non theory, e.g., Viney, G. (1998), p. 169. 
733 See Chapter 7, Subsection 7.2. 
734 See Subsections 3.1 and 4.2. Moreover, the commentators recognise unanimously that the causation 
requirement is usually very difficult to meet. See Guyon, Y. (1994), p. 399; Compagnie Nationale des 
Commissaires aux Comptes (1995), p. 24; Lyon, 27 January 1994, Bull. C.N.C.C. 2994.271 (Annot P. 
Merle) 399; Com., 27 October 1992, JCP.14.G.22026, Bull. C.N.C.C. II 91.376, Rev. Soc.1993.86 (Annot. 
M. Jeantin). However, confront Cass. Comm., 17 October 1984, JCP 1985.II.20458, annotated by Viandier. 
Translation by N. Sims; see also Subsection 4.3. 
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At the end of this brief excursus on the various scenarios that e-consumers will face if 
the want to ask TMOs for compensation for damage suffered for the provision of 
inaccurate trustmarks, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
Very broad liability clauses interpreted restrictively by means of public policy 
considerations based on fear of liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class characterise the common law approach to third-party liability 
for negligent misstatements. In fact, the chances for aggrieved e-consumers to hold TMOs 
liable for the provision of inaccurate trustmarks are very slim under English law as well as 
in the US.  
The German and the French legal systems offer more legal grounds on which to base 
third-party liability claims against TMOs. French courts, however, have proved their 
inclination to use ‘causation’ to impede or at least limit third-party liability for negligent 
misstatements; whereas, German courts seem to be more open in that respect. 
Moreover, in Europe, the rules on third-party liability of CSPs, derived from the 
implementation in the Member states’ legal systems of Article 6 of the Electronic 
Signatures Directive, could apply by analogy to TMOs. Therefore, these provisions may 
offer some additional protection to e-consumers who rely on inaccurate trustmarks, 
provided that courts decide to take them in consideration. 
Within the analysed European legal systems, the French is the one which grants, at 
least in theory, more protection to third parties who suffer loss by relying on negligent 
misstatements. The general tort clauses set out in Article 1382 and 1383 Code civil applies 
to the situation at stake. However, it will be quite difficult for e-consumers to prove the 
causal link between TMOs’ fault and the damage. Under German law, the most suitable 
means for e-consumers to recover their loss from TMOs seems to be represented by the 
‘contract with protective effect for third parties’ (VmSzD), which brings strangers to a 
contract under its ‘protective umbrella’. The court, though, requires the group of ‘strangers’ 
(i.e., e-consumers) to be capable of being objectively determinate by the tortfeasor (i.e., the 
TMO). Given the fact that a trustmark can be seen and relied upon by a potentially 
unlimited number of e-consumers, it is unlikely that the mentioned requirement will be 
met. As far as English law is concerned, a proximity relation between TMOs and e-
                                                                                                                                                    
735 See Chapter 7, Subsection 3.1, Section 4, Subsection 7.2. 
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consumers, necessary for TMOs’ duty of care towards e-consumers to arise, seems to be 
established under the ‘extended Hedley Byrne’ liability rules. However, the courts’ strong 
aversion to grant compensation for pure economic loss is very likely to bar any of such 
third-party claims against TMOs under English law. 
In summary, the answer to the first fundamental question addressed in this book: “Are 
TMOs liable towards e-consumers who detrimentally rely on inaccurate trustmarks and 
suffer loss?” is that, in theory, there is enough legal ground to enforce TMOs’ third party 
liability; in practice, however, the chances that TMOs will not be liable towards aggrieved 
third-party e-consumers who relied on the misleading or false information provided in the 
trustmark are way greater than the chances that TMOs will be held liable. At present, thus, 
it is possible to conclude for a de facto absence of TMOs liability towards e-consumers in 
Europe. 
 
4. Challenging the adequacy of the present TMO third-
party liability system 
 
Unregulated market forces, characterised by the opportunistic behaviour of the 
market players, are driving TMOs more towards an untrustworthy practice than otherwise. 
TMO practice seems to be going the wrong direction.736 
The analysis carried out in Chapter 3 showed that the necessary conditions for a 
trustworthy certification practice: 
 
1. certifier independency, 
2. impartiality in the auditing procedure,  
3. active monitoring of the certificate owner’s practice,  
4. certifier enforcement power, and  
5. certifier accountability 
 
are either missing or not fully guaranteed in the services of TMOs. In fact, as it was already 
pointed out, low-price policy and the widespread use of private sponsorships heavily 
                                                 
736 This has been showed in Chapter 3. 
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challenge TMO independence.737 Moreover, a third-party independent audit of e-merchants 
who asked for a trustmark is an exception while self-assessment by e-merchants is the 
rule.738 Active monitoring of e-merchant compliance and enforcement procedures are 
generally in place. However, due to the lack of transparency and information, it is difficult 
to assess the effectiveness of the present monitoring activities and enforcement practices. It 
is also legitimate to doubt, first, whether monitoring activities are in fact carried out and, 
second, whether enforcement procedures are activated at all.739 As to TMO accountability, 
the present study has revealed the absence in Europe (as well as in the US) of both specific 
statutory provisions and case law on TMO third-party liability. Furthermore, although in 
theory there seems to be enough legal ground to enforce TMO third party liability on the 
basis of the general principles of tort and contract law, the chances in practice that TMOs 
will not be liable towards aggrieved third-party e-consumers who relied on the misleading 
or false information provided in trustmarks are way greater than chances that TMOs will be 
held liable. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that TMOs are in fact not accountable.740 
It results in a picture of a rather untrustworthy TMO practice. 
None of the stakeholders (i.e. e-consumers, e-merchants, governments, and TMOs) 
seem to profit from an untrustworthy TMO practice.741 On the one side, the risk of 
undetected e-merchants’ actions that can cause loss to e-consumers is high and damages are 
very difficult to recover.742 On the other side, by joining a trustmark programme, e-
merchants run the risk that other e-merchants with the same trustmark will violate the rules 
of the trustmark programme and eventually cause damage to e-consumers who happen to 
rely on that trustmark. In this way, the reputation of that trustmark programme will be 
damaged and the investments made by all e-merchants to join it will be wasted. Although 
this is a risk that will always exist, an unreliable TMO practice will exponentially increase 
it. More generally, damage to e-consumers caused by a certified e-merchant will decrease 
the amount of trust that e-consumers have in e-commerce. Consequently, this will not bring 
any positive effect to e-business, nor to the economy. Moreover, governments run the risk 
in letting untrustworthy TMOs run wild. In fact, if damage related to e-consumers’ reliance 
                                                 
737 See the ‘low-balling effect’ theory in Chapter 3, Subsection 5.1. See Makkawi, B. & Schick, A. (2003), 
pp. 797-822; Calegari, M. et al. (1998), pp. 255-275; De Angelo, L.E. (1981), pp. 113-127. 
738 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.2. 
739 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.3. 
740 See Section 3. 
741 See Chapter 2, Section 8. 
742 See Section 3. 
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on trustmarks occurs, the inactivity of government in regulating the matter will also be 
indicated as one of the reasons for TMOs’ unreliable practice. A sound trustmark practice 
is a valuable means of self-regulation that gives governments the chance to stay out of a 
sector of Internet regulation. An untrustworthy trustmark practice may require a prompt 
corrective government action. Last but not least, none of the TMOs have reached critical 
mass yet. If e-consumers suffer damage because of their reliance on trustmarks, the 
soundness and the reliability of the whole trustmark system will be questioned and once e-
consumers’ trust is lost it will be very difficult to win it back. Consequently, the TMO 




Liability law has traditionally been one of the first legal guards against undesirable 
societal developments.743 In this respect, liability law aims to discourage subjects from 
putting in place specific unwanted conducts by making them liable for them and eventually 
obliging them to compensate the damages that may flow from their misconducts. 
The actual TMO third-party liability system – based on the general principles of tort 
and contract law which result into a de facto absence of TMOs liability towards e-
consumers – is not adequate because, to use an euphemism, it does not work as a deterrent 
to discourage TMO untrustworthy practice. In fact, the total lack of specific rules on TMO 
liability, coupled with the practical impossibility for e-consumers to hold TMOs liable in 
tort or in contract, as shown in the present study, creates a sort of legal ‘immunity’ for 
TMOs, which has surely has not helped foster best practice.  
A strong consolidated argument against an expansion of liability in auditor and 
accountant literature is that it does not produce a significant incentive to exercise care 
because accountants already have sufficient incentives to audit with due care.744 These 
incentives include malpractice liability to clients, sanction by regulators in security cases or 
other regulated matters, concern for reputation, and the threats of professional disciplinary 
proceedings. Such argument, however, is not applicable to TMOs. There is almost no 
malpractice liability to e-merchants because it is most of the time almost fully contractually 
                                                 
743 See Schellekens, M. & Prins, C. (2006), p. 49. 
744 See, e.g., Siciliano, J.A. (1998) p. 1953. 
 209
waved. No sanctions have been imposed on TMOs by regulators so far. Reputation is a key 
element for the success of TMOs, TMO reputation and credibility being positively related 
to e-consumer trust in e-merchants.745 Nevertheless, notwithstanding the scandal reported 
in the US in the late 1990s,746 TMO practice does not seem to have improved since then, 
proving that concern for reputation does not really work as an incentive to exercise care. 
Another reason for this can be that the chances that inaccurate trustmarks will be detected 
are not really high, thus the lack of TMOs’ concern for losing their reputation.747 
Furthermore, issuing trustmarks is not a regulated profession; thus, TMOs are not subject to 
any professional disciplinary proceedings. 
Moreover, floodgates arguments748 – commonly used in the US and Europe to limit 
third-party professional liability for negligent misstatements causing pure economic loss 
potentially to an unlimited amount of people for an indeterminate amount – have also to be 
taken into consideration. In this respect, it could be argued that implementing specific rules 
on TMO liability will not alone lead to a flood of third-party claims possibly resulting in 
the financial ruin of TMOs. To support what was just stated, the example of the specific 
CSPs’ liability provision set forth by the European legislator in Article 6 of the Electronic 
Signatures Directive could be mentioned. Such provision has been implemented in all the 
European legal systems and CSPs are still on the market providing their services. Going 
down this line of reasoning, one could say that floodgates arguments are not a reason not to 
lay down specific rules on TMO liability. However, they have to be taken into 
                                                 
745 See Chapter 2, Subsection 5.2. See Wakefield, R.L. & Whitten, D. (2006), pp. 1-19; Lafferty, B. et al. 
(2002), pp. 1-12; Hoxmeier, J. (2000), pp. 115-139; Goldsmith, R. et al. (2000), pp. 43-54; Keller, K.L. 
(1998). 
746 See Chapter 2, Subsection 6.1. 
747 Generally, e-consumers do not have enough competence on TMO practices to spot an inaccurate 
trustmark. See Chapter 2, Section 4. See also Nordquist, F. et al. (2002). Moreover, the de-materialisation of 
information (e.g., personal data, credit card data, etc.) brought about by the Internet (see Chapter 2, 
Subsection 3.1) makes it very difficult for e-consumers even to realise that their data have been stolen – e.g., 
by some cunning third-party who took advantage of the low security of an e-merchant website – or used by 
e-merchant in an unlawful way or in a way which is incompatible with the purposes stated on the relevant 
trustmark. 
748 The rationale of the floodgate liability theory was very well summarised by Cardozo C.J. in Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche who maintained that to allow such recovery would “expose [defendants] to a liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class” ([1931] 255 N.Y. 179). In other 
words the meaning of this metaphor is that the defendant – who negligently drafts an inaccurate statement 
which is relied upon by a potentially unlimited number of people and causes them economic losses – would 
be flooded with claims, resulting in his financial ruin. On the floodgates arguments see extensively, Lunney, 
M. & Oliphant, K. (2007), p. 458; Hodgin, R. (1999), pp. 61-62; Van Dam, C. (2006), p. 170; Cane, P. 
(1996), p. 455 et seq. 
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consideration in the process of drafting such rules, providing TMOs with the possibility of 
reasonably limiting their liability as it happens, e.g., for CSPs. 
Finally, the apathy of European governments on the matter does also not seem to be 
adequate to the present phase of the Internet. Nowadays, the Internet can be seen as being 
in the transition between the so-called ‘creative anarchy’ phase and the phase of ‘rules’.749 
In fact, after some years of anarchy and self-regulation, not only e-consumers but also 
enterprises are calling for government coherent regulatory intervention to make the Internet 
a safer and neater marketplace, especially when the market does not manage to properly 
regulate itself.750 
Hence, it seems reasonable to answer the second fundamental question: “Is the 
present TMO third-party liability system in Europe adequate?” by concluding that the 
present TMO third-party liability system is manifestly not adequate. Therefore, the next 
chapter will be dedicated to the elaboration of a model of adequate third-party liability for 
TMOs.  
 
                                                 
749 Debora Spar, in her book Ruling the Waves, distinguishes four phases through which the society that 
exploits discoveries usually passes. These phases are: 1. innovation; 2. commercialisation; 3. creative 
anarchy; and 4. rules. The phase of ‘innovation’ is defined as the flash point of discovery. The phase in 
which pioneers (or pirates, depending on the perspective) move into the new area seeking to exploit its 
potential is described as the ‘commercialisation’ one. ‘Creative anarchy’ is pictured as the phase when the 
needs of ordinary commerce come into tension with the freewheeling spirit of the new frontier. The final 
phase, i.e., ‘rules’, follows unavoidably as the commercial enterprises unable to hold back anarchy on their 
own call for government intervention as the best vehicle for bringing order (and profit) to the wild frontier. 
Spar, D. L. (2001), Ruling the Waves: Cycles of Discovery, Chaos, and Wealth from the Compass to the 
Internet (New York: Harcourt Hardcovers), pp. 1-22. See also, Mann, R. J. & Belzey, S. R. (2005) The 
Promises of Internet Intermediary Liability, Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 47, pp. 239 et seq. 






TOWARDS AN ADEQUATE TMO THIRD-PARTY 





In the previous chapter, it was concluded that the TMO liability system is not 
adequate. Hence, this chapter will be dedicated to answering the third fundamental question 
of the present analysis, which is: “What will an adequate TMO third-party liability system 
be?” 
In Section 2, the reason of the choice to combine law and ethics in order to build a 
model of adequate third-party liability for TMOs will be provided. Section 3 will be 
dedicated to the actual elaboration of the model for adequate third-party liability for TMOs 
based on the theory of ‘Warranted Trust’. Such theoretic model will be compiled in Section 
4, providing a concrete proposal for an adequate TMO third-party liability system. In 
Section 5, the proposed adequate third-party liability is summarised into a liability 
provision. How the provision would work in practice will be explained in Section 6. 
Section 7 contains some conclusions on the study and recommendations for international 
regulatory bodies. 
 
2. Law and ethics: two complementary normative 
sciences 
 
As already pointed out in Chapter 1, there are main two reasons why an ethical theory 
is chosen in order to improve the TMO third-party liability system. First, this approach 
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seems to widely comply with what has been recommended at the European level. In fact, in 
Recital 32 of the Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 
June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services in the Internal 
Market,751 the creation of a code of conduct at the Community level is encouraged as a 
means to determine the rules on professional ethics applicable to commercial 
communication.752 As the present effort aims to contribute to the creation of European 
standards/code of conduct for TMOs, the ethical aspects of TMO practice need to be taken 
into consideration also in setting out the related liability system. Second, law and ethics are 
two normative sciences which traditionally can very well complement each other. Simply 
put, ethics sets the basic societal interests that law should guarantee: “[w]ithin the tradition 
of natural law thinking which finds its roots in the philosophies of Aristotle and Aquinas, 
the political community has generally been understood in terms of a fundamental goal: that 
of fostering the ethical good of citizens. Law, on this concept, should seek to inculcate 
habits of good conduct and should support a social environment which will encourage 
citizens to pursue worthy goals and to lead valuable lives.”753  
The core of TMO liability will be based on the same principles of surveyors’, 
auditors’, and accountants’ liability so that e-consumers will receive at least the same 
protection in the online world as in the more traditional paper-based and oral forms of 
communication.754 Once such basis of liability is created, it will be tailored to the specific 
TMO practice by developing the concept of ‘adequacy’ in order to make it more effective. 
In this respect, the concept of ‘adequacy’ will be defined by applying to the trust 
relationship between TMOs and e-consumers the ethical theory of Warranted Trust – 
which, in a nutshell, aims to protect trustor reliance on trustee by implementing a regulative 
framework which takes into consideration the interest of both parties and the influence of 
the specific context in which the trust relationship develops – and considering the social, 
                                                 
751 OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, p.1. 
752 Recital 32: “In order to remove barriers to the development of cross-border services within the Community 
which members of the regulated professions might offer on the Internet, it is necessary that compliance be 
guaranteed at Community level with professional rules aiming, in particular, to protect consumers or public 
health; codes of conduct at Community level would be the best means of determining the rules on 
professional ethics applicable to commercial communication; the drawing-up or, where appropriate, the 
adaptation of such rules should be encouraged without prejudice to the autonomy of professional bodies and 
associations.” 
753 Craig, E. (2005), p. 542. The complementary nature of law and ethics and their interaction will be clearly 
showed in Chapter 9, Section 2. 
754 This aim is often referred to as ‘what applies offline should apply online’. See Schellekens, M. (2006), pp. 
51-76; Koops, B. J. et al. (2000).  
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economic, and political value of trustmarks. More specifically, the theory of Warranted 
Trust should help find a legal solution to the fundamental issue of the so-called 
expectations gap.755 In fact, on the one side, TMOs try to waive any possible liability 
towards e-consumers on the accuracy of the information they provide on e-merchant 
security, privacy, and business practices through trustmarks.756 On the other side,  
e-consumers would trust TMOs and rely on trustmarks as they tend to perceive TMOs as 
guarantors of e-merchants’ practices. Through the theory of Warranted Trust, it will be 
possible to take into consideration both TMOs’ and e-consumers’ needs and expectations 
and to translate them into a legal provision that is ‘adequate’ for both sides. 
 
3. Building blocks for a model of adequate third-party 
liability for TMOs: “going from trust to Warranted 
Trust” 
 
Given the undesirable developments of TMO practice, the creation of an adequate 
tortious liability system for TMOs is recommendable for the good of the e-society. In the 
present situation, the law can provide a form of hedging against the risk that the trust of e-
consumers trust will be misplaced, especially liability law, which offers remedies for 
breaches of trust.757 There are several advantages to introducing an adequate tortious 
liability system for TMOs. Only to mention some of them, liability law can lay down 
minimum requirements for the protection of e-consumers that cannot be derogated from 
contractual clauses. As Chris Witting aptly described in his book Liability for Negligent 
Misstatements, in a service-based economy, where individual’s decisions are often made 
with the assistance of experts’ advice or information, “[l]iability in negligence ensures that 
redress is available for the provision of advice or information which is inaccurate or 
misleading as a result of a failure to take proper care. It permits the commencement of 
actions not only by parties in direct contractual relations with the statement-maker, but also 
                                                 
755 See Chapter 4, Section 2. Pacini, C. & Sinason, D. (1999), p. 482; Houston, R.W. & Taylor, G.K. (1999); 
Epstein, M.J. & Geiger, M.A. (1994), pp. 60-66; Porter, B. (1993), pp. 49-68; Hanks, J. (1992), pp. 33 et 
seq.; Costello, J. (1991), p. 267; Chaffee, N. (1988), p. 882; Liggio, C. (1975), p. 42. 
756 See Chapter 3, Subsection 5.5. 
757 See Schellekens, M. & Prins, C. (2006), p. 49. 
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by those who are in neither direct nor contractual relations with the statement-maker.”758 
Furthermore, the legalization of a relationship can help in transforming trust into a 
“commodity [that serves as] an entity that is familiar and subject to pressure to conform to 
established standards [as a] dependable anchor for easier and more trusting relations as 
trust becomes routinely and predictably available, formalised, and standardised.”759 
Moreover, TMOs will possibly consider the legal sanctions and make betrayal of trust less 
likely to happen ex ante. In fact, liability rules could be used as a springboard for the 
creation of sound trust in the relationship between e-consumers and TMOs. 
As none of the laws applicable to TMOs sets forth specific rules on TMO liability, 
the system will have to be created almost from scratch. 
So arguments to answer the third and last fundamental question of this study: “What 
will an adequate TMO third-party liability system be?” will be unfolded through Sections 
3, 4, and 5. 
 
3.1. Basis of liability 
 
The key aim of this effort is to ensure that e-consumers receive at least the same 
protection in the online world as in the more traditional paper-based and oral forms of 
communication.760 TMO offline equivalents have been identified in surveyors, auditors, 
and accountants.761 More precisely, following the principle of functionality, trustmarks will 
be seen as information on somebody or something to be relied upon by others. Thus, TMOs 
will be seen as professionals who provide information on their clients or their clients’ 
practice, to be relied upon by third parties (e.g., e-consumers). Surveyors, auditors, and 
accountants can also be seen as professionals who provide information on somebody or 
something, to be relied upon by others. The comparison among TMOs, surveyors, auditors, 
and accountants is further specified in Table 6. 
 
                                                 
758 Witting C. (2004), p. 3. 
759 Sitkin, S. B. (1995) On the Positive Effect of Legalization on Trust, In R. Lewicki, B. Sheppard, & R. Bies 
(eds.), Research on Negotiation in Organisations Vol.5 (Greenwood: JAI), p. 185. See also Cross F. (2005), 
p. 1460. “law may function to expand the radius of trust, make it more likely that individuals will trust those 
outside their inner circle of family and close friends.” 
760 This aim is often referred to as ‘what applies offline should apply online’. See Schellekens, M. (2006),  





    TMOs   Surveyors Auditors/Accounts 
Independent and trustworthy info Trustmarks  Valuations Report/trustmarks 
On the quality of goods or  Security, privacy and Real estate Accounts 
practice    business practices 
To be relied upon by third parties E-consumers  Purchasers Shareholders/investors 
 
Table 6   Table of comparison 
 
 
Thus, the core of TMO liability has to be based on the same principles of liability of 
surveyors, auditors, and accountants. However, the legal analysis carried out in the 
previous chapters has shown that the principles of liability of surveyors, auditors, and 
accountants taken as such do grant e-consumers protection only in theory. In fact, due to 
the specific features of TMOs services, it will be very unlikely for e-consumers to obtain 
from TMOs compensation for the damages suffered by relying on inaccurate trustmarks.762 
Hence, for the TMO third-party liability system to work as a deterrent to TMO 
untrustworthy practice, the principles of liability of surveyors, auditors, and accountants 
have to be tailored to the specific TMO practice. This will be done hereunder by 
developing the concept of ‘adequacy’. 
 
3.2 The theory of Warranted Trust applied to define the 
concept of ‘adequacy’ 
 
The concept of ‘adequacy’ will be defined by applying the theory of Warranted Trust 
to the relationship between e-consumers and TMOs – which, as it will be shown, aims to 
protect trustor reliance on trustee by implementing a regulative framework which takes into 
consideration the interest of both parties and the influence of the specific context in which 
                                                                                                                                                    
761 See Chapter 1, Subsection 3.1. 
762 See Chapter 8, Section 2. 
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the trust relationship develops – and considering the social, economic, and political value 
of trustmarks. 
 
“Trust (…) is warranted if [the trustees] have good intentions, are competent and 
work according to a regulative framework and the regulative framework is 
adequate” (Van Gorp 2005).763  
 
If Van Gorp’s definition is applied to the relationship between e-consumers and 
TMOs, the result will be:  
 
“Trust is warranted if TMOs have good intentions, are competent, work 
according to a regulative framework, and the regulative framework is adequate.”  
 
Four elements can be identified in the definition of Warranted Trust:  
 
1. TMOs’ good intention;  
2. TMOs’ competence;  
3. TMOs’ compliance with the regulative framework; and 
4. Adequate regulative framework for TMOs. 
 
Comparing the definition of Warranted Trust to a widely recognised definition of 
trust - in trust, we rely on the goodwill of someone else - it results that Warranted Trust 
elements 1, 2, and 3 are all expressions of TMOs’ goodwill: goodwill in general, goodwill 
in entering the trustmark business with enough competence, and goodwill in complying 
with the regulative framework. Element 4, ‘adequate regulative framework’, is the only one 
independent from TMOs’ goodwill, so it can be pointed out as the element which 
differentiates Warranted Trust from trust. Moreover, besides being the characteristic mark 
of Warranted Trust, ‘adequate regulative framework’ is an objective element which can be 
rationalised and influenced by regulations, as opposed to goodwill and related matters, 
which are by definition subjective and can therefore neither be rationalised nor directly 
influenced. Nonetheless, it will be argued below that an adequate liability system for TMOs 
                                                 
763 Van Gorp, A. (2005) Ethical Issues in Engineering Design, Safety and Sustainability (Eindhoven: Simon 
Stevens Series in the Philosophy of Technology), p. 41. 
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can indirectly stimulate TMOs’ good intention, competence, and compliance with TMO 
duties and obligation. 
When it comes to the regulation of the Internet, the success of a regulative framework 
depends mainly on the possibility of enforcing it.764 Liability rules are the element of the 
regulative framework which guarantees its enforcement – at least in theory.765  
 Within the regulative framework, the focus will be on the liability system. Thus, for 
the scope of the present analysis, the definition of Warranted Trust can be rewritten as 
follows: 
 
“Trust is warranted when an adequate liability system is in place.” 
 
Now the question that needs to be answered is: What does ‘adequate’ mean? 
The definition of ‘adequate’ will be elaborated taking into consideration the trust 
relationship between e-consumers and TMOs, that is, the concrete situation to which the 
liability system will apply. More precisely, the concept of adequacy will be defined and 
refine through a three-stage analysis of the trust relationship between e-consumers and 
TMOs. 
 
Baier’s trust stage 
 
While people have a generalised understanding of the concept of trust, it is not 
readily amenable to clear definition. Research has at least implicitly accepted a definition 
of trust as a belief, attitude, or explanation concerning the likelihood that the actions of 
another individual, group or organisation will be acceptable or will serve the actor’s 
interests. For the purpose of this analysis, the definition of the philosopher Annette Baier 
                                                 
764 See, e.g., Prins, C. (2006) Should ICT Regulation Be Undertaken at an International Level? in Koops, B. J. 
et al. (eds.) Starting Point for ICT Regulation (The Hague: T M C Asser Press), pp. 185-187. Illegal 
filesharing is quite a relevant example of this. Music, films and software’s are generally protected by the 
copyright law in Europe. Filesharing, as a way to circumvent copyright law is bended in all Europe. 
However, only very rarely have P2P network providers or internet users who illegally shared or 
downloaded, e.g., copyrighted music, been held liable. Copyright law exists, yet it seems quite difficult to 
enforce it on the Internet. As a result, illegal filesharing activities proliferate, proving the present regulative 
framework unsuccessful.  
765 In practice, as it was shown in the comparative analysis (Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7) and in the related 
conclusions (Chapter 8) that the effectiveness of a liability system depends not only on the existence of a 
rule but also on the actual possibility that the aggrieved party has to activate it (e.g., to prove the necessary 
elements to make the third party liable) and on favourable policy arguments. 
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will be used: a three-place predicate (A trusts B with valued thing C). ‘Valued thing C’ 
here means ‘things the trusting person values’.766 Consequently, Baier’s definition of trust 
can be rewritten as follows:  
 
“A trusts B with things A values. Applying the new definition to the relation 
between e-consumers and TMOs it becomes: e-consumers trust TMOs with 
things e-consumers value.” 
 
What are the things e-consumers value? Nowadays, security, privacy, and more 
generally, fair business practice are the things that e-consumers value.767 Having defined 
what e-consumers value is, Baier’s definition of trust can be changed accordingly as 
follows: 
 
“e-consumers trust TMOs with security, privacy, and business practice.” 
 
In fact, when e-consumers trust TMOs, by relying on security, privacy, or business 
practice trustmarks, they expect TMOs to have checked whether e-merchants have 
adequate security measures, an adequate privacy policy, and a fair business policy in place. 
Thus, e-consumers expect TMOs to take care of what they value. 
As the requirements for an adequate liability system need to be in correspondence 
with the notion of trust, an adequate liability system can be preliminarily defined: a system 
which protects what e-consumers value (e.g., security, privacy, and fair business practice). 
 
Noteboom’s trust stage 
 
For Bart Nooteboom, trust is a four-place predicate:  
 
• someone 
• trusts someone (or something) 
• in some respect 
                                                 
766 Baier, A. (1986) Trust and Antitrust, Ethics, p. 237. 
767 See Chapter 2, Section 2. 
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• depending on conditions such as context of action.768 
 
Nooteboom adds to Baier’s definition the ‘context of action’ element and explicitly 
mentions that trust can be placed not only in persons but also in organisations. In fact, the 
first two elements of Nooteboom’s definition, ‘someone trusts someone’, are the same as 
the first two elements of Baier’s definition, ‘A trusts B’. Nooteboom only specifies further 
that trust can be in organisations (e.g., TMOs): “Of course an organisation itself does not 
have an intention, but it has interests and can try to regulate the intentions of its workers to 
serve those interests.”769 The third element of Nooteboom’s definition, ‘in some respect’, 
overlaps with Baier’s element ‘with valued thing C’. So the new element is the fourth one 
‘the context of action’. 
 
Bai-boom trust stage 
 
Before further analysing the ‘context of action’, Baier’s and Nooteboom’s definitions 
of trust will be merged creating the ‘Bai-boom definition’ and applied to the relations 
between e-consumers and TMOs as follows:  
 
“e-consumers trust TMOs with things e-consumers value (e.g., security, privacy, 
and fair business practice) depending on conditions such as TMOs’ context of 
action.” 
 
Coming back to the ‘context of action’, it may play a role in adjusting e-consumers’ 
expectations towards TMOs. More generally, you trust somebody or an organisation to do 
things to the degree to which he/she/it can influence the situation and has the power to 
change certain situations for the better. 
 
The next question to be answered is: “What is the TMOs’ context of action?” 
The Internet is the TMOs’ context of action, which brings into play specific features, 
e.g., de-materialisation, internationalisation or de-territorialisation, and technological 
                                                 
768 Noteboom, B. (2002) Trust (Cheltnham, UK; Northampton, MA, US: Edward Elgar), p. 36. 
769 Id. p. 38. 
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turbulence, that are to be taken into consideration.770 De-materialisation means that the 
information is no longer supplied and stored in written form, but electronically (as a series 
of ones and zeros) instead.771 Internationalisation or de-territorialisation is the change 
brought about by the Internet as a means of communication not restricted by geographic 
borders. Furthermore, apart from the observation that to talk about national boundaries no 
longer makes sense, it would seem to be very difficult, due to the mobility of the traffic on 
the Internet and the possibility for the senders to hide their identity, to determine where 
exactly a particular person or organisation is located or whether an activity is being carried 
out.772 Technological turbulence refers to the constant and rapid development of 
technology.773 De-materialisation, internationalisation, and technological turbulence are 
three very much interrelated features of the Internet that greatly challenge the positive 
outcome of the service undertaken by TMOs, i.e., to check whether e-merchants have 
adequate security measures and an adequate privacy policy in place and that they do 
business in a fair way – in other words, to take care of what e-consumers value most. More 
precisely, the de-materialisation of information, such as e-consumers personal data makes it 
very difficult to check how e-merchants actually process those data. For example,  
e-consumer data can be transferred to any place in the world in a matter of one click 
without leaving any trace of it (see also the internationalisation factor playing a role here).  
De-materialisation of persons, as the fact that persons such as e-merchants can have 
multiple virtual identities, makes quite difficult the proper identification of e-merchants – 
especially small and not really known ones – by TMOs. Should e-merchants not comply 
with TMO standards, it may become quite difficult to find e-merchants who provided fake 
contacts to carry out enforcement procedures as they could be located anywhere (see again 
the internationalisation factor also playing a role). The constant and rapid development of 
technologies also comes with always new and more sophisticated techniques to breach  
the security of e-merchant websites. This increases the need for TMOs to frequently change 
security standards in order to keep them always up-to-date and thus to also check 
frequently on whether e-merchants comply with them. 
                                                 
770 The three features of the Internet have been already defined in Chapter 2, Section 3. However, the 
explanation of the concepts will be re-proposed here to favour an immediate understanding of them by the 
reader. 
771 See Chapter 2, Subsection 3.1. 
772 See Chapter 2, Subsection 3.2. 
773 See Chapter 2, Subsection 3.3. 
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With the ‘context of action’ identified and the related impact on TMO practice 
clarified, the definition of the trust relation between e-consumers and TMOs can be 
rewritten as follows: e-consumers trust TMOs with things e-consumers value (e.g., 
security, privacy, and fair business practice) depending on circumstances such as TMOs’ 
context of action (i.e., the Internet). 
As a result, an adequate regulative framework can now be defined such as:  
 
“a regulative framework which protects what e-consumers value (e.g., security, 
privacy, and fair business practice) considering the TMOs’ context of action (i.e., 
the Internet).” 
 
Along the same line, ‘Warranted Trust’ can be rewritten as follows:  
 
“Trust is warranted when a liability system which protects what e-consumers value 
(e.g., security, privacy, and fair business practice) considering the TMOs’ context of action 
(i.e., the Internet) is in place.” 
 
 3.3 Social, economic, and political value of trustmarks 
 
In order to build an adequate liability system, the social, economic, and political 
impact of the rules has to be considered. 
As already mentioned,774 trustmarks are a very valuable means to improve e-society 
and e-economy, and to simplify e-policy. In fact, not only e-consumers, but also  
e-merchants and governments can benefit a great deal from trustmarks. 
E-consumers are not able to scrutinise the policies of organisations, companies, and 
other participants of the virtual world without borders.775 Ideally, through trustmarks,  
e-consumers can receive a sort of guarantee from an independent third party on the quality 
of, for example, an e-merchant’s business practice, its privacy statement, or the security 
level of its website. Moreover, trustmarks are very easy to recognise and can improve the 
perception of e-consumers with regard to potential online business partners, provide 
                                                 
774 See Chapter 2, Subsection 5.1. 
775 See Chapter 2, Section 3. 
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‘always-available’, independent, and trustworthy information on e-merchants, and thus 
enhance e-consumer confidence in online transactions. 
If the benefits of trustmarks for e-consumers can be summarised by the concept of a 
better buying experience, the consequential benefit for e-merchants will be a better selling 
experience. Given the heavy pressure to which merchants are exposed in the online world, 
which has been aptly described by Assafa Endeshaw in his paper The Legal Significance of 
Trustmarks as follows: “[w]hile it has taken many international companies a succession of 
decades to establish trust and confidence in the line of business or type of wares and 
services they have offered to their customers, the current wave of business start ups on the 
Internet feel hard pressed to succeed fast in the ‘Wild Web’ lest they perishes with the 
same speed that they sprouted”776, trustmarks can help e-merchants to succeed fast. 
Through the exhibition of the trustmark on their websites, e-merchants can make some 
information easily available to e-consumers, increase the chance to win their trust, and 
eventually do some business with them. Moreover, trustmarks offer e-merchants the chance 
to self-regulate sectors of their activities, set out their own standards, and thus prevent 
governments from interfering. 
Last but not least, enhancing consumer trust in e-commerce tops the European Union 
agenda.777 The reason is very simple: nowadays, trust is money,778 and with a minority of 
European citizens engaged in e-commerce activities,779 there is still a long way to go 
towards reaping the full benefits of e-commerce. Trust is the first reason why consumers do 
not buy online, given the presence of Internet access and interest in purchasing anything 
online.780 Trustmarks are a means of self-regulation which aims to enhance e-consumers’ 
trust in online communications. Therefore, trustmarks can give governments the chance to 
stay out of some sectors of Internet regulation, thus relieving them of an additional 
financial burden. Concurrently, trustmarks can help boost e-commerce and bring 
governments the related revenues. 
                                                 
776 Endeshaw, A. (2001), p. 204. 
777 See, e.g., the recent study for the European Commission Increasing Trust and Confidence of Consumers in 
the Information Society (forthcoming); Eurobarometer (2004); i2010 Five-year strategy to boost digital 
economy <http://europa.eu.int/information_society/eeurope/i2010/index_en.htm>; the set-up of a dedicated 
European Agency on information security (ENISA) also highlights the political significance of information 
security and the need to strive for greater cooperation across EU Member States as well as internationally, 
see <http://www.enisa.eu.int/>; see also the very recent document produced by the ENISA Information 
Security Awareness Initiatives: Current Practice and Measurement of Success (July 2007). 
778 See, e.g., Valente, K. (2001). 
779 Eurobarometer (2004), p. 3. 
780 Eurobarometer (2004), pp. 9-11. 
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3.4 A model for an adequate TMO liability system 
 
An adequate liability system for TMOs should be based on the liability rules that 
apply to surveyors, accountants, and auditors which then will have to be tailored to TMOs 
in order to:  
 
1. effectively protect what e-consumers’ value and the related expectations that  
e-consumers put into their trust relationship with TMOs; 
2. take into account the difficulties that TMOs face by operating in a context of 
action such as the Internet;781 and 
3. bring TMO practice up to the quality level which will give trustmarks the 
opportunity to extend their potential benefits to social, economic, and political 
levels.782 
 




Legal basis  Surveyors’, auditors’ and accountants’ liability 
Adequacy  What e-consumers value 
TMOs’ context of action 
Social, economic, and political value of trustmarks 
 
Table 7   Model for an adequate TMO liability system 
 
4. Compiling the model: a concrete proposal for an 
adequate TMO third-party liability system 
 
The liability model will be compiled in three steps: first, third-party liability will be 
imposed on TMOs in order to protect what e-consumers value; second, TMO third-party 
                                                 
781 See Subsection 5.2 Bai-boom trust stage. 
 225
liability will be mitigated keeping into consideration the difficulties faced by TMOs related 
to the context of action in which they operate; and third, the possible impact of such TMO 
third-party liability system will be assessed against the social, economic, and political value 
of trustmarks. 
Before starting, it is helpful to recall the typical TMO third-party liability case. 
An e-consumer relying on a security, privacy, or business practice trustmark on an 
e-merchant website decides to interact with such e-merchant. The e-consumer purchases, 
for example, goods from the e-merchant website or subscribes for an e-merchant online 
service. In order to complete the transaction, the e-consumer provides the personal data the  
e-merchant asked for (e.g., name, surname, data of birth, phone number, address, e-mail 
address, his interests, his purchase preferences) together with the relevant payment details 
(e.g., credit card number, bank details).  
In fact: 
a) the e-consumer never receives the good or the service he paid for;  
b) without the e-consumer’s prior consent, his personal data are processed by the  
e-merchant for purposes other than the fulfilment of the relevant contractual obligations 
(e.g., used for profiling- and marketing-related purposes, shared or sold to third parties) and 
eventually, the e-consumer starts to receive unsolicited marketing e-mails and phone calls 
from the e-merchant and/or by third parties;  
c) the e-consumer’s payment details are used directly by the e-merchant to defraud 
the e-consumers; they are shared or sold by the e-merchant to third parties who ultimately 
frauds the e-consumer; or stolen during the transaction or from the e-merchant’s client 
database by a cunning third party who takes advantage of the poor security of e-merchant’s 
IT infrastructure. 
 In any or a combination or all of the above cases, the e-consumer will suffer 
damage. The damage can range from the violation of the e-consumer’s privacy and data 
protection right783 to pure economic loss. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
782 See Chapter 2, Section 5. 
783 Generally recognised in all Europe through the implementation of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p.31. 
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4.1 Step 1: What e-consumers value 
 
It was already pointed out that, in order to substantiate a claim for damage directly 
against TMOs, e-consumers generally will have to prove that: (a) the damage occurred to 
them; (b) TMO fault in the issuance of the trustmark; and (c) the causal link between TMO 
fault and the damage occurred. In almost all the legal systems analysed, in order to meet 
the causation requirement, the e-consumer would have to prove his reasonable reliance on 
the trustmark and that it was foreseeable for the TMO that its carelessness might cause 
damage to the e-consumer.784 To provide all these pieces of evidences is already very 
difficult because of e-consumers’ lack of information or TMO practice and, more precisely, 
fair security, privacy, and business standards.785 However, even if e-consumers manage to 
prove all this, they could still see their claim rejected by means of adverse policy 
arguments leading to a de facto absence of liability.786 The effort is thus here directed to 
create a system which, in the first place, effectively protects what e-consumers value and 
the related expectation they put into their trust relationship with TMOs. 
As already shown, e-consumers value high e-merchant website security, and fair 
privacy and business practice. In fact, they trust TMOs. Moreover, e-consumers trust 
TMOs by relying on security, privacy or business practice trustmarks; they expect TMOs to 
have checked whether e-merchants have in place adequate security measures and privacy 
policies, and conduct fair business activities. This way, e-consumers expect TMOs to take 
care of what they value. From a strictly legal point of view, in order to protect what  
e-consumers value, the TMOs that represent themselves as reliable sources of information 
on e-merchant security, privacy, and business practice to e-consumers, should accordingly 
be held liable if the information they provided through trustmarks is not accurate.  
E-consumers shall first prove the damage that occurred to them. Second, they shall 
prove their reliance on the relevant trustmarks, whereas the reasonableness of their reliance 
and the foreseeability from the TMOs’ side that their carelessness may cause damage to  
e-consumers will be assumed. The reason for this assumption rests in the inner scope of 
TMO activities. The very task of TMOs is to enhance the level of trust in electronic 
communications and transactions by issuing trustmarks, which are made to be relied upon. 
                                                 
784 See Chapter 8, Section 2. 
785 See Chapter 2, Section 4. 
786 See Section 3. 
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This is the main function of TMOs, the reason why they were created.787 Moreover, the 
reason why e-consumers rely on trustmarks is that they are issued by TMOs, which are also 
defined as TTPs – parties that can be trusted and relied upon.788 There seems to be enough 
reasons to assume that e-consumers’ reliance on trustmarks is always reasonable. 
Moreover, if reliance is always reasonable, it goes without saying that TMOs should 
foresee that an inaccurate trustmark may cause damage to  
e-consumers by TMOs. However, in order to guarantee an effective protection of what  
e-consumers value, given a loss suffered by e-consumers because of their reliance on 
inaccurate trustmarks, the traditional principle of actori incumbit probatio, according to 
which it is the plaintiff who shall prove the defendant’s negligence, should be reversed. In 
fact, because of the general lack of competence that e-consumers have on both TMO 
practice and, more precisely, fair security, privacy, and business standards789 it will be very 
difficult – if not impossible – for them to prove TMO negligence. Therefore, in order to 
avoid the problem for e-consumers of proving the failure of the TMOs to take reasonable 
care in providing their services, there should be created a presumption of TMO negligence. 
Nevertheless, e-consumers will still have to prove that the presence of the trustmark on the 
e-merchant’s website determined their decision to transact with the latter. 
 
4.2 Step 2: TMO context of action 
 
However, considering the difficulties faced by TMOs by providing their services on 
the Internet due to the de-materialisation of information and identities, internationalisation, 
and technological turbulence,790 such presumption of liability should not be an absolute 
one, which would lead to a regime of strict liability for TMOs. Instead, it should be 
possible for TMOs to rebut the presumption of liability by proving that they actually act 
with reasonable care. In other words, it is only the burden of proof concerning the fact that 
TMOs provided their services with reasonable care that should be shifted onto the TMOs 
that have the necessary know-how to investigate the matter.  
                                                 
787 See Chapter 2, Section 5. 
788 See Chapter 1, Section 1. 
789 See Chapter 2, Section 4. 
790 See Subsection 5.2 Bai-boom trust stage. 
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Normally, to act with reasonable care means to perform the service with a diligence 
and competence appropriate to the profession. However, as the TMO profession is still at 
the early stages in Europe, standards of reasonable care have not been established. While it 
is possible to find the definition of ‘reasonable care’ in the code of conduct of other more 
established professions (e.g., surveyors, accountants, and auditors), a code of conduct of 
TMOs does not exist. TMO standards of care should be set by the European legislator – 
given the ‘internationalisation’ of online services it should be even better to have an 
international regulatory body setting worldwide standards for TMOs. Being official 
standards, whether developed by a European or international recognised body, they will be 
‘open’ and ‘public’, which means that participation in their development is open to all the 
stakeholders and the results of the standardisation are publicly available.791 These standards 
could actually be based on the key elements of a trustworthy certification practice which 
have been pointed out at the beginning of this study,792 which are: (1) certifier 
independency; (2) impartiality in the auditing procedure; (3) active monitoring of the 
certified company; (4) certifier enforcement power; and 5) certifier accountability. 
However, until the recommended issuance of official TMO standards, standards could also 
be established by analogy with professionals comparable to TMOs, i.e., surveyors, auditors, 
and accountants, and by checking whether the TMOs fulfilled the duties and obligations 
related to the service they provided. These duties and obligation are set forth in the 
contractual clauses or notices which are displayed somewhere on the TMO’s website,793 so 
in a sense, the contract does define the tort’.794 
Moreover, considering again the difficulties faced by TMOs by providing their 
services on the Internet, TMOs shall be given the possibility of limiting the scope of the 
trustmark795 (e.g., trustmarks which do not guarantee e-merchants’ security as a whole, but 
only that e-merchants have in place some specific security measure regarding payments, or 
                                                 
791 For a definition of official standards (as opposed to de facto standards) see Chapter 3, Subsection 2.1 
Official and de facto standards. 
792 See Chapter 3, Section 3. 
793 E.g., in ‘Terms and Conditions’, in the ‘Certification Practice Statement’, the Seal Licence Agreement, or 
in the ‘Relying Party Agreement’. 
794 Reed, C. (2000) Internet Law: Text and Materials (London/Edinburgh/Dublin: Butterworths), p. 140. 
795 Such limitation has been already granted to CSPs (that are professionals which for the services they 
provide are comparable by analogy to TMOs – as already showed in Chapter 1, Subsection 3.1) in Article 6 
(3) of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community 
Framework for Electronic Signatures (99/93/EC) (OJ L 13, 19 January 2000, p.12). 
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trustmarks which guarantee that e-merchants comply with the relevant rules as far as the 
transferring of personal data towards third countries is concerned) and their validity period. 
In summary, by operating this presumption of TMO liability, the e-consumers shall in 
fact only prove that damage occurred because they relied on an inaccurate trustmark. The 
TMOs will then be liable for the accuracy of the information on the trustmark for the whole 
validity of it unless they prove either that the trustmarks have been used (i.e., relied upon) 
for purposes that exceed the limits or that they acted with reasonable care in issuing the 
trustmark and checking e-merchant compliance. 
 
4.3 Step 3: Social, economic, and political value of trustmarks 
 
Official standards for TMO practice, coupled with a liability system which 
effectively takes into account both e-consumer and TMO interests, will most likely 
improve the quality of TMO services. On the one hand, official standards will set the basic 
principles for a trustworthy quality certification practice. On the other hand, such liability 
system will encourage TMOs’ good practice by making them liable if e-consumers relying 
on inaccurate trustmarks suffer loss and TMOs have not complied, though without 
overburdening them. 
E-consumers, e-merchants, governments and also TMOs will all benefit from a 
rehabilitation of the trustmark system. E-consumers will have a reliable source of 
information in order to fill the information gap (also defined as information asymmetry) – 
already documented in Chapter 2, Section 4 – they have with respect to e-merchant 
security, privacy, and business practice, and thus overcome this specific barrier to the 
easier adoption of e-commerce. E-merchants will benefit from renewed confidence among 
e-consumers in online transactions and, more precisely, through the exhibition of 
trustmarks on their website, e-merchants can make some information easily available to e-
consumers, increase the chance of winning their trust, and eventually doing some business 
with them. On the side of governments, trustmarks are a means of self-regulation,796 which 
aims to enhance e-consumer trust in online communications and transactions. Hence, 
trustmarks can give governments the chance to stay out of the related sectors of Internet 
regulation, relieving them of an additional financial burden. Concurrently, trustmarks can 
                                                 
796 See Chapter 2, Section 5. 
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help boost e-commerce and bring governments the related revenues. Last but not least, 
given the benefits for e-consumers, e-merchants, and governments, the demand for 
trustmarks will increase and TMOs will have the chance to expand their business and reap 
the relative benefits. Hence, such liability system may also work as an incentive which can 
indirectly stimulate TMO good intentions (i.e., a fair certification practice), enhance TMO 
competence (i.e., quality standards), and compliance with the certification standards good 
intention, competence, and compliance with the standards.797 
Considering the abovementioned social, economic, and political positive impact of 
rehabilitating TMO practice, the policy arguments which, as already previously pointed 
out, weigh so much in deciding the outcome of a third-party liability claim798 should vary 
accordingly. This means that once the necessary elements for  
e-consumers to have a cause of action against TMOs are met (i.e., e-consumer damage, 
factual reliance on trustmarks, and the causation link between the inaccurate trustmarks and 
the damage e-consumers suffered), the courts should not bar it. Practically speaking, the 
most recurrent policy arguments concerning unlimited liability (i.e., arguments to limit 
third-party professional liability for pure economic loss towards an unlimited number of 
people for an indeterminate amount) may be counterweighted by: (a) maintaining that the 
damages in a typical third-party liability case may never consist of a large amount; and (b) 
possibly imposing a compulsory TMO third-party liability insurance. It has been pointed 
out that such duty was already imposed on CSPs under French law.799 This way, the 
relative costs could be passed on to the e-merchants by slightly increasing the price of 
TMO services. This should not result in an insuperable disincentive because the current 
fees for trustmarks are quite low.800 
 
5. A possible TMO third-party liability provision 
 
Based on the considerations made above and on the experience of CSP liability as set 
forth in the Electronic Signatures Directive and its implementation in the analysed 
                                                 
797 See Subsection 5.2. 
798 See Section 3. 
799 See Chapter 7, Section 6. 
800 As a matter of completeness, it is worth stressing that introducing compulsory TMO third-party liability 
insurance may however result in a disincentive for TMOs to perform their services more carefully. In fact, 
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European legal systems, the proposed model of adequate third-party liability can actually 
be summarised into the following liability provision: 
 
“By issuing a trustmark, a Trustmark Organisation is liable for damage caused to 
any person who relies on such trustmark as to the accuracy of the information represented 
in the trustmark for the time of its validity, unless the Trustmark Organisation proves that it 
has not acted negligently. 
A Trustmark Organisation may indicate limitations on the scope of a trustmark 
provided that they are clearly recognisable by third parties. Accordingly, the Trustmark 
Organisation shall not be liable for damage arising from the reliance on the trustmark for 
purposes that exceed the limitations related to it.” 
 
6. Possible impacts of the proposed TMO liability 
provision 
 
 It is now interesting to see how the proposed TMO liability provision would work 
in practice. In the typical TMO third-party liability case, the aggrieved e-consumer will 
have to prove that he relied on the security, privacy, or business practice trustmark on the 
website of the e-merchant in order to transact with the latter. Furthermore, the e-consumer 
will have to prove that he suffered damage which is related to that transaction. At this 
point, according to the proposed provision, the TMO will be presumed liable for that 
damage. In order to rebut such presumption, the TMO will have to prove alternatively that:  
(a) it checked and monitored the e-merchant’s security, privacy, or business practice with 
due care and issued the relevant trustmark accordingly; (b) by the time the e-consumer 
relied on the trustmark, it was not valid because it had already expired; or (c) the damage 
suffered by the e-consumer was not caused by the e-merchant’s failure to comply with 
what is stated in the trustmark (e.g., the trustmark certified e-merchant’s security and the 
damage was caused not because the e-consumer’s payment details were stolen during the 
transaction by a cunning third party who took advantage of the poor security of the e-
merchant’s IT infrastructure, but because the e-merchant directly used the  
e-consumer’s payment details in order to defraud him). 
                                                                                                                                                    
the insurance lowers the TMO liability risk. Moreover, it will also have to be checked whether insurance 
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 As already pointed out, the TMO has all the necessary technical knowledge to 
provide evidence that it did not act negligently in the issuance and monitoring of the 
trustmark and that the damage was not caused by e-merchant failure to comply with what 
was stated in the relevant trustmark. Therefore, the TMO would have all the necessary 
means to rebut the presumption of negligence and prove that it is not liable for the damage 
suffered by the e-consumer.  
It could be argued that such liability system will exponentially increase e-consumers’ 
actions for damage against TMOs. In fact, for any damage e-consumers suffer from a 
transaction with an e-merchant that has a trustmark, it will be quite easy for e-consumers to 
trigger the presumption of TMO negligence. In such case, no matter if the TMO may easily 
prove to have acted with due care, the (legal) costs that the TMO will have to bear in order 
to face the possible significant number of e-consumers’ claims will dramatically increase to 
the detriment of its business. Although this is theoretically possible, it seems not very 
foreseeable in practice. Generally, one e-consumer cannot suffer a big loss from transacting 
with e-merchants. Therefore, if the e-consumer is not quite sure that he has some chances 
of holding the TMO liable, he will not start a legal action against the latter because of the 
related costs. It is more realistic to imagine a situation in which more e-consumers would 
have suffered damage from transacting with the same e-merchant and a class action is 
proposed. As class actions have only recently entered into European legal systems, it is 
very difficult to predict their possible impact on TMOs. On the one hand, the damages that 
could be claimed may reach amounts which can seriously jeopardise TMOs’ business. On 
the other hand, in countries where class actions are already a consolidated practice, it does 
not happen everyday to see one of them. Thus, the already-mentioned argument, that a 
class action will not be proposed if there are quite some chances of holding the TMO liable, 
may be valid. Therefore, a provisional conclusion on this delicate issue could be that the 
threat of class actions may work as an incentive to develop TMOs’ best practice. The 
proposed liability system may thus work as a deterrent to discourage TMOs from providing 
their services carelessly without in fact exposing them to an excessive liability risk.  
Moreover, it could be argued that the proposed liability provision will fit without too 
much trouble into the analysed European legal systems. The presumption of TMO 
negligence together with the limitation of TMO liability to the scope for which the 
                                                                                                                                                    
companies are actually ready to offer unlimited insurance coverage to TMOs and the related costs. 
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trustmark was issued are in fact borrowed by the CSP liability system which has been 
implemented in England, Germany, and France.801 Furthermore, the fact that e-consumers’ 
reliance on trustmarks is deemed always reasonable could, at first sight, create some 
compatibility problem with the English system. The recipient of information who wants to 
claim damage suffered from negligent misstatements has to prove his reasonable reliance 
on the inaccurate statement to fulfil the proximity test.802 However, it has already been 
argued that the reliance of the recipient of information is usually considered reasonable 
when the other proximity requirements are fulfilled.803 Accordingly, e-consumers reliance 
will then be reasonable as in the typical TMO third-party liability case where the proximity 
factors are all satisfied.804 
 
7. Conclusive remarks and recommendations 
 
“Are TMOs liable towards e-consumers who detrimentally rely on inaccurate 
trustmarks and suffer loss?” 
 
In theory, there is enough legal ground to enforce TMOs’ third party liability; in 
practice, however, the chances that TMOs will not be liable towards aggrieved third-party  
e-consumers who relied on the misleading or false information provided in the trustmark 
are way greater than chances that TMOs will be held liable. Thus, at present, it is possible 
to conclude for a de facto absence of TMOs liability towards e-consumers in Europe.805 
 
“Is the present TMO third-party liability system in Europe adequate?”  
 
The present TMO third-party liability system is manifestly inadequate because, to use 
an euphemism, it does not work as a deterrent to discourage TMO untrustworthy practice. 
In fact, the total lack of specific rules on TMO liability, coupled with the practical 
impossibility for e-consumers to hold TMO liable in tort or in contract, as shown in the 
                                                 
801 See Chapter 5, Section 7; Chapter 6, Section 6; Chapter 7, Section 6. 
802 See Chapter 8, Section 2. See also, e.g., Witting, C. (2004), pp. 321-322. 
803 See Chapter 8, Section 2. See also, e.g., Witting, C. (2004), p. 197. 
804 See Chapter 5, Subsection 6.1. 
805 See Section 3. 
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present study, creates a sort legal ‘immunity’ for TMOs which has surely not helped 
fostering best practice.806 
 
“What will an adequate TMO third-party liability system be?” 
 
An adequate TMO third-party liability sytem would be a system which: (a) 
effectively protects what e-consumers value and the related expectations that e-consumers 
put into their trust relationship with TMOs; (b) takes into account the difficulties that 
TMOs face by operating in a context of action such as the Internet;807 (c) brings TMO 
practice up to the quality level which will give trustmarks the opportunity to extend their 
potential benefits to social, economic, and political levels;808 and that can be summarised 
from a strictly-legal perspective in the following liability provision: “By issuing a 
trustmark, a Trustmark Organisation is liable for damage caused to any person who relies 
on such trustmark as to the accuracy of the information represented in the trustmark for the 
time of its validity; unless the Trustmark Organisation proves that it had not acted 
negligently. A Trustmark Organisation may indicate limitations on the scope of a trustmark 
provided that they are clearly recognisable by third parties. Accordingly, the Trustmark 
Organisation shall not be liable for damage arising from the reliance on the trustmark for 
purposes that exceed the limitations related to it.”809 
Recently, both in Europe and in other countries, there has been quite a lot of talk 
around the potential impact of trustmarks on e-commerce as means to foster e-merchant 
best practice and contextually enhance e-consumer trust.810 The present study aims to 
contribute to the discussion by adding a piece of the puzzle that until now is missing: an 
analysis of TMO liability. In fact, no study has systematically addressed in depth such issue 
                                                 
806 See Section 4. 
807 See Subsection 3.1.2.3. 
808 See Chapter 2, Section 5. 
809 See Sections 5, 6, and 7. 
810 See, e.g., Expert Workshop held at the European Commission on 8 March 2007 on Measure to Increase 





; De Bruin, R. et Al. (2005) Final Report. See also See Ko, Y. (2007) APEC Cross-Border Privacy Rules 
and Trustmarks: A Step Toward Integrated Electronic Commerce in the Asia-Pacific, World Data 
Protection Report 7 (3), pp. 20-22; Trustmark Conference, May 15 and 16, 2007, Mexico City, Mexico; 
APEC ECSG Data Privacy seminar June 22 and 23, 2007, Cairns, Australia. 
 235
so far. On the basis of the present contribution, the discussion on TMO liability can be 
promoted with all the stakeholders in Europe as well as on a global level. In fact, the goal 
should be to create a global system of TMO liability which can apply to TMOs offering 
their services all around the world. The European Commission and organisations such as 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)811 and the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)812 may actually play a 
crucial role in taking relevant steps to promote and coordinate the creation of European 
TMO third-party liability standards and stimulating a global harmonisation on the matter, 
coordinating their efforts with relevant trustmark initiatives all around the world.813 
TMO third-party liability calls for a global, active approach so that liability can fulfil 
a useful role in enforcement of self-regulatory schemes without ‘overdoing it’. Neither 





                                                 
811 <www.uncitral.org/>. 
812 <www.oecd.org>.  
813 E.g., Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Trustmarks initiatives. See Ko, Y. (2007), pp. 20-22; 
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